

2009

g

LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA
SAN DIEGO

R 21/1s Robert

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

THE ELEMENTS OF CHRISTIAN
DOCTRINE

THE ELEMENTS
OF
CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE

BY

T. A. LACEY, M.A.

VICAR OF MADINGLEY

εἰς γὰρ ἐστὶν ὑμῶν ὁ διδάσκαλος

RIVINGTONS
34, *KING STREET, COVENT GARDEN*
LONDON
1901

SALVA NOS DOMINE SALVTARIS NOSTER
HOC SAECVLO INEVNTE TV QVI PER
ANNOS PERPETVOS VIVIS ET REGNAS


P R E F A C E

THIS book is not a theological manual ; it treats of those fundamental truths which underlie theology, as the facts of nature underlie the natural sciences. Neither again is it a manual of dogma ; it is rather an attempt to set out the matter of which dogma, or the settled judgment of Christian thought, is the formal expression. At the same time neither dogma nor theology is ignored. To treat of Christian Doctrine without regard to theology or dogma would seem to the writer as foolish as to treat of agriculture with a studied ignorance of chemistry and of human experience. By Christian Doctrine he understands nothing

else but the teaching of Jesus Christ, received and retained in the Christian society, guarded by the dogmatic definitions of the Church, analysed and systematized by the labours of theologians. The elements of this doctrine are here set forth, so far as he can compass it, in their natural connection.

If the introduction seem disproportionately long, he would plead the importance of the preliminary considerations to which it is devoted. If some questions that are now eagerly debated have small place assigned them, it is because he is not writing controversially. If the practice of Religion seem to be treated too broadly and generally, it is because an approach to detail would be the beginning of a larger volume than is here. Some minds are repelled by the apparent hardness of dogma ; some are wearied with the intricacies of theology. What is here attempted is the simple presentment of the living truth of the gospel, in the form which Christian experience and Christian

science have shown to be required. It is meant for persons of ordinary education ; as far as possible everything that calls for even a small measure of technical knowledge has been either passed by or set apart in notes. There are many ways of presenting Christian Doctrine. In presenting it to a child one tries to formulate answers to the questions that naturally pose themselves in a childish mind. The simplest presentment to an educated man is one that shall be constructed for him in a corresponding fashion. This the writer has attempted. If he has not succeeded, he has at all events done his best.



CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

	PAGE
PART I.— <i>The Nature of Christian Doctrine</i>	I
The Relation of Master and Disciple	1
The Faith of the Disciple	2
The Faith of Christendom	6
The Authority of the Master	7
The Christian Tradition	11
Natural Religion	14
Revelation	14
Its Completeness	15
Its Exclusiveness	17
Its Interpretation	18
The Record	20
The Rule of Faith	22
Holy Scripture	23
PART II.— <i>The Content of Christian Doctrine</i>	28
Supernatural Truths	28
The Language of Revelation	30
Heads of Doctrine	31
God and Creation	31
Redemption	32
The Church	33
The Ministry	34
The Marks of the Church	40
Practical Religion	42

	PAGE
PART III.— <i>The Proposition of Faith</i>	44
The Duty of believing	45
The Sin of Unbelief	49
The Sufficiency of Proposition	50
Grounds of Sufficiency	51
Credentials of the Apostles	53
Present Sufficiency	55
Limits of the Proposition	60
Mode of Proposition—Ordinary	62
Solemn	63
The Place of Theology	65

CHAPTER I

OF GOD AND CREATION

SECT. I.— <i>The Being of God</i>	70
Natural Knowledge of God	70
His Unity	71
Eternity	72
Infinity	73
The Nature of Spirit	74
Errors—Dualism	74
Monism	75
Polytheism	75
SECT. II.— <i>The Holy Trinity</i>	76
The Divine Persons	76
The Word <i>Person</i>	77
The Personal Distinctions	80
Procession and Generation	81
The Double Procession	83
Tritheism and Unitarianism	84

	PAGE
SECT. III.— <i>The Attributes of God</i>	85
Relative Attributes	86
Absolute Attributes	86
Of Pure Being	87
Of Knowledge and Will	89
Polytheism and Anthropomorphism	91
SECT. IV.— <i>The Creation of the World</i>	92
The Beginning	92
The Finite	93
Pantheism	94
The Creative Word	95
Providence	97
Deism and Evolution	97
The Record of Creation	98
The Divine Attributes in Creation	99
SECT. V.— <i>The Spiritual Creation</i>	100
Body and Soul	101
Separate Spirit	102
Angels and Demons	103
Knowledge and Will	104
Freedom of the Creature	105
The Possibility of Sin	106
The Divine Attributes in Relation to Created Spirit	108
SECT. VI.— <i>The End of Man</i>	109
The Faculties of Knowledge and Will	109
Blessedness	111

CHAPTER II

CONCERNING HUMAN LIFE

SECT. I.— <i>The Original State of Man</i>	113
Capacity of Perfection	113
Supernatural Endowments	115

	PAGE
Innocence	117
Supernatural Righteousness	117
SECT. II.— <i>The Fallen State of Man</i>	118
Disobedience	118
Death	120
Corruption of Nature	121
Original Sin	123
SECT. III.— <i>Actions and Habits</i>	125
Determining Forces	125
Mixture of Good and Evil	127
Power to keep the Commandments	127
Corruption of Human Society—	
Injustice	129
Toleration of Evil	130
The Balance of Good and Evil	131
Actual Sin	132
SECT. IV.— <i>The Promise of Salvation</i>	133
The Need of Supernatural Help	133
The Hope of Israel	134
The Healing of the World	135
The Preparation of the Gospel—	
Prophecy	136
Sacrifice	138

CHAPTER III

CONCERNING REDEMPTION

SECT. I.— <i>The Incarnation</i>	142
The Likeness of God restored	143
The Purpose of the Incarnation	144

	PAGE
The Person of the Incarnate	145
The Two Natures	148
The Human Life of Christ	151
The Emptying	152
The Twofold Knowledge	153
The Twofold Will	155
 SECT. II.— <i>The Atonement</i>	 156
The Priesthood of Christ	158
His Sacrifice	159
The Lord's Supper	161
The Continual Sacrifice	162
Theological Terms	164
 SECT. III.— <i>The Doctrine of Grace</i>	 166
Universality of Redemption	166
Supernatural Grace	167
In the Humanity of Christ	168
In all the Redeemed	169
Continuing	170
Auxiliary Grace	170
<i>Charismata</i>	172
Effect of Grace—Justification	173
Sanctification	176
Theological Terms	176
 SECT. IV.— <i>Eternal Life</i>	 178
Regeneration	178
Death unto Sin	179
The Second Death	179
Growth in Grace	181
The Potential and the Actual	182
Communication of the Divine Life	183
The Eternity of the Gift	184
The Resurrection of the Body	185
The State of the Separated Soul	187

CHAPTER IV

CONCERNING THE CHURCH

	PAGE
SECT. I.— <i>The Christian Society</i>	191
The Redemption of the World	191
The <i>Ecclesia</i> —of the Old Testament	192
of the New Testament	193
Election and Calling	196
The Kingdom of God	198
The Body of Christ	200
The Members of the Church	200
Those cut off	201
The Faithful departed	202
SECT. II.— <i>The Characteristics of the Church</i>	204
Unity—Numerical	204
Moral	204
Jew and Gentile	205
Practical	207
Of Local Churches	210
Holiness—Essential	211
Priesthood	213
Practical	214
Catholicity	215
Of Particular Churches	216
Apostolicity	217
SECT. III.— <i>The Organization of the Church</i>	218
Societies Natural and Artificial	218
Officers of the Church—Apostles	220
The Threefold Ministry	222
In Later Times	224
Divine Appointment of the Hierarchy	225
Unity of the Hierarchy	226
Power of Ordination	227
Priesthood	229

	PAGE
SECT. IV.— <i>The Ministry of the Word</i>	232
The Teaching Commission	233
Authority	234
The making of Disciples	235
Binding and Loosing	236
The Word	238
Definition	239
The Canons of the Church	239
SECT. V.— <i>The Ministry of the Sacraments</i>	241
Mysteries—the Meaning of the Word	241
The Christian Mysteries	244
The Latin <i>Sacramentum</i>	245
The Number of the Sacraments	247
The Doctrine of the Sacraments	248
Matter and Form	248
The Minister	250
Intention	250
Effect	251
The Seven Sacraments—Baptism	252
Confirmation	253
Penance	254
The Lord's Supper	257
Ordination	258
Marriage	260
Unction	261
Sacramental Character	262
The Necessity of the Sacraments	263

CHAPTER V

CONCERNING PRACTICAL RELIGION

SECT. I.— <i>Conscience</i>	265
A Natural Faculty in Man	266
Judging Right and Wrong	267

	PAGE
The Standard of Judgment	269
The Christian Conscience	270
The Weak Conscience	271
Probability	273
Responsibility for Conscience	274
 SECT. II.— <i>Duty</i>	 275
The Nature of Obligation	275
Morality—Natural	276
Revealed	276
Judaic	278
Christian	279
Social and Individual Duty	280
Obedience to Authority	282
Ordinances	283
Apparent Conflict of Duties	285
Precepts and Counsels	285
Complications of Duty	287
 SECT. III.— <i>Perfection</i>	 289
The Meaning of Perfection—Ultimate	289
Present	290
<i>Patria</i> and <i>Via</i>	290
Perfection—of Condition	292
of Life	294
Charity the End of the Commandment	295
 APPENDIX	 299
 INDEX	 313

INTRODUCTION

PART I.—*The Nature of Christian Doctrine*

CHRISTIAN doctrine is that which is taught by the Lord Jesus Christ. Teaching implies the relation of Master and Disciple, and we must understand at the outset in what this relation consists. We are not to follow the analogy of those sciences in which the learner has to make his way chiefly by investigation, aided only by an instructor whose function is to direct his studies, to remove difficulties, and to solve doubts. We must think of the master rather as one whose work is to convey information not otherwise accessible, and to lay down principles not founded in the first instance on experience or observation. Christian doctrine is concerned with Divine truths, which a man by searching can find out very imperfectly, if at all. There are certain truths of Natural Religion, as it is called, which a man might conceivably discover by investigation, but such investigation is rarely undertaken. The truths of Natural Religion are commonly known by tradition, the original source of which cannot be historically traced; they are received in childhood, retained or lost according to the uncertain effect of the experience of life. Christian doctrine does not ignore these truths or pass them by, but neither does it, properly speaking,

build upon them; that is to say, it does not use them as principles from which all further knowledge of the kind is deduced. It assumes them as already known, and proceeds to convey the knowledge of other truths, not contained in them by necessary implication, not discovered or discoverable by any learner, but taught by the Lord Jesus Christ as Master.

The relation of master and disciple is partly objective and external, partly subjective and internal. As external, the relation consists in the fact that what is taught is delivered by the master and received by the disciple without question; as internal, it consists in a real assent of the disciple to the teaching of the master, an assurance that he knows the truth and is declaring it. To understand the relation fully, we must therefore consider the assent of the disciple, the authority of the master, and the matter of the teaching.

The assent of the disciple in regard to Christian doctrine is called *Faith*. The word is used in all relations of trust between man and man; it may express the confidence in which a learner receives the instruction of any teacher. Such confidence is instinctive in childhood; in manhood, if reasonable, it is the fruit of experience, and an unreasonable confidence in any man is counted among the worst of follies: if I have faith in a teacher it is because I have found him thoroughly master of his subject, and honest in delivering what he knows. But the faith required for acceptance of the Lord Jesus Christ as Master goes beyond this. His teaching is concerned for the most part with things outside the range of experience. It can be verified, if at all, only as a consequence of the most unqualified acceptance; it is a privilege of the highest Christian life to find experimental proof of those things which have

been confidently believed. This experience, therefore, cannot be the foundation of discipleship. Faith in Christ is, then, something different from confidence in a man. It is conviction, anterior to all proof, which is expressed with the fervour of St. Peter, "Thou hast the words of eternal life."

This is not to say that faith of the kind which stands between man and man has no place in our relation to the Lord Jesus Christ. He made use of miracle to inspire a confidence based on evidence; the known experience of the saints, and the lessons of Christian history, serve the same purpose in all ages. Such evidence may attract men to him as Master, or may help them to resolve doubts, but it cannot of itself bring about the relation of discipleship. It may enforce the conviction that he is not as other men are, that he has some special power and knowledge, and a claim altogether unique to attention and reverence; it may remove a natural hesitation to believe stupendous affirmations which cannot be verified by experience; it cannot produce the unflinching assurance that what he taught is true. The faith of a Christian reaches even to this. It is something apart from our natural experience. In the words of St. Paul, it is the gift of God. All our natural powers are indeed given by God, but faith is a gift special and apart. In a word, it is supernatural. Of its source there will be more to say afterwards; at present we are concerned only with its working.

*Faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the proving of things not seen.*¹ It is concerned alike with things future, and therefore not yet knowable, and with things present indeed, but not present to our senses in such a way as to be matter of knowledge. Things future are

¹ Heb. xi. 1.

hoped for. There is a kind of unreasonable hope which is begotten only of vehement desire. We put that aside ; the assured hope here spoken of looks for a thing, either on the ground of a promise, or because it is likely to occur in the ordinary sequence of cause and effect. But what is the ground of this likeliness? Why do I expect things to occur in orderly sequence? Because of habit and training, no doubt ; but my confident expectation is ultimately founded on a conviction that nature is rationally ordered, controlled, that is to say, by an intelligence to which my own mind is in a measure correspondent, and the working of which I can follow. But to be convinced of this is nothing else than to believe in God the Creator. My own limited and partial experience of the universe can furnish me only with a very uncertain and irrational expectation of the sequence of an effect upon its cause : it may be an irresistible expectation, but I can have no certainty that it will not be disappointed.¹ An assured expectation depends on a belief in the consistent and uniform working of the universe according to the Will of God. What we call a Natural Law is a statement of this Will so far as it is known to us by inference from its results. But a necessary condition of such inference is the belief that God is consistent with himself, unchanging in purpose. An expectation founded on this belief is obviously near akin to one founded on trust in a promise made by God. In either case it depends on confidence

¹ The doctrine of Hume, that the determination of the mind by customary experience to expect one object following another in time is the only source of our idea of causation (*Treatise of Human Nature*, vol. i. p. 450, ed. Green and Grose), is all but certainly true as a matter of empirical psychology. It does not follow that causation is purely subjective, nor, as Hume thought, that we cannot transcend the subjective idea.

in him that he is true to himself. In the one case we have that faith which is a part of Natural Religion ; in the other case we have the faith which is proper to a Christian. This faith is the assurance of things hoped for on the ground of a promise made by God through Jesus Christ our Lord.

But Christian doctrine is not concerned only with things future, and therefore not seen as yet. We are taught of things present, but unknowable save as learnt from this direct teaching. They are things not seen, things of which neither sense nor intellect has any direct apprehension, but which nevertheless are made known to us by faith. We must be careful of our meaning here. We do not mean that we become acquainted with these things by a sort of supernatural intuition or inspiration to which we give the name of Faith. The word *faith*, as used in this connection, does not depart from its ordinary meaning. We learn these things from the words of a Master, to whose teaching is given the full assent of the disciple. Faith is the firm conviction that the Master knows what he is teaching, and teaches truly. It is not therefore independent either of sense or of intellect. The material of faith must be received in the ordinary course of instruction—heard, that is to say, and understood. “Belief cometh of hearing,” says St. Paul, “and hearing by the word of Christ.” But sense and intellect can go no further in dealing with these things ; they can only receive, they cannot verify what is received. This limitation will be better understood if we bring into comparison their activity in other matters. We receive historical information from the statements of those who profess to know the facts ; their statements are tested by comparison with those of other authorities, by documentary and other evidence ; a doubtful assent may

be given to the unsupported statement of a single author, but if he be one whose other statements have been tested and found generally trustworthy, we accept with the less misgiving what he alone asserts. All historical knowledge rests on faith in authorities, but a faith which in its turn depends on a verification done by the intellect in the process of receiving information. Again, when we receive information directly through the senses, we verify it by careful observation or experiment, that is to say, by comparing phenomena, and by applying the principle of causation. From viewing, for example, the apparent motions of the heavenly bodies we advance to the science of astronomy. In learning about such matters we arrive at various degrees of certainty or probability, and according to the degree we call our mental state *knowledge* or *opinion*. These, then, depend upon evidence. But for the truths contained in Christian doctrine there is no evidence of this kind: there is only the word of the Master. The experience which may verify them itself depends upon, and therefore cannot precede, the hearty acceptance of the teaching. They are accepted in pure trust, by the simple assent of the disciple. Faith is the proving of things not seen.

Faith is a proof to him who believes. It is not evidence by which others can be convinced. The disciple is satisfied about the truth of what he is taught, because he has faith in the Master; he cannot convey his satisfaction to another; faith is incommunicable, and strictly individual. But we use the word in a derived sense, speaking of the Catholic Faith, the Faith of the Church or of Christendom. The word was used by St. Paul in this secondary sense. It means the whole body of truths which, as a matter of fact, are believed by Christian men. They are not held by a corporate act of

faith, but severally by the faith of individuals in agreement. The fact that all Christians do believe these things is no proof that what they believe is true. The faith of many is no more evidence than the faith of one. If a thing which is verifiable by ordinary human experience be generally taken for true, this general belief is evidence of considerable weight, though the history of popular delusions, even about matters easily verified, shows how cautiously it should be received ; but the truth of a thing commonly unverifiable is no whit established by the common consent of all mankind.¹

Such common consent has, however, a value. It cannot prove the truth of what is believed ; but it shows that there are reasons for the belief, and reasons which have been found cogent to enforce assent. In like manner, the general assent of Christian men to certain teaching cannot in any way prove that teaching true, but it shows that some reason has been found for believing it to be true. Such reason can only be found in the authority of the Master. The general assent, therefore, shows that Christians at least suppose the Lord Jesus Christ to have delivered this teaching. But here is an historical belief subject to verification. The general assent to certain doctrines, or the faith of Christendom, has a definite value as evidence to prove that the Lord Jesus Christ did in fact teach those things that are believed. It is part of the historical evidence for the facts of his life and teaching. To test and justify the

¹ Thorndike, *Epilogue*, Part i. p. 149 : "What contradictions soever are held among Christians, nevertheless they are sensible that no man's private spirit, that is, any evidence of Christian truth in the mind of one man, can oblige another man to follow it, because it imports no evidence to make that which he thinks he sees appear to others" (*Works*, vol. ii. part i. p. 378, ed. 1845).

record is the study of Christian evidences. The kind of evidence and the amount of evidence required for certainty varies almost with every mind: some are satisfied with the simplest tradition, others require a detailed investigation.

So far there is no room for the function of Christian faith; it is only when the fact is fully accepted that the Lord Jesus as Master taught such and such things, that faith, the assent of the disciple, can begin. Nor is the measure of a man's faith in any way affected by his readiness to become a disciple. An easy acceptance of the historical facts of our Lord's teaching does not predispose any one to a real belief in the teaching as true; the most cautious and sceptical attitude of mind towards the historical record does not hinder the entire assent of the disciple, when once the record is made good. Hooker, in his sermon on the Certainty of Faith in the Elect, finely develops the scholastic distinction between the Certainty of Evidence and the Certainty of Adherence. The former has many degrees, is painfully built up, and may again be shaken by doubts; the latter is firmly rooted in a moral conviction, *It is good for me to hold me fast by God*. This latter certainty is the ground of the Faith of the Disciple.¹

This faith or assent of the disciple is not a mere blind confidence. It goes with an intelligent appreciation of the authority of the master. Such authority is of two kinds. The one is personal: the master speaks with authority because he inspires confidence by his character and by the conscious possession of knowledge. The other is official, resting on a commission. In a purely human organization such a teaching commission may be given as guarantee of competency by any recognized

¹ Hooker, *Works*, vol. iii. p. 470, ed. Keble.

source of authority ; for the things of God, with which Christian doctrine is concerned, the one source of authority is the self-knowledge of God himself. Both kinds of authority are specially attributed to the Lord Jesus Christ as Master. "We know that thou art a teacher come from God," said Nicodemus, putting himself definitely in the position of a disciple. "The multitudes were astonished at his teaching ; for he taught them as one having authority, and not as their scribes." The scribes had authority by commission, as sitting in Moses' seat, but they lacked that note of personal authority which marked his teaching. It was indicated in the form of words, "*I say unto you*," by which he himself set his own teaching in contrast with theirs. The authority of the Master is thus twofold—objective, in that he is recognized as coming from God ; subjective, in that he impresses on men a sense of his incommunicable superiority.¹

For the function of Master no more is needed. It is enough for a disciple to know that he is taught by one who comes from God, and who speaks with personal authority. The relation of discipleship is now established. What is afterwards learnt about the person of the Master strengthens, indeed, the certainty of the assent given by the disciple, but cannot be in any way the ground of that certainty. The assent must be secured, the relation of discipleship established, before this further knowledge can be acquired ; for it is derived exclusively from the teaching of the Master himself. When we have learnt that he is not merely come from God, but is himself God, is not merely the Illuminator, but is himself the Light, God of God, Light of Light, our faith is confirmed ; but unless we already had the faith of the disciple,

¹ Matt. vii. 29 ; xxiii. 2 ; John iii. 2.

we could not have learnt this. St. Peter had to be for some time a disciple, he had to attain the confidence in which he said, "At thy word I will let down the nets," and to make the declaration of faith, "Thou hast the words of eternal life," before he could arrive at his ultimate confession, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God."¹ This that is afterwards learnt accounts for and explains the note of inherent and personal authority which made an impression, originally inexplicable, on the hearers of the Lord's teaching. The authority of the Master, real and objective, though not yet known in its full reality, made an impression subjectively on those who heard him, and drew them to him as disciples. The record of his teaching still has the same effect, and so the relation of discipleship is continually renewed in succeeding generations. This relation once established, the disciple learns the whole truth about the Master, and his faith is confirmed.

The authority of the Master is incommunicable. It would not be so if it were an authority only of commission. The Prophets also were teachers come from God. To the Apostles the Lord Jesus Christ conveyed the fulness of his own mission: "As the Father hath sent me, even so send I you." It would seem, indeed, to be conveyed with an even increased effectiveness due to the completeness of the Lord's own personal work: "He that believeth on me, the works that I do shall he do also; and greater works than these shall he do; because I go unto the Father." But however entirely the Master's mission be handed on to others, his personal inherent authority can pass to no one. It rests upon what he is in himself, the very God. Now, as before, it is true: "Never man so spake." It follows that, since his

¹ Luke v. 5; John vi. 68; Matt. xvi. 16.

authority in its entirety is incommunicable, nothing can be added to his teaching. Others may teach with varying authority where he has been silent, but their teaching is their own, not the Lord's. St. Paul, for example, carefully distinguishes between what he teaches by his own authority as a ruler of the Church, and what he delivers as taught by the Lord himself. The total sum of Christian doctrine is contained in what the Master himself taught.¹

To what then serves the authority conveyed by commission to the Apostles? They were not to declare new truths; they were appointed to be witnesses, testifying to the teaching of the Lord. They were the founders of a tradition; that is to say, they received something which they handed on to others. This idea is found everywhere in the writings of the New Testament. "That which was from the beginning," says St. John, with characteristic iteration, "that which we have heard, that which we have seen with our eyes, that which we beheld, and our hands handled, concerning the Word of life; that which we have seen and heard declare we unto you also." The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews defines his own place in the line of tradition; he has received the teaching of salvation, "which having at the first been spoken through the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard." St. Paul himself in one place speaks of his gospel as given in this way: "I delivered unto you first of all that which also I received." Elsewhere he speaks of it as given him directly: "By revelation was made known unto me the mystery . . . which in other generations was not made known unto the sons of men, as it hath now been revealed unto his holy apostles and prophets in the Spirit." But in this he is only putting himself on the level of the other Apostles;

¹ John xx 21; xiv. 12; vii. 46; 1 Cor. vii. 10-12, 25, 40.

his gospel, he writes to the Galatians, was not after man : " For neither did I receive it from man, nor was I taught it, but it came to me through revelation of Jesus Christ." The true meaning of this stands forth in his emphatic claim to have seen the Lord, like the rest, though as one born out of due time : " Am I not an Apostle? Have I not seen Jesus our Lord?" Like the rest, he had received and was handing on to others, not a separate and personal revelation from God, but the teaching of the Lord Jesus Christ. The nearest approach to a larger claim is found in what St. Paul writes to the Corinthians about the hidden wisdom : " The things of God none knoweth, save the Spirit of God. But we received, not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is of God ; that we might know the things that are freely given to us by God." This needs consideration.¹

The Apostles were not only the founders of a tradition ; they were also its guardians. In this capacity they had the special support of the Holy Spirit. The promise was, " He shall teach you all things, and bring to your remembrance all that I said unto you." The work of the Holy Spirit is here clearly stated ; he was not to teach the Apostles new truths, but was to inform them by stirring and strengthening their memory of what the Master himself had taught. He was to guard them against the loss of that which was committed to them. But this function of guardianship was needed for all time. How should the purity of the tradition be secured when the Apostles were passed away? They committed to writing a record of the Lord's teaching. But a written record may be corrupted, either by falsification or through being overlaid by spurious interpretation. This was to

¹ I John i. 1-3 ; Heb. ii. 3 ; I Cor. xv. 3 ; Eph. iii. 3-5 ; Gal. i. 12 ; I Cor. ix. 1 ; ii. 11-12.

be guarded against. The tradition, therefore, and the keeping of the sacred books, was committed to a society, the Church, the society of believers, which is "the pillar and ground of the truth." The commission of the Apostles, not indeed as the founders, but as the guardians, of the Christian tradition, is continued in the Church. The one Body is illuminated by the One Spirit for the performance of this work, and such illumination is sufficient to account for the exalted language in which St. Paul speaks of the spiritual discernment or interpretation of spiritual things. The Church is the guardian of Christian doctrine. The function of the Church is not to receive new revelations, but to keep intact the faith once for all delivered unto the saints, to guard the sacred writings, and to secure them against false interpretation. For this end the Church has authority in controversies of faith, and is able to condemn new teaching as contrary to that which has been received. But as it was with the Apostles, so it is now; the Church is not an original teacher, but a witness to the teaching of the Master.¹

Christian doctrine then is received as taught by the Lord Jesus Christ. It is the revelation of what God wills us to know about himself and our relation to him. A truth is said to be *revealed* when it is made known by one who formerly held it secret. There are certain truths which are naturally held secret from men, because there are no means ordinarily available for discovering them. Not all that may be known of God is of this kind. It is not indeed possible to prove by scientific demonstration even the existence of God; from this point of view it could only be said at the utmost that if there were no God the universe would be an insoluble riddle. But if

¹ John xiv. 26; 1 Tim. iii. 15; Jude 3. Compare 1 Tim. vi. 20; 2 Tim. i. 13, 14.

there is no scientific proof, there is moral proof in abundance ; and moral proof, involving moral certainty, is that on which men rely in most activities of life. Such proof there is not merely of the existence of God, but of much that concerns our relation to him. "The invisible things of him," says St. Paul, "since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity." From this knowledge may be derived the sense of obligation, which is the foundation of religion ; those who have no other knowledge of God but this are still without excuse, says the Apostle, if, knowing God, they glorify him not as God.¹ There is therefore a true Natural Religion, the truths of which, as already noted, are in fact received for the most part by human tradition. For these truths no revelation is needed ; the teaching of the Lord Jesus Christ takes them for granted, and doing so confirms our belief in them, and clears away doubts and possible misunderstandings.

Other truths there are which our natural powers, at all events as now developed, are incapable of discovering. These are the proper subject of Revelation. But even here there are many things which were not made known for the first time by the teaching of the Lord Jesus Christ. Revelation had begun from the earliest age of human history. Its first origin is lost in the dimness of those periods of which the writings of the Old Testament give us only fragmentary and mysterious records. Revealed Religion, like Natural Religion, became a tradition, vaguely spread throughout the world, guarded with jealous care in one family or nation. Within these narrow limits there was a growing revelation. To his chosen people God made himself known by degrees,

¹ Rom. i. 20, 21.

suggesting always a fulness of knowledge to be granted in the future. That full knowledge was given by the teaching of the Lord Jesus Christ. The whole course of revelation is summed up in the opening words of the Epistle to the Hebrews: "God, having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners, hath at the end of these days spoken unto us in his Son."

These truths of the older revelation are taken for granted in the teaching of the Lord Jesus Christ, just as are the truths of Natural Religion. But imperfect knowledge is misleading as well as insufficient, especially when it is knowledge artificially conveyed of things not fundamentally understood. The teaching of the Old Testament is therefore not only supplemented in the New; it is in a way corrected. Our Lord very often seemed to men to be contradicting the Law and the Prophets. He explained that he was not contradicting but fulfilling them. In doing this, in filling up the imperfect outline of truth which they presented, he had frequent occasion to correct the impression which an incomplete revelation had inevitably made upon men's minds and upon human traditions.¹

Christian doctrine then, or the teaching of Christ, contains three elements. It assumes and enforces the truths of Natural Religion. It assumes the truths formerly revealed, as recorded in the Old Testament, correcting erroneous impressions due to their incompleteness. It sets forth new truths revealed by the Incarnate Word himself.

Revelation is now complete. We cannot conceive any revelation of the truth of God more perfect than that which is made by him who is the "very image of his

¹ See especially Matt. v. 17-48.

Substance." This consideration would not exclude the possibility of a continuous and growing revelation by the Lord himself to the Church, or to specially favoured persons for the benefit of the Church. Revelations of this kind, made after the Ascension, are recorded in the exceptional cases of St. Paul and St. John. When we say that revelation is complete, we do not mean that all possible knowledge of God is given to men, but only that all knowledge is given which God wills them to have. It is conceivable that in the course of ages circumstances might arise in which God would will that men should have a larger knowledge, and so would make a further revelation. But such revelation would require attestation as strong as that furnished to the original gospel by the personal character and teaching of the Lord Jesus Christ. Nothing of the kind has been. On the other hand, there are many pretended revelations which are not so attested; and what is of the greatest significance, men were specially warned by the original deliverers of the gospel tradition that such would be the case. They were told to be on their guard against "false Christs and false prophets;" against the preaching of any other gospel, even by an angel from heaven. There is, on the other hand, no suggestion of any future revelation which should be genuine. The revelations of the Old Testament continually look forward to a future and more perfect revelation completing them. There is nothing of the kind in the New Testament. It is therefore in the highest degree probable that in the revelation of the gospel we have the sum of what God wills us to know about Himself while the world stands.¹

¹ Heb. i. 3; Matt. xxiv. 24; Gal. i. 8. Joh. Damasc., *De Orthod. Fide*, i. 1: Πάντα τὰ παραδεδομένα ἡμῖν διὰ τε νόμου καὶ

As the revelation of the gospel is complete, so also it is exclusive. It is the revelation of things naturally secret, which we cannot discover by ourselves, but which God wills us to know. It is therefore exclusively confined to these things. God does not reveal what he intends us to find out by our natural powers. The Lord Jesus Christ did not enlighten men's ignorance at large, but only in regard to those matters about which he willed to enlighten them. He had, however, to use their language, to live among them and share their experiences. He had to speak of many things about which they were ignorant or misinformed, and in doing so he made use of their common expressions. This is fully understood in regard to matters of natural science. He did not correct erroneous opinions; he himself used the inaccurate language of common life. It is not so clearly understood in regard to some matters which come near to the actual substance of his teaching. It was, for example, a part of his teaching to confirm the revelations of the Old Testament, which he did by referring to the Holy Scriptures as the genuine Word of God; but it was no part of his teaching to clear up questions about the human authorship of these books. He therefore spoke of them in this respect according to the common usage of the time. A more difficult question is raised by his use of the common language about the souls of the departed, as in the parable of Lazarus. It is hard to say how much or how little he willed to reveal about the secrets of death, and therefore we cannot say how far his use of such language may be taken to confirm the

προφητῶν καὶ ἀποστόλων καὶ εὐαγγελιστῶν δεχόμεθα καὶ γινώσκουμεν καὶ σέβομεν, οὐδὲν περαιτέρω τούτων ἐπιζητοῦντες . . . ὡς οὖν πάντα εἰδὼς [ὁ Θεός] καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἑκάστῳ προμηθοῦμενος, ὅπερ συνέφερον ἡμῖν γνῶναι ἀνεκάλυψεν, ὅπερ δὲ οὐκ ἐδυνάμεθα φέρειν ἀπεσιώπησε.

ideas which it represents. In such cases our attitude should be one of reverent and prudent reserve. We may, however, be confident of this—that in a matter so secret and of so great moment, our Lord would not give even apparent sanction to an opinion seriously conflicting with the truth.¹

From the completeness and exclusiveness of the revelation there follow two consequences. It follows, in the first place, that in the Church of the New Testament we are not to look for that continuous and progressive revelation which marks the history of the Old Testament. The other consequence is that we must look for a continuous and progressive interpretation of what is revealed. The whole revealed truth of God was delivered to men whose understanding was imperfectly prepared for its apprehension. It was given in a form suited to their circumstances, easy to be retained in memory and tradition; its whole content was not immediately understood. Some parts of our Lord's teaching were delivered in a form seemingly intended for the time to be hard of understanding. Interpretation is necessary unless the teaching is to be unmeaning, but until questions are raised there is no occasion for precise definition. Questions of three kinds may arise: questions about matters bordering on revealed truth, but not actually included; questions of inclusion or exclusion, whether a thing incidentally said by the Lord is a proper integral part of his teaching; questions concerning the interpretation of what he undoubtedly taught. Questions of the first kind cannot be answered for lack of material; they must remain questions only. Those of the second kind must often be insoluble. The questions of interpretation

¹ See the interesting discussion in Maldonatus, on Luke xvi., of the question whether the parable be history or allegory.

are the most important, and they cannot be held insoluble, for it would be irrational to suppose that God has revealed himself to us in riddles that have no answer. But revelation, being of things naturally secret, can be illustrated only by revelation. One revealed truth can be satisfactorily interpreted only by comparison with another revealed truth. The comparison is compelled by questioning. The questioning is due to partial understanding. Such partial understanding, when it leads to obstinate division of opinion, is what we call heresy; the part played by heresy in the order of Divine providence is to compel questioning and a clearer apprehension of the truth.¹

When questions arise it is the function of the Church, as having authority in controversies of faith, to answer them. The answer is given, not by any original teaching, for that would imply a new revelation, but by a declaration of the teaching on the subject current everywhere in the Church. This can be determined only by a comparison of traditions. At times this is easily and readily done; a novel interpretation, unheard of anywhere in the past, stands condemned on the ground of its novelty. At other times the process of determination is difficult, or not readily undertaken. It is a mistake to suppose that any easy method is provided for promptly determining such questions. There may be long delay; but when once the answer is made and established, there is a *definition*

¹ Compare Mark iv. 11, 12 and parallel passages with Luke ix. 45, where much turns on the question whether the conjunction *ἵνα* expresses purpose or consequence. It seems probable that in the former passage a consequence is intended, in the latter a purpose. See also I Cor. xi. 19, "There must be also heresies among you, that they which are approved may be made manifest among you;" and Tertullian's hard and fierce comment, *De Praescr.*, c. 1-3.

of faith, which becomes an integral part of Christian doctrine, not as a new truth, but as the settled interpretation of what was taught from the beginning.

The teaching of the Lord Jesus Christ being a complete revelation, the record of it also must be complete. If anything originally unrecorded were afterwards recovered, this could only be by a fresh revelation. How then was it recorded? It was stored up exclusively in the memory of those who received it. There is perhaps in St. Luke's Gospel a trace of documents relating to our Lord's birth written at the time of the events, but there is no reason to suppose that any account of his life and teaching was committed to writing until after the lapse of many years. His doctrine had sunk into the minds of those whom he taught, and the power of the Holy Ghost was afterwards upon them to rouse and sustain their remembrance. What they had received by word of mouth they delivered in the same way. The teaching of the Master was thus communicated to the growing body of disciples by numerous interlacing lines of oral tradition. No surer means could be devised for preserving the record intact. Any variations of teaching, due to individual perversity or ignorance, were bound to come into collision with sounder and purer traditions. The Epistles of St. Paul abound with illustrations of this. We see there how jealously St. Paul himself was watched, and how ready he was in his turn to check the hesitations even of his fellow-apostles. By these means, in the course of some years, a solid tradition of doctrine was formed in the Christian society. Tradition is to a society what habit is to the individual. It cannot be set aside without a conscious effort. It is subject however, like habit, to subtle and imperceptible changes, and we should have no guarantee for the permanence of the Christian tradition, were it not

for the perpetual guidance of the Holy Spirit. This guidance was for the whole society. St. Paul couples the one Body and the one Spirit with the one Faith and the one Hope of our Christian calling. The social tradition was all-powerful to check individual variation, and was itself guarded by the operation of the Holy Spirit.¹

Not until the Christian tradition was firmly established is there any trace of its being recorded in writing. Nor even then was any systematic record made. There was a "pattern of sound words" which Timothy was charged by St. Paul to hold in faith and love, but the earnestness with which he was urged to guard the deposit shows that reliance was put on oral tradition and memory. The writings of the Apostles are local and occasional; they assume the teaching which they illustrate. Collections were made by individual writers of the sayings and doings of the Lord; they were numerous, as we know from the preface to St. Luke's Gospel; they were but fragmentary, as the concluding words of St. John's Gospel aver. Of these collections we retain four, and some doubtful fragments of others. There is no trace of any orderly and systematic reduction to writing of the whole Christian tradition.²

In the course of time however the Christian writings acquired a new importance. They were documents. The record of the teaching of our Lord Jesus Christ is matter of history, and for history the importance of documentary evidence can hardly be exaggerated. An age which knew nothing of the science of historical criticism was nevertheless led to guard these documents with jealous care. They were not a complete record, but they were invaluable as means of testing the accurate

¹ Eph. iv. 4, 5.

² 2 Tim. i. 13, 14. Compare 1 Tim. vi. 3, 20.

persistence of the tradition received. There was a negative test. In the course of his controversy about the rebaptism of heretics St. Cyprian put the question whether it was written in the Gospels, the Epistles, or the Acts of the Apostles, that heretics should be received without baptism; if it were so, then the authority of the written record must prevail; if not, then the custom of the Church to the contrary must be upheld. There was also a positive test. St. Athanasius ridiculed the eagerness of the Arians to hold Councils for the discussion of doctrine; the Holy Scripture, he said, was the surer test of true teaching. Tertullian indeed spoke slightly of the appeal to Scripture; he would rely rather on the Rule of Faith, the oral teaching of the Church given at baptism. But the contrary opinion prevailed. It was thought unsafe to press any teaching for which support could not be found in the sacred writings. From the fourth century onward there was a general adoption of the rule to which the English Church has given emphatic approval, that no man may be required to believe, as necessary to salvation, anything which cannot be proved out of Holy Scripture. St. Athanasius, after enumerating the books of the Old and New Testaments, says, "These are the fountains of salvation, so that he who thirsts may be satiated with the oracles contained therein; in these alone is declared the schooling of religion; let no one add hereto or take aught herefrom." The Church was still the teacher, the guardian, the interpreter of the Christian tradition, but the current record was to be verified by the documentary evidence. The infallible rule of faith, says Bramhall, is Holy Scripture interpreted by the Catholic Church.¹

¹ Cyprian, *Epist.* lxxiv. p. 800, ed. Hartel; Athanasius, *De Syn. Arim. et Sel.*, tom. i. p. 873, ed. Colon; Tertullian, *De Praescr.*, 13-19; Athanasius, tom. ii. p. 39; Bramhall, *Works*, vol.

But what is Holy Scripture? The books of the New Testament are no systematic record of Christian doctrine, complete and self-contained. Neither, on the other hand, are they the only books of the kind. Many others at one time existed, some few survive to our day. Those included in the Canon of Scripture seem on the face of things to be arbitrarily selected. There is no apparent reason why the Epistle to the Hebrews should be included, the Epistle of St. Clement to the Corinthians excluded; why two short private letters of St. John are preserved, while other more public writings of the Apostles are lost to memory; why four Gospels were received, and the many others of which St. Luke speaks, and the *Logia*, or collected sayings of the Lord current in the first age, were rejected. The Epistle of St. Barnabas was for a time accepted in some places as canonical, the Revelation of St. John was rejected. Not until the end of the fourth century were the books of the New Testament universally received as we now have them.

The selection of these books was the work of the Church. It was not a conscious and deliberate selection made at any set time. Of the Holy Scripture, as of the whole sacred tradition, the Church was not the originator but the guardian; no book could be raised to this level or degraded at the arbitrary bidding of ecclesiastical authority. The Church merely noted and recorded the fact that certain books had been received as genuine records. The Canon was the result of concurrent traditions in all parts of the Church. A book

ii. p. 22, ed. 1842. A long list of quotations from the Fathers on this head will be found in Goode's *Divine Rule of Faith and Practice*, vol. iii. pp. 29-211. Compare Pusey, *Eirenicon*, part i. pp. 336-351.

received in some few places but rejected by the Church at large was put aside for lack of this concurrent testimony. A book ignored in one or two places only was eventually received everywhere on the strength of the general tradition. The testimony of the Church is that these books do as a matter of fact contain the teaching of the Lord himself, as delivered by those who were his eye-witnesses from the beginning.

This is in the first place purely a matter of historical fact. As so regarded, the testimony of tradition might conceivably be overthrown by other evidence. The continuous tradition of a society like the Christian Church will carry great weight with all reasonable men, but it cannot amount to absolutely conclusive evidence. The writings of the New Testament are therefore tested by scholarship and criticism, like any other books. If when so tested they were found to be altogether different from what they profess to be, if they proved to be forgeries or late compilations of doubtful legends, then the foundations would indeed be cast down; the Church would be shown to have been a faithless or incompetent guardian of tradition, and we should have no certain knowledge about any teaching of our Master. But in fact the most rigid and unsparing criticism has served only to establish in the main the authenticity of the books, and the accuracy of the tradition by which we have received them. This being so far established, we may accept that tradition with the more confidence where verification is doubtful.

In this way the genuineness of the tradition is vindicated even to those that are without. But for him who has once adopted the standpoint of the disciple, there is much stronger confirmation. Accepting the teaching and the promises of the Lord, he has an over-

powering certainty that what the Lord committed to the Apostles and to his Church will be preserved; he has the assurance of the continual guidance of the Holy Spirit. Nor is this to argue in a circle, as if we grounded the authority of the Church on the testimony of Scripture, and the authenticity of Scripture on the testimony of the Church. It is true, as Hooker says, that "the first outward motive leading men so to esteem of the Scripture is the authority of God's Church." But, as he shows, the testimony of the Church is subject to the most searching examination, and when this examination leaves the elementary facts of the record undisturbed, those facts thus guaranteed involve as a necessary consequence the truth of the Divine guidance in which we trust. It is now as it was in our Lord's own time. A few simple facts are sufficient to confirm us in the position of disciples; then as disciples we receive the rest of the teaching without demur.¹

A disciple, then, receives the Holy Scriptures first and last on the authority of the Church. It is the written record of the sacred tradition which the Church is to guard. Is this record finally closed? There is no question that the record of the Christian revelation, written or unwritten, was from the first complete; nothing could be added without further revelation. But it does not necessarily follow that the record, as written, should be closed at any time. There are two opinions on this subject. The one has been expressed emphatically by the Russian theologian Khomiakoff: "The collection of Old and New Testament books, which the Church acknowledges as hers, are called by the name of Holy Scripture. But there are no limits to Scripture; for every writing which the Church acknowledges as hers

¹ Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.*, iii. 8. 14, vol. i. p. 376.

is Holy Scripture. Such pre-eminently are the Creeds of the General Councils, and especially the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed. Wherefore the writing of Holy Scripture has gone on up to our day, and, if God pleases, yet more will be written.”¹ The contrary opinion is that Holy Scripture is to be regarded exclusively as a contemporaneous record of the teaching of our Lord, delivered by the Apostles, and those who were eye-witnesses of the Word. According to this opinion the Canon of Scripture is necessarily closed with the first age of the Church; and if nothing may be imposed on men as matter of faith but what is supported by the evidence of the written word, it will follow that even the Creeds themselves need the support of such testimony.

The difference between these two opinions is less in reality than in seeming. For, on the one hand, since it is held that the books of the New Testament and the Creeds are both alike transcripts of the one tradition, the doctrine delivered by the Lord to his Apostles, they are bound to be in agreement; if they were in the smallest degree in conflict, the basis of our faith would be overthrown. And, on the other hand, the Creeds are received as an authentic interpretation of Scripture, delivered by the authority of the Church, which has jealously guarded the doctrine received from the beginning. The difference is one of definition. If Holy Scripture be taken to mean any and every authentic record in writing of the substance of the Christian revelation, then the Creeds must be included; if it be taken to mean contemporaneous record only, they are excluded. According to both opinions they are an authentic record, but in the one case they are reckoned to have authority at first hand, in the other case they

¹ Birkbeck, *Russia and the English Church*, vol. i. p. 200.

have authority at second hand. In the former case they are taken as evidence for the facts, in the latter case they are evidence only for the meaning of the facts. In the English Church all authorized teachers are required to conform to the latter opinion.¹

It remains to summarize what has thus far been said.

(i.) Christian doctrine is that which is taught by the Lord Jesus Christ about the hidden things of God.

(ii.) It is received by the *faith of the disciple*, who commits himself with a confidence absolute, though not blind or unreasoning, to the teaching of the Master. What the Master has actually taught has to be ascertained by historical evidence, of which the common belief of Christendom forms the chief element. When once it is ascertained, the disciple assents to it with entire assurance.

(iii.) He does this on the ground of the *authority of the Master*, whom he acknowledges to be sent from God, and thereafter learns to be none other than himself God of God. In a secondary sense he receives the doctrine on the authority of the Church, but only as the faithful guardian, transmitter, and interpreter of the Lord's teaching, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.

(iv.) Christian doctrine is a *revelation* of truths which could not be naturally discovered. It assumes the truths of Natural Religion, and all other truths revealed by the prophets of the Old Testament, corrects the imperfections of these, and adds a fuller knowledge.

(v.) This revelation is *complete* and *exclusive*. There

¹ Of the *Thirty-nine Articles*, the *Sixth* and the *Eighth* define Holy Scripture as meaning the Canonical books of the Old and New Testament, and affirm that the Creeds "ought thoroughly to be received and believed: for they may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scripture."

is therefore no continuous or further revelation, but there is a progressive understanding of what is revealed. It is the function of the Church, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, to watch this process, guarding the purity of interpretation, and marking the result in *definitions of faith*.

(vi.) There is a *complete record* of this revelation, contained from the first in the tradition of the Church, and after a while set down in the sacred Scriptures of the New Testament, without the support of which nothing may be reckoned an essential part of the doctrine necessary for salvation. The *Rule of Faith* is Holy Scripture interpreted by the Church.

PART II.—*The Content of Christian Doctrine*

Christian doctrine is directly concerned only with the invisible things of God, made known by revelation. But human life is one and indivisible, as also is the human understanding. We cannot shut up our actions or our thoughts into compartments. Christian doctrine will therefore be continually touching on things known to us by sense and experience; it may serve to correct erroneous inferences about these very things; it conveys information about them not otherwise attainable. In such cases we have to distinguish between the facts discoverable by our natural powers, and the truths delivered to us by revelation. These latter, by reason of the way in which they are learnt, we call *supernatural truths*. They are neither more nor less true, and in themselves neither more nor less certain, than the others. For us, however, they are at once less certain and more certain; less certain in respect of what Hooker calls the certainty of evidence, for there is no evidence comparable to that

of the senses and the intellect ; more certain, in so far as we trust the Word of God more entirely than our own impressions and inferences. There cannot be conflict between the two orders of truth, for there is one God, the Author of nature and the Author of revelation. If there seem to be conflict, we have either misinterpreted the evidence of nature, misunderstood what is given by revelation, or drawn erroneous inferences from the one or the other. The last fault is perhaps the commonest. It usually involves the logical fallacy of arguing *a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*. The truths of revelation are stated *secundum quid*, in words which are intended in a certain limited sense ; for in speaking of the invisible things of God we are compelled to use words derived from our experience of visible things, having in fact none other. If then we argue from the words of revelation without regard to the limitations within which they are used, we may draw from supernatural truths false inferences concerning natural facts, or counter-wise. To take a familiar example, the words *Heaven* and *Hell* are names of things naturally known to us—the visible sky over our heads, and the depths of the earth under our feet. These words are used in revelation as the names of invisible realities about which are declared supernatural truths. If from these supernatural truths we attempt to draw inferences about the constitution of sky and earth, we come into conflict with natural knowledge. If, on the other hand, from our knowledge of earth and sky we attempt to draw inferences about the invisible realities of heaven and hell, we arrive at fantastic imaginations, which may obscure and confuse the supernatural truth.

We must be careful then how we enlarge the field of Christian doctrine by uncertain inferences. When terms

of our natural understanding are used to express supernatural truth, we may be sure there is some analogy between the things so named in common; but we must not force the analogy. God is spoken of in terms of Fatherhood and Sonship; there must be some analogy between the relation as existing in the Godhead and the relation familiarly known in human life. A certain spiritual condition is spoken of as death; it must have some analogy with that change in the body and its functions, the name of which it borrows. The analogy is real; there is not merely a superficial resemblance between two things which leads to the proper name of the one being improperly applied to the other. Knowledge of God is possible at all only because of a certain correspondence of our nature with the Divine nature, by reason of which we are said to be made in the likeness of God. Our life has some real analogy with the life of God, our experience with God's working, our ideas with his knowledge. The words therefore by which we express ideas derived from our experience of life have a certain fitness for the use made of them in revelation. They are used in a way not altogether arbitrary, but according with their natural sense, to express the truths supernaturally made known to us. But our ideas are for the most part highly complicated. The content of the idea of fatherhood, for example, is not easily determined. For the simple acceptance of Christian doctrine, it is enough to know that God is spoken of as the Father in a sense generally corresponding with that in which we speak of fatherhood in man; for a perfect understanding of revelation, we should need to know precisely what are the characteristics of fatherhood in man which so faithfully represent what is in God as to make the word suitable for expressing the Divine relation. In proportion to

our ignorance on this head is the peril of pressing the analogy.

A faithful exposition of Christian doctrine will proceed with careful regard to these limitations. We must confine ourselves to what is actually given in revelation, together with those few inferences which attain to the highest degree of certainty. Other inferences may be admitted in a class apart as opinions more or less probable; others again should be marked for emphatic rejection as involving a contradiction with known truth.

We begin with God himself. His being is a truth of natural religion, confirmed by revelation. His attributes, clearly enough perceived, as St. Paul says, through his works from the beginning of the world, were revealed with growing distinctness under the Old Testament, and were rather illustrated than declared by the teaching of our Lord Jesus Christ. But revealed religion regards God in particular as the Creator. By creating the world, and especially by creating spiritual beings, God has set up a relation of the creature to himself. It is a subordinate relation, and the freedom of the creature renders possible insubordination. On these three points, creation, freedom, and insubordination, some floating ideas of doubtful origin, partly true and partly false, have permeated the natural knowledge of most men; they are corrected and fixed by revelation. The conception of sin, and the consciousness of a degraded or fallen state in which sin, unnatural in itself, is become a habit or second nature to man, are in like manner things doubtfully apprehended by natural religion, but openly declared by revelation.

From this point we pass entirely beyond the limits of natural knowledge. By revelation we have in the Old Testament a promise of deliverance from this evil state,

in the New Testament a declaration of the manner of deliverance and the assurance of its accomplishment. Redemption by the Incarnate Son of God, the truth of the Atonement, is the peculiar teaching of the gospel. We find, indeed, here and there in mankind an ardent desire for such deliverance, a hope even, which we may possibly trace to a tradition of God's promise made at the beginning of revelation ; but this desire is either inoperative, tending to despair, or else finds vent in fantastic imaginings of purification or propitiation, which often run riotously counter to morality, and become the source of greater evils than they were supposed to remedy. It is natural that such imaginings should have some superficial resemblance to the Christian religion, for on the one hand they come from an effort of the human mind to compass that which God effects in Jesus Christ according to his own wisdom, and on the other hand it seems probable that God has allowed these natural searchings to furnish materials for the outward observances of religion. The visible superiority of the true religion is found in the perfect harmony of Divine and human action, of moral effort and supernatural aid, which characterizes the Christian doctrine of Grace and of Eternal Life. This doctrine is the necessary pendant to that of the Incarnation and the Atonement ; and taken together these are the core of Christian teaching. They contain the essential truth of Redemption.

But the Christian religion has an outward presentment. The effect of grace is the sanctification of the creature, and of the creature as made by God. Nature is not to be superseded, but filled with new powers, purified and brought close to God in perfect subordination. The purpose of Redemption is to restore in man the original work of God. But God made man a social being,

incapable of living his life truly and fully in isolation. The individual man is incomplete in himself; indeed he becomes himself only as he finds his place in social organization.¹

The social organism of mankind in the family and the state is degraded by the Fall equally with the animal and spiritual organism of the individual man. Restoration is therefore necessary here also. And as the animal and spiritual organism is neither superseded nor merely improved by the work of Redemption, but is supplemented by new and supernatural powers bestowed upon each man, to coexist with his natural powers, so a new and supernatural bond of social order is given to mankind, which coexists with the natural solidarity of family and state. This supernatural society is the Christian Church. Until the rise in modern times of some counter opinions, all men were agreed, says Thorndike, "that the Church is a society of men subsisting by God's revealed will, distinct from all other societies." There were disputes about the composition and constitution of the society, but the disputes were themselves proofs of the common belief in the reality of that about which men debated. The constitution of the Church is then a matter of revealed truth. It is the outward organization of that kingdom of God which the Lord Jesus Christ proclaimed, and in speaking the things concerning the kingdom he revealed to the disciples all that essentially belongs to the social order of redeemed humanity. This too is a part of Christian doctrine.²

It will therefore be necessary to determine what

¹ This truth was expressed by Aristotle once for all in the phrase describing man as φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον (*Pol.*, i. 2).

² Thorndike, *Epilogue*, part i. p. 5 (*Works*, vol. ii. part i. p. 24); Acts i. 3.

constitutes membership in the Church, and what are the relations of the members to one another. We must do this not by induction from the existing practice of those who now claim, with whatever degree of right, the name of Christian, but only by study of the actual teaching of the Lord, preserved in the Christian tradition. The pretensions of those who call themselves Christians are to be measured by this standard; they cannot make a standard to themselves. The Church is not a gathering of individuals who make their own laws of association; it is a society subsisting by the revealed will of God to which individuals are aggregated; and this aggregation is the work of God.¹

Social order is impossible without duly appointed officers, exercising authority. It is therefore a matter of Christian doctrine to know what is the revealed will of God in this regard; how the sacred ministry of the Church is constituted, and what are its powers. It is obvious that, according as the Divine Will disposed, the Lord Jesus Christ might have ordered these matters either generally or specifically. In the former case all the necessary powers of government would be given to the Christian society at large, and the details left to the ordering of sanctified human wisdom within the Church; Christian doctrine would then be concerned only with the general powers, the details being matters of history and ecclesiastical law. In the latter case some at least of the details would be ordered by revelation, and would form part of the Christian tradition.

It is necessary then to inquire which of these two modes of institution was actually followed by our Lord.

¹ See Acts ii. 41, 47, where the word *προστιθέναι* can bear no other meaning than this. The words *τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ*, inserted in the current text, are an obvious gloss.

We cannot say that a clear and unmistakable answer to this question is found in the written record of his teaching. There are passages, indeed, which are commonly quoted as signifying the express appointment of a ministerial power and function in the Church; but their exact purport is the precise question in debate, which therefore they cannot solve. Men whose opinions are not to be ignored have pointed out that all these passages are patient of an interpretation which attaches the powers there spoken of to the Church at large, without indicating even in the broadest outline the manner of their exercise.¹ There are solemn charges delivered by the Lord to the Apostles; there is a promise and a grant of powers needed for the fulfilment of the charge; there is a very definite mission—"As the Father hath sent me, even so send I you." Had these words the effect of giving to the Apostles a magisterial authority in the Church, or were they addressed to the whole body of believers; or, if to the Twelve alone, then to them as representing the whole body? In a word, were the Twelve addressed as *Apostles* or as *Disciples*?

One of the most unvarying of Christian traditions takes the words as conveying or illustrating a grant of specific authority. The Lord committed to the Apostles his flock, of which they were to be pastors and rulers; he committed to them all the nations of the world, out of which to gather disciples. By necessary inference,

¹ Such is the ground maintained in Dr. Hort's lectures on *The Christian Ecclesia*, where the passages are subjected to a searching analysis. Dr. Hort, however, was deserted by his usual caution when he said (p. 84) that there is "no trace in Scripture of a formal commission of authority for government from Christ himself." This positive denial seems hardly more justifiable than a positive counter-assertion that the passages in question contain a clear and unmistakable record of such a commission.

and probably in accordance with explicit instructions, they were to take to themselves others who should aid them while they lived, and afterwards succeed to their authority. Thus the sacred ministry of the Church was directly instituted by the Lord himself. So says the Christian tradition. At various times there have been sharp controversies about the nature of the powers thus given, but the dispute always presupposes the reality of the gift. Even in the sixteenth century, those who broke loose from the received order of the Church and were in open revolt against the prelacy delivered this same tradition as they had received it. There was bold speculation, only in part new, as to the mode of appointment to the sacred ministry, but the institution itself was treated as an integral part of the Christian deposit. The Protestant and Reformed Confessions are here agreed. "The power of the keys, or of bishops," says the Confession of Augsburg, "according to the gospel is a power or mandate of God to preach the gospel, to remit and retain sins, and to administer the sacraments." The Saxon Confession, presented to the Council of Trent, attributes to the Son of God, as supreme Priest, the institution of ministers of the gospel. The Helvetic Confession declares that "the origin, institution, and function of ministers is most ancient, and is an ordinance of God himself, not a novelty or of man's devising." The Reformed of the Netherlands profess to appoint ministers, elders, and deacons "in such order and manner as the word of God prescribes." The English Calvinists were no less positive, and Hooker, in his controversy with them, had to show that they attributed to the Divine Word an even too precise and detailed ordering of the sacred ministry.¹

¹ Hooker, *Ecc. Pol.*, v. 80. See Note A at the end of the volume.

According to a principle already laid down, a tradition of the whole Christian society so firmly rooted that no stress of controversy could shake it, a tradition which underlay controversy about the matter of the tradition itself and was the fundamental postulate of all parties alike, a tradition concerning those primary ideas of government about which every society is tenaciously conservative,—such a tradition is of itself good historical evidence for the fact of a definite commission given by our Lord to the first Pastors of the Church. The tradition is found in possession from a very early date. The Epistle of St. Clement of Rome to the Corinthians supplies, indeed, little evidence about the mode in which the ministerial commission was conveyed, but is clear and unmistakable about the continuous transmission of authority from the Lord himself. The Fathers of the second century, it is allowed on all hands, knew no other opinion. In controversy with heretics they triumphantly adduced the succession of authority in the Apostolic churches, an argument in their eyes indisputable and conclusive.¹

In face of such a tradition the complete silence of Scripture would be insignificant. But Scripture is not silent. There are many passages of the New Testament which are in perfect accord with the tradition. They are patient indeed of another interpretation, but that interpretation can be maintained only by setting aside or ignoring the evidence of the tradition. To examine the records of the New Testament without using this evidence is to attempt a delicate piece of work without using the proper tools. The historic Church, the Church as known

¹ Clem. Rom., *Ad Cor.*, 37-44. See the treatment of this subject in Gore, *The Church and the Ministry*; and Moberly, *Ministeria Priesthood*, ch. iv.

to the later Christian tradition, is without all question the outcome or effect of the events recorded in New Testament. But causes can be investigated only by watching their effects, and it is useless to study the Apostolic Church without reference to later growth.¹ The writings of the New Testament might perhaps be studied in isolation if they were systematic treatises, though even then the result would be unsatisfactory; but they are in fact occasional writings, and they can be understood only in relation to the state of things which gave them birth. That state of things was the continuous growth of a society, the Christian Church, every stage of which can be rightly understood only in relation to other stages. The question before us concerns the constitution of that society. It is a question purely of fact; whether in fact the essential constitution of the sacred ministry was given by revelation of the Lord Jesus Christ; whether it be in fact a matter of Christian doctrine. I take that question to be answered in the affirmative by the persistent tradition of the Christian

¹ This seems to me the one fatal flaw in the otherwise luminous work of Dr. Hort, already referred to, on *The Christian Ecclesia*. He says (p. 2), "The larger part of our subject lies in the region of what we commonly call Church History; the general Christian history of the ages subsequent to the Apostolic age. But before entering on that region we must devote some little time to matter contained in the Bible itself. It is hopeless to try to understand either the actual Ecclesia of post-apostolic times, or the thoughts of its own contemporaries about it, without first gaining some clear impressions as to the Ecclesia of the Apostles out of which it grew; to say nothing of the influence exerted all along by the words of the apostolic writings and by other parts of Scripture." True; but it is equally hopeless to try to understand the "Ecclesia of the Apostles" without reference to its after-growth. The mistake lies in treating either part of the subject in isolation.

Church reading in the required sense the words of the Lord himself.

The constitution of the Church then, as a social organism with a duly appointed ministry, is to be taken as a matter of Christian doctrine. And since the Church is generically a society of men, it is necessary to know the specific marks or characteristics by which it is distinguished from other societies. These may be in part such as have been acquired in the course of ages, and are therefore results of human experience and objects of purely natural knowledge. The Church has a history, and is known by that history. But more important are those notes which belong essentially to the Church, and are the immediate consequence of the Divine ordering. These must be sought in the revelation of Jesus Christ, and are included in the scheme of Christian doctrine.

The Church exists for a certain end. Human society in general exists for the right ordering of human life, materially and morally.¹ The Church, the society of redeemed and regenerate humanity, exists for the right ordering of the higher or spiritual life. It is none the less external, for this life is to be lived in the body, and under the ordinary conditions of humanity, reinforced, not superseded, by the working of Divine grace. The spiritual life depends in the first instance on the knowledge of God, and the first office of the Church is to see that men have this knowledge; the Church has a teaching office. In the second place, there are certain external means of grace appointed by God, of which the Church is the keeper and dispenser; the Church has the administration of the sacraments. By the ministry of the Word and the Sacraments the primary spiritual needs of the individual

¹ Aristotle, *Pol.*, i. 2 : *Γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὕσα δὲ τοῦ εἶ ζῆν.*

are supplied, and he is so fitted for his place in the social order of redeemed humanity. These things all belong to Christian doctrine. There is much about them which is proper to social organization as such, and so belongs to the natural order; there is much that comes from human authority within the Church, and from no higher source. These elements are carefully to be distinguished; there remains in the organization of the Church something essential and peculiar to this society, according to the will of God made known to us by Jesus Christ.

The study of the marks or characteristics of the Church is the more important because there are groups of individuals which claim to form exclusively the society in question, and their claim is denied by others. This claim, therefore, must be tested; and it can be tested only by finding whether all the characteristic marks of the Christian Church are found in the group asserting the claim, and whether some of them are found exclusively in that group. It is evident that in such cases there will be a tendency consciously or unconsciously to insist on those characteristics which are most apparent in the group in question, or on the other hand to emphasize those in which it appears to be lacking. When, for example, the Donatists of the fourth century claimed that they and they alone formed the true Christian Church, they naturally insisted on those Christian characteristics in which they supposed themselves to be conspicuously superior; their opponents as naturally emphasized the points in which they fell short of the ideal. This controversial treatment of the marks of the Church leads inevitably to a loss of proportion. Nor is it easy, in the presence of a practical dispute, to treat the matter without regard to controversy. We can only attempt with the least possible prejudice to search and to set out the solid

core of Christian doctrine, by reference to which the controversy must be determined.

A similar difficulty occurs in dealing with the discipline of the Church. There are differences of opinion among professed Christians, differences affecting not merely details of practice in regard to which divergent usages may coexist in one society, but matters which are regarded by some at least of the disputants as fundamental. Thus we have certain groups of professed Christians who claim to be observing all the essential rules of discipline by which the Christian society is held together, and we find other professed Christians altogether denying their claim. There are some who maintain as part of that essential discipline a system of no small complexity; others allow nothing beyond the bare elements of social order to be essential. Episcopal rule is held by some to be a necessary part of ecclesiastical organization; by others it is regarded as only one form in which the government of the Church may lawfully be cast; others yet again contend that ecclesiastical order essentially consists in subordination to a single superior, who is the Vicar of Christ, the visible head of the Church on earth. The question of discipline is therefore entangled in controversy, and a treatment of it which should ignore controversy is hardly possible. The matter is often treated as a question whether such and such a group is in truth a part of the Church; and those who seem to deny this are said by a barbarous term to *unchurch* the claimants. But the question is not correctly posed in this form. It has two faults. In the first place, it obscures the nature of membership in the Church. Such membership is conferred on individuals, not on groups of persons, and no man is within the Church by aggregation to any smaller body, but only by aggregation to the

Church itself. In the second place, it suggests that men are within the Church by reason of their observance of the Church's discipline. The converse is rather true. Men are bound to observe the discipline of the Church because they are within the Church. There is, therefore, in all these controversies, a preliminary question, whether such and such persons are individually members of the Christian Church. The question may then be raised, whether such persons, being within the Church, do individually or collectively observe the essential discipline of the Church. But what is the essential discipline of the Church? On this point turn most of the disputes by which the Christian society is in practice divided. How then shall the question be answered? The divisions of Christendom, some being of long standing, and having their roots in a remote past, raise an obvious difficulty. We lack that uniform tradition of the whole Christian society, or at least of its greater part, by which we determine most surely the sense of Christian teaching. The divisions indeed perpetuate themselves just because they hinder that solution of controversy by which alone they can be ended. Here again, then, treating the matter as uncontroversially as possible, we can but state what seems to be most clearly established in the constitution of the Church as given by the Lord Jesus Christ, leaving doubtful points as doubtful.

So far we are concerned with Christian theory—the apprehension of truth. There remains a part of Christian doctrine, the importance of which is altogether out of proportion to the space which its treatment will demand. It is the doctrine of Christian practice, or Religion. Religion is submission of the human will to the Will of God. It is good and true in measure as it is founded in true knowledge of God. Its strength is another matter.

Men may adhere earnestly to a false religion. A religion the most degraded, because founded in the most degraded idea of God, may have the strongest possible hold on its votaries. By revelation God has sought to make known to men, not his Nature only, but his Will. This part of revelation proceeded even more slowly than the other; both alike are complete in the teaching of Jesus Christ. The Christian religion is submission to the Will of God as revealed by him. It is an active, not a passive, submission. It consists in the willing performance of those duties which are laid upon us by the teaching of the gospel. Christian doctrine therefore includes the declaration of these duties. They are few and simple, but so comprehensive as to cover the whole of human life.

In the first place, we shall have to consider the nature of Conscience, the faculty by which duty is recognized as such. What faith is to the apprehension of doctrine, conscience will be to the apprehension of practical duties; with this difference however, that whereas faith is concerned only with truth supernaturally revealed, the conscience apprehends alike the duties imposed by the natural law and those inculcated by revelation. Following this distinction, the Christian religion is the observance alike of natural duties and of those to which a man is bound by virtue of his admission to the Christian Church. But even these latter are laid upon man for the fulfilment of the end of his natural being. He is united to the Body of Christ in order that he may find his own proper perfection. The end of the Christian religion is the attainment of this perfection, the nature of which we shall therefore have occasion to consider.

Under these heads we shall study the elements of Christian doctrine. We must distinguish the truths which are actually taught by revelation of God, the

necessary inferences that follow, the opinions which are to be held with certainty. We must mark, on the other hand, opinions which attain to a less degree of probability, and set aside those which are clearly to be rejected, because in conflict with the truth.

PART III.—*The Proposition of Faith*

“How shall they believe,” asks St. Paul, “in him whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach, except they be sent?” The doctrine of Christ must be set before men; then only can they receive it; then only can they bear the responsibility of rejecting it. The Lord Jesus Christ himself set before men the truth of God; those who received it from him set it before others in turn, being sent for this very purpose. The Apostles were the few who were more especially appointed for this end. They in particular, though not they alone, are referred to in our Lord’s words, “He that receiveth whomsoever I send receiveth me.” To the Seventy, who received a limited commission like that of the Twelve, he said, “He that heareth you heareth me; and he that rejecteth you rejecteth me; and he that rejecteth me rejecteth him that sent me.”¹

This communication of the doctrine of Christ to all who will receive it is called by theologians the Proposition or Proposal of Faith. Such proposition imposes on the hearer the duty of acceptance. He is intellectually free to believe or disbelieve, but he is not morally free. He is intellectually free, because revealed truths are not of a nature to carry necessary conviction to the mind as soon as they are stated. They are accepted, as we have seen,

¹ Rom. x. 14; John xiii. 20; Luke x. 16.

by faith in him who has revealed them ; and apart from this requirement of faith, we need evidence to prove that he has in fact revealed what is propounded. But the hearer is not morally free to disbelieve. Rejection of revealed truth is continually spoken of as wrong-doing. It is treated as a part of that separation from God which is at once the effect and the mark of sin. "He that is of God heareth the words of God," said the Lord Jesus Christ to the doubting or unbelieving Jews ; "for this cause ye hear them not, because ye are not of God." The reason is not far to seek. Since God has willed to make himself known to men, it would be dishonouring him to suppose that the means chosen and used for this revelation were insufficient for the purpose. His complete and final revelation is by his Son Jesus Christ. Therefore we are bound, on the hypothesis of revelation, to hold that Jesus Christ made known the truth of God in a way that ought to have carried conviction. His credentials, so to say, were sufficient to remove all reasonable doubt. Accordingly, in the Gospel narrative we continually find men driven to confess that he was indeed sent from God. He appealed confidently to his credentials. "The works which the Father hath given me to accomplish, the very works that I do, bear witness of me." Those therefore who rejected him were inexcusable. "If I had not done among them the works which none other did, they had not had sin : but now have they both seen and hated both me and my Father." ¹

The nature of human responsibility requires us to limit this judgment to those upon whom the Lord's teaching and the manifestation of his Divine mission were actually brought to bear. But further, he adapted his teaching to the capacity of the hearers. Even to the Twelve, and

¹ John viii. 47 ; v. 36 ; xv. 24.

that on the last night before his Passion, he said, "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now." This does not mean that he accommodated his doctrine to the natural and acquired abilities or to the prejudices of men. Otherwise he would not on the one hand have chosen rude Galileans to be the depositaries of revelation, nor on the other hand have condemned the Pharisees and the chiefs of Judaism for their rejection of teaching which ran most strongly counter to their traditions. It can only mean that he put before men just so much of Divine truth as they were morally required to believe, the credentials being what they were. As the reality first of his Divine mission, then of his own Divine power, was gradually disclosed, he unfolded truths which made the greater demands, not on the understanding, but on the faith of his hearers. To reject him in the beginning as a Prophet was a moral delinquency of the same kind as to reject him in the end as Son of God. His full revelation could not be made, even to his intimates, until he had finally established his claim to their confidence by the Resurrection. St. John says twice, and with emphasis, that only when the Lord was raised from the dead, or glorified, did his disciples understand certain parts of his life or teaching.¹

The Proposition of Faith means then, in the first instance, the active teaching of the Lord Jesus Christ, propounded in varying measure to various persons, in full measure to certain chosen ones after his resurrection. To them he unfolded the whole counsel of God, and within a few days fixed it in their hearts and memories by sending to them the Holy Ghost. Those who did not accept it, when put before them according to their several measure, are condemned as guilty of sin. The Proposi-

¹ John xvi. 12 ; ii. 22 ; xii. 16.

tion of Faith was continued by those who delivered to others what they received from the Lord ; and it continued to impose the same responsibility on the hearer. They who received or rejected him that was sent received or rejected the sender. Belief or unbelief is never spoken of in the New Testament as a choice of the intellect ; it is a moral choice between good and evil. The main argument of St. Paul in the Epistle to the Romans turns on the principle that belief in the Gospel is a moral action. Those who refused it are reprobated as disobedient. The same is the teaching of St. James, who bids the Jews of the Dispersion "receive with meekness the implanted word." The Jews of Beroea are commended, not as intelligent, but as noble, or generous, because they received the word with all readiness of mind. Faith is a gift of God, a supernatural virtue ; when the gospel was first preached at Antioch of Pisidia, as "many as were ordained to eternal life believed ;" the preachers of the gospel, says St. Paul to the Corinthians, "are Ministers through whom ye believed, and each as the Lord gave to him." But this must not be pressed to the overthrow of human responsibility. "We ought to welcome such," says St. John, "that we may be fellow-workers with the truth." The reason was then, as always, that God, purposing to make himself known, had provided sufficient means. There was testimony to the truth, which if a man rejected he rejected out of perversity. "He that believeth not God hath made him a liar ; because he hath not believed in the witness that God hath borne concerning his Son." They who preached the gospel gave a sufficient testimony ; and those to whom they testified were therefore bound to receive it, as those who had heard the Lord himself were bound to receive his word. "Ye received me," says St. Paul to the Galatians,

“as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus.” At an earlier period he described men as disorderly, who would not follow his tradition; and he made this peremptory claim of moral authority: “If any man obeyeth not our word by this epistle, note that man, that ye have no company with him, to the end that he may be ashamed.”¹

The Apostles, we must remember, did not speak in their own name. They did not claim to have an original revelation. They taught by tradition; that is to say, by delivering to others what they had received. Their witness was therefore twofold. They had to put before men at once the teaching and the credentials of the Lord Jesus Christ. In the latter aspect they were witnesses of the Resurrection; in the former aspect they were guardians of a deposit. They were to add nothing of their own; or if they added anything by way of counsel or opinion, they were to mark it carefully as their own. “Concerning virgins,” said St. Paul, “I have no commandment of the Lord; but I give my judgment, as one that hath obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithful.” He says modestly in conclusion, “I think that I also have the Spirit of God.” But when he was on the ground of revelation, he could say, “I give charge, yea not I, but the Lord.” We have here the important distinction, of which there will be more to say, between Christian doctrine and Christian opinion. When giving a simple opinion St. Paul had a certain claim on the obedience of his spiritual children; when he proposed to them the doctrine of Christ, he claimed an obedience of absolute obligation. The witness that he bore was such that men could not reject it without sin.²

¹ Rom. xv. 31; James i. 21; Acts xvii. 11; xiii. 48; 1 Cor. iii. 5; 3 John 8; 1 John v. 10; Gal. iv. 14; 2 Thess. iii. 6, 14.

² 1 Cor. vii. 10, 25, 40.

We must here pause to ask what is meant by the sin of unbelief. It is described by St. John as making God a liar. The rejection of revealed truth is in the same order as the rejection of natural religion. St. Paul has set out the guilt of this rejection in the Epistle to the Romans: "The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold down the truth in unrighteousness; because that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God manifested it unto them. For the invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity." That is to say, nature gives sufficient testimony to the being and power of God. And speaking generally, this testimony is sufficiently proposed to all men. Therefore those who reject it are without excuse, "because that, knowing God, they glorified him not as God, neither gave thanks; but became vain in their reasonings, and their senseless heart was darkened." They were not left in helpless ignorance or doubt, but as moral agents, having the choice of truth and falsehood, "they refused to have God in their knowledge." The sin here consists in the refusal to employ according to the will of God the testimony of himself which he affords. The same sin is involved in the rejection of revealed religion. Sin being generically a disordered misuse of creation, the sin of unbelief is the misuse or neglect of those means by which God has willed to make himself known. This needs pressing; for a certain unwillingness to acknowledge that unbelief is sin, an inclination to reckon it only as an intellectual, not a moral defect, has led to much confusion. Compelled by the stern language of Scripture to allow that there is in unbelief at least something of the nature of sin, men

look for the element of sinfulness, not in the unbelief itself, but in its secondary causes. They assume that unbelief is ordinarily caused by moral disorders which blind or warp the judgment: where it is found consisting with general purity and nobility of character, it is treated as abnormal, a puzzle to the understanding, not a thing calling for moral condemnation. But a normal connection of this kind between unbelief and other forms of depravity cannot be traced. It is true that general depravity may hinder belief. "Men loved the darkness rather than the light," says our Lord, "for their works were evil." But we may not infer this particular cause from the effect; and indeed St. Paul, while recognizing the connection, inverts the order, and treats general depravity as a natural consequence of unbelief. Because men would not have God in their knowledge, therefore "God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not fitting." But neither is this a necessary consequence, nor is it this which makes the sin of unbelief. Regarded in itself, unbelief is a misuse of God's gift, and is therefore a sin.¹

To return: if rejection of the faith be sin, there must be a sufficient proposition of the faith. Sin is an act of the will; and until the faith is presented to the understanding it cannot be rejected by the will. The mere absence of belief is no sin; there must be an act of rejection. If a man err through ignorance, such error will not bring him into condemnation, unless indeed, as Bramhall says, he "err with obstinacy, not willing to embrace the truth, though it were sufficiently proposed."² But actual unbelief, we are taught, is ordinarily actual sin. It follows that we have in fact a sufficient proposition of the faith. Under ordinary conditions the truths of natural

¹ Rom. i. 18-28; John iii. 19.

² Bramhall, *Works*, vol. v. p. 206.

religion are sufficiently proposed to all men. In like manner revealed truth is sufficiently proposed, not indeed to all men, but to all those to whom the gospel is preached. It was so proposed by the Lord himself; it was so proposed in the time of the Apostles; it continues to be so proposed.

Who then is the proponent? As we have seen, the Apostles had to put before the world two things, the teaching of Christ and his credentials. In doing this they needed credentials of their own. Their proposition was sufficient; but why? Why were men bound in conscience to believe their report? Two reasons are conceivable. Either it was sufficient in itself to carry conviction, or it was proposed by a sufficient authority. The former reason is not lightly to be passed by. The Lord Jesus Christ seems to imply more than once that such immediate conviction is possible, at least for some men or in some conditions of heart and mind. "If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God." The truth itself may appeal to men. "If I say truth, why do ye not believe me? He that is of God heareth the words of God: for this cause ye heard them not, because ye are not of God."¹ There are men at all times to whom the teaching of the gospel seems to come home as evident truth. They may fortify themselves with these passages; but it must always remain doubtful how far they are influenced by a habit of thought working secretly in their minds. The obligation to believe was not put by the Lord on this ground. It was because of the works that he had done among

¹ John vii. 17; viii. 46. St. Paul's words in 2 Cor. iv. 2 may seem at first sight to look the same way, but he is more probably speaking of personal confidence in a teacher secured by open and straightforward dealing.

them, such as none other did, that he convicted those who rejected him of the sin of unbelief. However potent, therefore, the internal evidence of the truth, it was not sufficient to impose the moral obligation of believing. But if it was not sufficient when the Lord himself was the proponent, much less could it be sufficient when the truth was presented by his ministers. Nor is this all the difficulty. These ministers had also to put before men the credentials upon which the Lord himself insisted. These were his life and works, and, above all, his Resurrection. But if the doctrine was not self-evident, still less were the credentials. They were historical facts. There is some plausibility, and perhaps something more, in the contention that our Lord's recorded life is too perfect in its beauty to be a fiction; that it could not be invented unless by a man of equally perfect character. But this cannot be said of the Resurrection, which the Apostles put forward as the main ground for believing the truths of the gospel. They were, first and foremost, witnesses of the Resurrection. This was a thing in itself most improbable; its natural improbability was, in fact, precisely what gave it evidential force. It has, indeed, been said, and well said, that the Resurrection was "the appropriate—the obviously appropriate—climax to the whole of Christ's previous attitude towards matter."¹ But this conclusion is of value only when the justice of that previous attitude is acknowledged; that is to say, when the whole truth of the gospel is accepted. It is of infinite value for the reinforcement of faith to observe a natural and not an arbitrary connection between the credentials and the teaching which they support. But we are considering the Resurrection as presented to men not yet believing. To them it is presented as a fact by no

¹ Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, p. 100.

means self-evident. The truth proposed to men is not therefore sufficient in itself to carry conviction. We are compelled to fall back upon the second reason for believing. The truth is sufficiently proposed, because it is proposed by a sufficient authority.

The Apostles were witnesses of the Resurrection; and they had to put before men the teaching which they had received from the Lord. What were their credentials? From one point of view we have these set forth with singular fulness in St. Paul's controversial epistles. His apostolic authority was challenged, and he had to meet the objectors. His main position is that by manifest honesty of purpose he commended himself to every human conscience. He appealed to the evidence of his disinterested work; his refusal to accept even sustenance from those whom he taught; his abounding labours and sufferings in the cause of the gospel; his readiness to face even death. Driven by stress of controversy, he would even vaunt these things, the signs of an Apostle. In a less degree he relied on the evidence of miracles; but he returns always to the former point: he would have men say of him that he was a truth-teller, and when he spoke of his own experience he must therefore be trusted. "We are made manifest unto God," he says, "and I hope that we are made manifest also in your conscience."¹

These, it will be seen, are purely personal credentials; they could affect only those among whom St. Paul lived his life. And more, however convincing to those who knew him intimately, they were subject to a corroding doubt; there was always the possibility of hallucination. They might prove St. Paul's honesty; they would not

¹ See the Epistles to the Corinthians, *passim*, and especially 2 Cor. iv. 2, 11; xii. 1, 12.

prove his possession of real truth. But something lay behind. There were others who bore the same testimony—the original Twelve. They, no doubt, had the same personal credentials, though we hear less of them because their apostolate was never challenged. They bore united testimony; and St. Paul, though careful to guard the independence of his own witness, was no less careful to test it by comparison with theirs. “I laid before them,” he says, “the gospel which I preach among the Gentiles, but privately before them who were of repute, lest by any means I should be running, or had run, in vain.”¹ Nor did the testimony of the Twelve stand alone—the witness of a small knot of closely associated men who might be suspect. There was from the first a considerable body of men who stood with them. St. Paul appealed to the witness of some hundreds for the Resurrection. Some thousands were joined to them while the memory of all they recorded was yet fresh.² Others were continually added who, if they brought no original support, testified at least to conviction carried home where there were ample means for refuting falsehood. In a word, the gospel was received on the testimony of the whole Church. This element in the proposition of the faith remains constant. The Apostles with their personal credentials passed away; the Church remained. The proposition was weakened on one side, as the generation that was near to the events passed away; it was strengthened on another side by the wide extension of the Church and the multiplication of interlacing traditions, which added to the difficulty, and therefore to the value,

¹ Gal. ii. 2.

² The testimony of the empty grave and of the grave-clothes to all the dwellers in Jerusalem is well brought out in Mr. Latham’s stimulating book *The Risen Master*.

of unanimity. We have already considered the witness of the Church to Christian doctrine. We now come to the proposition of the Church. The Church at large is in all ages the proponent of the faith.

Let us recall what has been said about the nature of Christian doctrine and the faith of the disciple by which it is received. The function of the Church as the proponent of the gospel is to put before men the teaching of our Lord and Master Jesus Christ, together with his life and works which are his warrant as Teacher. In this way men are made disciples. This proposition is sufficient, with a sufficiency that is of God ; and therefore he who rejects it is ordinarily guilty of sin. Ordinarily ; for we are not bound to suppose it sufficient in all circumstances for all men. But of exceptional cases God alone, the reader of all hearts, can judge. The proposition is in general sufficient. But in what does the sufficiency consist ? In other words, what is there in the presentment of Christian doctrine which binds men to receive it ? This is not the same thing as to ask why men do as a matter of fact believe. There are motives in great variety which induce belief ; and some of the most active are such as it would certainly be no sin to resist. Early training, habits of thought, confidence in a leader, are common motives of Christian belief, which under changed conditions are equally motives to error. What we are seeking is a generally sufficient motive, invariably directing men to the right end, which therefore cannot be resisted without sin.

Two answers to the question may be considered and put aside. It is said that men are bound to believe what is proposed, because of the infallibility of the Church, the proponent. But the infallibility of the Church is itself a part, and no very elementary part, of the doctrine which

is to be received. To a believer it is a great and valuable stay; but it cannot be a ground of believing in general. Refusal to accept the teaching of an infallible authority cannot be sinful unless there are previous grounds for believing in the infallibility. As Bramhall says, "if either a man be not assured that there is an infallible proponent, or be not assured who this infallible proponent is, the proposition may be disbelieved without giving God the lie." This answer, therefore, will not do. The infallibility of the Church may be a valid reason to certain persons for believing certain particulars of Christian doctrine; it cannot be the fundamental reason for accepting Christ as Master.¹

A second answer grounds the obligation of believing on the sufficiency of Holy Scripture. The proposition of faith is contained in the Bible; the Church is indeed the proponent, but only in the sense of directing men to the Word of God. A preliminary objection to this may be taken at once. It supposes a ground of sufficiency entirely different from that on which the Apostles relied; for when they taught, the Scriptures of the New Testament did not exist. Another objection sometimes taken is unsound. We cannot impugn the sufficiency of Holy Scripture on the ground that all kinds of error notoriously claim its support. The fact that a man wrests the Scriptures does not prove their insufficiency for guiding him right if he will bend his will to learn. The sin of unbelief might consist exclusively in such wresting or neglect of the Word of God. But there is a more searching objection. What is meant by the sufficiency of Holy Scripture? Setting aside the heedless sayings of men who do not weigh their words, we find a close reasoner like Calvin maintaining that what is taught in the Bible

¹ Bramhall, *Works*, vol. ii. p. 279.

commends itself immediately to the reader as Divine.¹ But here again we stumble on a difficulty already met. The Lord Jesus Christ himself did not claim for his own spoken words such immediate acceptance. He appealed to his works; and for the rejection of this evidence presented to their eyes he accounted men sinners. But if his spoken word could not carry conviction, how shall the same word more coldly presented after the lapse of ages on the written page? It did then, and does now, carry conviction to some hearts, and a special blessing is pronounced on these; but a general obligation to believe cannot be so grounded. Nor can it be grounded on the historic record in the Gospels of the Lord's credentials, his Life, his Works, his Resurrection. It was one thing to see and know these, or even to hear of them at first hand from eye-witnesses; it is a very different thing to read them as facts of history. As recorded in the Gospels they are such facts, and so must stand or fall by the rules of historical evidence. A careful investigation may compel intellectual acceptance of the facts, and may possibly set up for those capable of such investigation a moral obligation to believe. But if the record is to have this effect in general, the truth of the facts must be directly evident—so evident that refusal to believe is giving God the lie. It cannot be made thus evident unless by the supreme power of God the Creator acting on the mind of the reader. Calvin assumes such action, and so becomes logical. The sufficiency however is no longer in the Scriptures themselves, but in the Divine grace which enables men to see the truth. This, and not the sufficiency of Holy

¹ Calvin, *Instit.*, i. 7, § 4: "Si puros oculos et integros sensus illuc afferimus statim occurret Dei maiestas quae subacta reclamandi audacia nos sibi parere cogat."

Scripture, is supposed as the ground of the obligation to believe. The true meaning of the sufficiency of Holy Scripture we have already considered when dealing with the nature of Christian doctrine. It is sufficient for the matter proposed, not for the proposition.

These attempted answers being put aside, the sufficiency of the proposition is found to be in reality a far less simple matter. We are not bound to take into account all the motives which may induce belief; but we must include all that are universal in operation, and so belong to the general order of God's ruling. We can bring these under two heads: the inherent reasonableness of the matter proposed, and the authority of the proponent. By reasonableness we must understand not merely a superficial probability, but a far-reaching conformity with the whole order of creation, in which we trace the working of the Divine Reason. For the present purpose this reasonableness must be such as to convince not only some specially gifted souls, but the understanding and conscience of the ordinary man. It will range in practice from the analogy with nature worked out by the solid thought of Butler, to the simplest perception of something in the gospel corresponding to a need felt in the heart of man. But God does not require any one to be convinced by such reasonableness alone of the truth of things outside his own experience. There is added the authority of the proponent, which is the Church. "I should not," says St. Augustine, "believe the gospel, did not the authority of the Catholic Church move me thereto."¹

These much-debated words have been misunderstood chiefly for want of attention. We must note exactly

¹ Aug., *Contr. Epist. Fundamenti*, c. 5: "Evangelio non crederem nisi me catholicae ecclesiae commoveret auctoritas." See Note B.

what St. Augustine says, and what he does not say. He puts forward the authority of the Church not as a ground for believing, but as a motive. It has been compared with the report of Philip bringing Nathanael to Christ, and with the witness of the Samaritan woman attracting her fellow-townsmen, who afterwards said, "Now we believe, not for thy speaking: for we have heard for ourselves and know." But this falls short of St. Augustine's meaning. He did not speak of the Church as merely arousing a curiosity which is satisfied by the gospel. The testimony of the Church is one of the causes directly moving men to believe. The nature of this testimony we have already considered; we are now concerned with its effect. It has in practice the effect of inducing belief. Whether we regard the historical testimony of the whole Church from the beginning, or the common assent of Christians at any given time, or that "conversation in the bosom of the Church," which Hooker puts prominently forward,¹ men are in fact drawn to the faith and sustained therein by this influence. God has therefore provided means by which his truth may be set before men. We may apply to revealed religion what St. Paul said of natural religion, that God has not left himself without witness.² The proposition of the faith by the Church is ordinarily sufficient to require assent, and to impose on the hearer the obligation of believing.

The authority of the Church is not the ground for believing. There is one only ground: it is the conviction of the disciple that God has taught these things through Jesus Christ our Lord. If the authority of the Church were the ground for believing, it would follow that a new doctrine might be proposed by the Church to rank equally with the original teaching of the gospel.

¹ Hooker, *Works*, vol. ii. p. 95.

² Acts xiv. 17.

But this we have seen to be impossible. The proposition of the Church is limited to the setting forth of the teaching of the Lord Jesus Christ in a form intelligible and free from ambiguity. In practice the Church is limited to propounding what is already contained in Holy Scripture. This limitation obviously does not belong to the nature of things, for the Church was preaching the faith before the Canon of the New Testament was closed. Nor again is it imposed on the Church by Divine authority, for that could not be done without express revelation. So again the assertion that "Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation," cannot be itself a truth necessary to salvation; else it would be self-contradictory, since no such assertion can be found in Holy Scripture. The assertion is true, but it must not be confused with the revealed truths of the gospel. It is the recognition of a fact; and the sufficiency of Holy Scripture in this regard being a fact, the Church renounces, by a self-denying ordinance, the power of proposing as matter of faith anything which goes beyond.

Holy Scripture, I have said, is sufficient for the matter proposed, though not for the proposition. This does not mean that nothing more is required of the Church than to place the Bible before the world. The Rule of Faith, as we have seen, is Holy Scripture interpreted by the Church. The faith which is proposed by the Church is the content of Holy Scripture, collected, explained, guarded, and freed, if necessary, from ambiguity. On the other hand, not everything contained in Holy Scripture is equally proposed. There are parts of the Bible the meaning of which is far from clear, and which the authority of the Church has never interpreted. Every such passage has in fact some one definite meaning,

which is the truth ; but this truth is not proposed as matter of belief. No blame therefore attaches to those who fail to apprehend it. Any one stands condemned who reads into such an obscure passage a meaning contradictory to a known truth ; but no one is condemned merely because he fails to draw out the true meaning. Nor may we hope that such obscurities will be cleared up in the future. The nature of the Church's witness forbids this. The Church does not propound anything new as matter of faith, but only declares what has been taught from the beginning. A novel interpretation may therefore be condemned ; but the meaning of a Scripture which has always been in doubt cannot be fixed by authority.

The Proposition of Faith is thus limited, partly by the nature of things, partly by a humble reserve. But in practice the teaching of the Church goes beyond the Proposition of Faith. We have seen the Apostles overstepping this limit. St. Paul taught some things of his own judgment, not by revelation of the Lord. The distinction holds good for all time. Not only matter of faith but also matter of opinion is put forward by the Church, sometimes with great tenacity. The opinion, already mentioned, that Holy Scripture contains all things necessary to salvation, is an instance. Another may be found in the current teaching of the Church with regard to the inspiration of Scripture. These doctrines are carefully to be distinguished on the one hand from those positive rules which the Church imposes by way of discipline, and on the other hand from those revealed truths of which the Church is only the recipient and proponent. They occupy a middle position, depending on the authority of the Church but not being the expression merely of the corporate will of

the Church. They are the result of an attempt to ascertain truth by means of the common sense of the whole Christian body, guided and sustained by the indwelling Spirit of God. They are a part of the teaching of the Church, though not strictly speaking a part of Christian doctrine. How then should they be regarded? As a matter of discipline the Church may forbid any man to contradict them, may even require of those who are to be admitted to the teaching office entire assent; and apart from these rules of discipline the grace of humility will impel the faithful to acknowledge at least the extreme probability of what is taught with the common consent of Christians. But this obligation of humility is not to be confused with the obligation of faith arising from the proposition of Christian doctrine.

It remains to consider the mode of this proposition. The Proposition of the Church is commonly described as of two kinds, ordinary and solemn. By the Ordinary Proposition of the Church we mean the exhibition of Christian doctrine which goes on day by day continually. Those who have their conversation in the bosom of the Church—to revert to Hooker's phrase—drink in perpetually the knowledge of the truth. They are taught by catechism, by custom, and by the example of their fellows. They are taught, according to the maxim *lex orandi lex credendi*, by the appointed forms of worship. The Holy Scriptures are put into their hands and are expounded. Much that is human, much that is local and peculiar, becomes in this way mingled with Divine truth, to the point sometimes of obscuring it. The true proposition is found in that which is universal and consistent. Accretions are warded off by the concurrence of all parts of the Church, the witness of the whole *Ecclesia dispersa*. In proportion to the freedom of intercourse among

Christians the purity of the proposition is guarded. The divisions of Christendom weaken the proposition, to a less degree in these days than when intercourse depended more on personal communication, but still seriously; and as the proposition is weakened so also is the obligation of faith. It is not however destroyed. The Ordinary Proposition of the Church may be identified in that which is taught by all parts of the Church alike; and to the simple Christian the proposition of his own part of the Church suffices.

The Solemn Proposition of the Church is required, and is attainable, only on extraordinary occasions. It is a declaration, by a Council fairly representing the whole Church, of what is believed and taught as Christian truth. Such a Council would ideally consist of all the bishops at least throughout the whole world—the *Ecclesia congregata*; but in practice no such gathering has ever been possible. A Council is known as General or Oecumenical, whatever its numbers, when it is recognized as being fairly representative. Nor is it possible to lay down any rule as to what will constitute such representation. The general acceptance of a Council alone can determine its authority. The work of a Council—I do not speak here of disciplinary canons or rules for the social order of the Church—is to gather in one definition the concurrent witness of all parts of the Church. It is required only when some serious innovation or heresy is threatening the continuity of Christian doctrine. A conciliar definition is not more certain or more binding than the ordinary proposition of the Church. In itself indeed it is less binding. The decree of a Council, however great and important, is valuable only as declaring the general doctrine of the Church; if it run counter to this, it is rejected. The first Council of Nicaea, in the

face of Arian innovation, declared the faith of the Church in the consubstantiality of the Son of God. Some years later the Council of Ariminium, a larger body, accepted a statement which was practically Arian. The result was only a temporary confusion and trouble. The general teaching of the Church overrode the authority of the Council. A conciliar definition is merely a solemn mode of putting before men what the Church believes and teaches. The Solemn Proposition of the Church, like the ordinary proposition, is not the ground of believing but a motive to belief. The dogmatic definition of Nicaea or Chalcedon is binding, not because it is the decree of a Council, but because it accurately expresses the doctrine received from the Lord Jesus Christ.

Such definition is not therefore without effect. The proposition being more solemn appeals more strongly to the conscience; and being more public, leaves the less room for a plea of ignorance. It follows that as a man is bound to accept the truths of revelation proposed by the Church, so he is in particular bound to believe what is solemnly defined. A Council cannot make that revealed truth which was not revealed truth; but, says Bramhall, "a general Council may make that revealed truth necessary to be believed by a Christian as a point of Faith, which formerly was not necessary to be believed." That is to say, the truth being brought home to a man, he is bound to receive it. Bramhall defines and limits the obligation by saying that "when a general Council hath determined any controversy, no man may oppose its determination, but every one is bound to acquiesce and possess his soul in patience, though he be not convicted in his conscience of the truth of their sentence." But this is rather a matter of Christian discipline than of faith. Field is perhaps clearer. It is not necessary, he says, "expressly

to believe whatsoever the council hath concluded, though it be true, unless by some other means it appear unto us to be true, and we be convinced of it in some other sort than by the bare determination of the council only. But it sufficeth that we believe it *implicite*, and *in praeparatione animi*, that out of the due respect we bear to the council's decree we dare not resolve otherwise, and be ready expressly to believe it, if it shall be made to appear unto us." By the judgments of these two great English divines I am content to abide.¹

So much we may say of the Proposition of Faith by the Church, ordinary and solemn. But the teaching of the Church is sometimes spoken of inaccurately in a more extended sense, being taken to mean all that is taught by any within the Church. This may obviously include some erroneous teaching, and much that is doubtful; for by no means all questions are determined by the authority of the Church, and mistaken opinions even about those which have been determined are not easily eradicated. Questions that have not been determined are known as open questions. Upon these, individual teachers may give divergent answers, and if the teaching function were in no way organized, there would be nothing more to say. But theology is an organized science. We must be careful here to see exactly what we mean. Theology is the science of revelation. It is the orderly systematic exposition of revealed truth as proposed in definitions of faith, and the orderly systematic treatment of open questions. Theologians, like the students of other sciences, maintain continual intercourse, mutually informing and correcting one another. The science of theology becomes in this

¹ Bramhall, *Works*, vol. ii. pp. 90, 91; Field, *Of the Church*, bk. v. c. 51, vol. iv. p. 60, ed. 1852.

way a certain compensation for the divisions of Christendom. A theologian is valued, not because he belongs to this or that communion, but only because of his knowledge. It is necessary to make allowance for prejudices, due to his ecclesiastical position, which may affect his judgment; but this allowance made, his knowledge and skill contribute their share to the science common to all his fellows throughout the world. There is therefore a scientific tradition of theological learning, partly uniform, partly controversial; and that which is uniform, since it is current everywhere, may easily be confused with the teaching of the Church. We must therefore be on the watch carefully to distinguish between the teaching of the Church and the teaching of theologians.

How should we regard the teaching of theologians? The question is not difficult to answer. Theologians are scientific experts. Their authority is exactly that of any other experts in their own science. Where they are unanimous, it is the extreme of rashness for any who are not expert to dissent. Where a great majority of them is agreed, it is still rash to follow the dissentient minority, though this minority may possibly be in the right. But rash and reckless speculation or an obstinate adherence to personal opinions, in a matter so important as religion, is a thing to be discouraged. On the other hand, no one is bound in conscience to believe any speculative opinion, however strongly supported by expert authority. An opinion therefore which runs counter to the general trend of theological teaching is condemned, not as false or heretical, but as rash. It may even be right for the Church, by way of discipline, to forbid men publicly to maintain such an opinion. The Church of England has thus adjudged that a certain opinion about

good works of supererogation "cannot be taught without arrogance and impiety."¹

Of special importance is that part of theological science which deals with practical duties. The moral teaching of the Lord Jesus Christ was given in the form not of minute and detailed precepts, but of wide far-reaching principles. These are preserved unchangeable with the rest of the Christian tradition, interpreted, if need be, and proposed to men by the Church. The whole Christian doctrine so proposed is sometimes divided under the heads of Faith and Morals; but the distinction is not well marked, since the teaching under both heads alike is received by faith. The principles of moral action are thus part of the Proposition of Faith. To these are added certain precepts of the Church, having the same authority which belongs, as we have seen, to all teaching of the Church that goes beyond the Proposition of Faith. That is to say, these precepts may not be proposed as necessary to salvation, but they impose a grave responsibility on any Christian who neglects them. There remains an important work for theologians. It is the application of the precepts of the gospel and of the Church to particular cases. The function of a theologian is to consider exceptional circumstances and to frame rules of conduct for individuals. Moral theology is the systematic study of practical religion; that branch of it which deals with particular cases is known as Casuistry. It is a science in the study of which, even more than in other branches of theology, there is needed not only skill but a pure adhesion to the spirit of true religion. The conclusions of theologians in this regard have the same kind of authority as in other matters. They establish in varying degrees a probability that

¹ *Articles of Religion*, No. xiv.

what is recommended is the right or at least the wiser course of action. And since probability is, in Butler's phrase, the guide of life, the conclusions of moral theology are valuable as means for informing the conscience. They are this, but they are no more.

A statement of Christian doctrine will therefore include in the first place those truths of the gospel which are defined and set before men by the Church in the Proposition of Faith. To these we must add all that is taught by the Church, not as Divine truth which men are bound to believe, but as opinion so highly probable as not to be rejected without dangerous temerity. Of far less importance, but not to be neglected, are the opinions of theologians about open questions. The systematic treatment of these topics is the sum of theological science.

My object is to exhibit these things in the simplest possible form. I shall try to state what is generally received and taught as the doctrine of Christ. I shall use for this purpose the language of the Church, but shall avoid the use of terms which belong only to the technical language of theology. The more important errors opposed to this doctrine will be indicated. I shall further aim at stating, with proper distinction, what is taught on the authority of the Church; and where it seems to be called for, I will try to give what is most probable in theological opinion. It will sometimes be well to mention even what stands on a lower ground of probability. In treating so large a matter within so brief a compass, I must often say what seems to me true without giving my reasons; I may often seem to speak with certainty where doubt or hesitation might be expected. I give only what I have received. Error may be in the measure of the recipient; for that I bear

the blame, protesting only that the error is not wilful. If I say anything amiss, I desire the condemnation of the offence, and pardon only for the offender. I therefore venture to make my own the words of Bramhall—¹

“I submit myself and my poor endeavours, first, to the judgment of the Catholic Œcumenical essential Church. . . . And if I should mistake the right Catholic Church out of human frailty or ignorance, . . . I do implicitly and in the preparation of my mind submit myself to the true Catholic Church, the spouse of Christ, the mother of the Saints, the pillar of truth. And seeing my adherence is firmer to the infallible rule of Faith, that is, the Holy Scriptures interpreted by the Catholic Church, than to mine own private judgment or opinions; although I should unwittingly fall into an error, yet this cordial submission is an implicit retractation thereof, and I am confident will be so accepted by the Father of Mercies, both from me and all others who seriously and sincerely do seek after peace and truth.

“Likewise I submit myself to the representative Church, that is, a free general Council, or so general as can be procured; and until then, to the Church of England, wherein I was baptized, or to a national English Synod: to the determination of all which, and each of them respectively, according to the distinct degrees of their authority, I yield a conformity and compliance, or at the least, and to the lowest of them, an acquiescence.”

¹ Bramhall, *Works*, vol. ii. p. 22.

CHAPTER I

OF GOD AND CREATION

SECT. I.—*The Being of God*

THERE is One eternal God. We mean by this a Being, without cause, without beginning, who is himself the cause of all things that have had beginning, that is, of all things that are not Himself. He is known as such, in some measure, by the common sense of mankind, since all things in our experience are referred to some cause, which is itself due to some other cause; and so we proceed until we are brought up to a cause which is not itself caused in any way. It is not impossible to imagine the existence of many such primary causes; but we become by experience so convinced of the unity of the visible world, that we are driven to refer all to one cause. For if we imagine several primary causes, we are compelled to refer the unity of their action to a common controlling force; but this is a common cause behind them, which alone is primary. A certain knowledge of God is therefore natural to man. That which may be known of God, says St. Paul, is manifest in men; it is a fact of their consciousness.¹

¹ Rom. i. 19. Joh. Damasc., *De Fid. Orthod.*, i. 1: Πᾶσι γὰρ ἡ γνώσις τοῦ εἶναι Θεοῦ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ φυσικῶς ἐγκατέσπαρται. See Introduction, p. 49.

This does not mean that all men know God, or recognize the necessity of this one cause of all things; but that nature affords sufficient evidence of his being to those who seek. The Being of God and the Unity of God are therefore truths of natural religion. They are not, strictly speaking, articles of the Christian Faith. They are, as St. Thomas Aquinas says, preambles to the Faith;¹ that is to say, they are presupposed in the delivery of Christian doctrine. For unless belief in God go before, nothing can be received as revealed by him. Such belief, being assumed as the basis of Christian doctrine, must be guarded against perversion or misunderstanding which would falsify all that is built upon it. We must therefore be careful to see what we mean by the Being and Unity of God.

Being and Unity are alike metaphysical terms; that is to say, they are employed in the scientific analysis of human knowledge. But the knowledge is prior to its analysis, and the fact which is known is prior to the knowledge. We are concerned with the fact; we use the results of metaphysic only for the sake of clear understanding. The truth that we have to express is the simple fact that *God is*. And this is an unchanging fact. The peculiar Name of God used in the revelation of the Old Testament, I-H-V-H, the pronunciation of which is uncertain, appears to be an expression of this fact; and the paraphrase of the Name given to Moses in Horeb was rendered by the Greek interpreters, in the language of philosophy, THE BEING.² Now Being, in this sense, excludes the idea of beginning or end; it includes the idea of self-existence or self-origination,³ which is foreign to all things that have beginning. For all things that

¹ *Summa Theol.*, I. 2. 2.

² 'O ΨΩΝ, Exod. iii. 14.

³ Latin theologians use the term *aseitas*, i. q. *a se esse*.

begin to be, or come into being, have a cause prior to themselves, and therefore external to themselves. This unalterable Being of God we feebly express by saying that he is Eternal. In so using the word we must remember that it means nothing less than this. It does not signify an inconceivable immeasurable duration. It signifies unalterable Being in which, since there is no beginning, no end, neither is there any middle or other division of extent; in which therefore there is no room for the idea of successive moments, no duration or lapse of time. In this Being there is no past or future; no present even, if this be regarded as a passing moment.

By the Unity of God we do not mean merely the negation of plurality. We do not mean that he is unique, or the only being of the kind. In this imperfect sense the Unity of God was first proclaimed in revelation. He was declared to have no equal, whether rival or partner. But this teaching was only a preparation for more perfect knowledge, and in itself it corrects only a crude form of misbelief. Neither do we say that God is One, in the sense in which every several thing is one among many, by which we mean that it is identically itself and not another. We can say this of God, but we are far from expressing the true meaning of his Unity. Nor again may we say that he is One, in the sense that a multitude is one. We can speak of one in many and many in one, either numerically, as a heap of stones is one heap, or logically, as humanity is one in many individuals; but there is no place for this sense of unity in our conception of God. Nor yet again may we say that he is One as being the total sum of all things. Every total has an unity of its own. The Universe is in this sense one; but the Universe is not God. The things that are caused do not in their sum make up the cause of their coming into being.

This last conception however, though false, is an approximation to the truth. It is false because it inverts the order of fact. We may not say that All is God, but we may say that God is All.¹ There is a shadow of this truth in the reiterated phrase of Isaiah, "I am the first, and I am the last."² It finds perfect expression in the teaching of St. Paul that "in him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and things invisible," and that "all things have been created through him and unto him; and he is before all things, and in him all things hold together." At an early stage of revelation it had been said, "Behold, heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee." It was now declared that the whole universe is in some sort contained in God, and he is beyond the universe; he is All.³ In the language of philosophy we say that God is infinite. We do not mean the abstract infinity which is merely the negation of limit, nor the lower mathematical infinity which is immeasurable extension, but the Infinite Being who comprehends all in one, who is described in the imagery of prophecy as holding heaven and earth in the hollow of his hand, who is the fulness that filleth all in all, who is above all as well as in all. Now the most perfect unity is the unity of the Infinite.⁴

¹ *Τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν*, I Cor. xv. 28; *Τὰ πάντα καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν*, Col. iii. 11. St. Paul adapts the phrase on each occasion to his immediate purpose.

² Isa. xli. 4; xliv. 6; xlviii. 12. The sin of Babylon, saying in her heart, "I am, and there is none else beside me" (Isa. xlvii. 10), is the sin of human pride aping the universality of God. The same sin is attributed to Nineveh in Zeph. ii. 15.

³ Col. i. 16, 17; I Kings viii. 27.

⁴ Observe the word *πλήρωμα*, abused by Pantheism, but rescued to Christian use by St. Paul (Eph. i. 23; Col. i. 19; ii. 9). On the use of terms of philosophy in theology it was acutely said by

This one eternal God is pure Spirit. We are here using a term derived from our natural knowledge. The distinction of matter and spirit is arrived at by our consciousness and experience of ourselves. To express that which is not material we borrow the word *spirit*, the name of the breath from the lungs, using it to signify a mode of existence which the human mind has learnt to regard as distinct and even separable from that of the body.¹ This mode of existence is naturally attributed to God. Conscious of the spiritual faculty of will, and knowing that our own will is, within ourselves, the ultimate cause of all that we do, we are driven to assume that a like cause of all things that are made is to be found in the will of a supreme Spirit. The postulate of natural religion is confirmed by Revelation, which adds the knowledge that God, the supreme Spirit, is not eternally immanent in the material universe as in a body, but is the cause of this universe, being himself eternally pure Spirit.

The truth of the Being and Unity of God is contested by various opinions, which we may briefly indicate. They can be reduced to three heads—Dualism, Monism, and Polytheism.

Dualism is a belief in two first principles. These are generally distinguished as good and evil, the conception of two principles or first causes being due to the difficulty of understanding how the evil that is in the world can be traced to a good cause, or the good to an

Aubrey Moore, "Even when religion and philosophy both agree to speak of God as 'the Infinite,' for the one it is an adjective, for the other a substantive" (*Lux Mundi*, p. 65; 10th ed.).

¹ The Greek *πνεῦμα* and the Latin *spiritus* have the same history. That of the English *ghost*, used as their equivalent, is obscure.

evil cause. This belief, which had existed for ages in the East, entered into active competition with Christianity in the form of Manichaeism, so called from the Persian teacher Manes. Borrowing some Christian features, it spread widely in the fourth century, when St. Augustine passed several years of his youth under its influence. It held its own obscurely in various parts of Christendom, until in the twelfth century it became dominant in Southern France and Northern Italy among the sectaries known as the Albigenses. In practice the distinction of good and evil is commonly confused with the distinction of matter and spirit, the former being regarded as the creature of the evil principle, and absolutely subject to its control. In this form dualism is found to lend itself equally to an austere morality combined with severe mortification of the body, and to unbridled licentiousness founded on contempt of the body and its functions as naturally and inevitably evil.

Monism is in philosophy and religion the converse of dualism. Morally, it asserts that evil does not exist, that which we call evil being only a lesser degree of good, or seeming evil because of an imperfect apprehension. Intellectually, it is the denial of the distinction of matter and spirit. As such it takes two forms. Materialism is the denial of spiritual existence, and is therefore properly atheistic; what we call mind or spirit is thought of only as a function of matter. Pantheism, which regards all material things and all created spirit as being essentially a part of the Divine nature, we shall consider when we come to the doctrine of Creation.

Polytheism ought, strictly speaking, to mean belief in a multiplicity of first causes. But it may be doubted whether any human mind is capable of resting consciously in such a belief. Polytheism has many roots in thought

and imagination. For our purpose it is sufficient to say that it indicates either an arrest of the tendency of the mind to seek a first cause, or else a straining of that distinction between the Divine attributes which we shall shortly consider. But it must be observed that an apparent and professed Polytheism is not inconsistent with a genuine belief in the Divine Unity. When men's thoughts have progressed beyond their practice, they see behind the Pantheon of popular religion the uniform Power and Wisdom which is God. Such belief is not properly polytheistic; the deities of mythology may still be acknowledged, but they are conceived as resting in a lower plane of spiritual existence. It is interesting to observe that the Greek and Latin fathers of the Church seem to have always regarded them as having a real existence of this kind, classing them as demons.

SECT. II.—*The Holy Trinity*

The One Eternal God is in a Trinity of Persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. He is revealed to us as eternal Love. But love is a relation between persons. Therefore to say that God is Love is to say that he is not one only Person. The doctrine of the Holy Trinity is not set out in express words of Scripture, but the truth is revealed, and the doctrine gradually formulated by the Church was expressed in appropriate words in answer to questions that were raised about the meaning of revelation.

The first Person of the Holy Trinity is the FATHER. We use the word here not as when we speak of the Fatherhood of God in relation to his creatures, but as expressing a relation within the Divine Nature. The word so used implies in the first place origin or

begetting, and secondarily the love which is natural to that relation. In this sense the Father is spoken of as the Fount of Godhead, eternally flowing and eternally producing.

The second Person of the Holy Trinity is the SON. This word again is used only to express the relation of begetting, and the love which is proper thereto. It is appropriate, but not exclusively appropriate. As if to guard us from too narrow a conception of the relation, we find another term also used ; the Son is known as the WORD. This term, like the other, is borrowed from our human experience, which has a faint resemblance to the Divine activity. It is taken from the language of philosophy. In our experience *Word* is Thought formed within the mind and brought forth in speech. This conception, applied to the Divine Nature, gave the doctrine of the Word or Wisdom of God which is found in the later Jewish writings, and notably in Philo of Alexandria. The application is justified, and the conception cleared from error, in the Christian revelation.

The third Person of the Holy Trinity is the HOLY GHOST. God is pure Spirit ; we have seen how the word is used of the Divine Being, but the poverty of language compels us to use it also to express a relation of the Divine Persons. In our own experience we use it for the impulse or movement of the soul when bent on doing something ; we speak of acting with spirit, of being stirred by a spirit of adventure, and so forth. Applying as usual our own language to Divine things, we speak in a similar sense of the Spirit of God. We mean the going forth of the Divine activity.¹

¹ So St. Thomas Aquinas, *Sum. Theol.*, I. 27. 4 : "Quo nomine quaedam vitalis motio et impulsio designatur ; prout aliquis ex amore dicitur moveri vel impelli ad aliquid faciendum."

We must consider the meaning of the word *Person* as here used. It is a Latin equivalent of the Greek *Hypostasis*. This word in popular Greek signified something solid and firm; it was adopted in the language of philosophy to signify the reality underlying an appearance or a mental conception. Thus it was not far removed in sense from *Being* or *Substance*.¹ When the questionings of heresy made it necessary to define Christian truth, these terms were borrowed from philosophy, but used in a way so far new as to express things hitherto unknown. The word *Being* or *Substance* was by established usage appropriated to express the One unchanging God. To express the severalty of the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, a mode of existence revealed with sufficient clearness but foreign to all human experience and therefore to all current language, the word *Hypostasis* was after some hesitation adopted. There were some to whom it seemed dangerous to speak of three *Hypostases* in the Divine Being; it might imply too separate an existence. This danger was partly averted by the use of a countervailing term testifying to the Divine Unity. The three *Hypostases* were declared to be *Consubstantial*, existing in one only Substance or Being.²

¹ *Οὐσία*, *substance*, is the pure *being* of that which *is*. 'Υπόστασις, literally *under-standing*, was originally the solid sediment in liquor, or the base of a building; morally, a fixed resolve. The transition to the philosophic sense is obvious. In the New Testament it stands for a mingled moral and mental *assurance* (2 Cor. ix. 4; Heb. iii. 14; xi. 1). In Heb. i. 3 St. Athanasius makes it as equivalent to *οὐσία* (*contr. Ar. iv. Op. tom. i. p. 516, ed. Colon*). So the Vulg. and the English R.V.

² Even the word *δμοούσιος*, *consubstantial*, which at the Council of Nicaea became the watchword of the faith, had been rejected at the Council of Antioch, A.D. 269, which condemned Paul of Samosata. It was then used in the sense in which we say that two things

The word Hypostasis, thus used, is represented in Latin by *Persona*. This term also was not accepted without hesitation, the objection to it being the converse of that alleged against the Greek term. The word *persona*, being commonly used for a part or character sustained by a man either temporarily or permanently, might seem to suggest, when used of the Holy Trinity, merely three modes of activity in the One God. The Son would then be the Father, only acting in a different manner, and the Holy Ghost likewise. This was, in fact, the teaching of Sabellius, who with his followers employed the word in this sense. It was therefore suspect. Rescued to orthodoxy, it acquired a fixed and definite meaning. This was settled by the authority of Boethius, who in the fifth century dominated all the schools of Latin Christendom. Regretting the lack of a more suitable word in the Latin language, he defined *Persona* as *naturae rationabilis individua substantia*, where *individua substantia* stands for the exact equivalent of *hypostasis* in its more general sense, and there is added the difference of rationality.¹

We are compelled to engage in this study of words by the need of a clear understanding of the terms, utterly inadequate as they are, in which we express what is revealed about the Divine Nature. If their sense be not

of the same kind have a common substance (the *substantia secunda* of metaphysics), as two men the common substance of humanity. See the argument in Athanas. *De Synodis*; tom. i. p. 919.

¹ Boethius, *De duabus Naturis*, p. 1206, ed. Basil, 1570. We should perhaps read *rationalis*. He observes that the Greeks also used the corresponding word *πρόσωπον* in this sense, but preferred the less ambiguous term, and explains, "Nos vero per inopiam significantium vocum translaticivam retinimus nuncupationem, eam quam illi *ὑπόστασις* dicunt *personam* vocantes, sed peritior Graecia sermonum *ὑπόστασις* vocat *individua substantiam*." *Substantia*, *οὐσία*, is pure being; *individua substantia* is distinct existence.

carefully guarded, the watchwords of right belief become the cause of error. If, for example, the word *Person* be carelessly understood in the sense now current of *personality*, an heretical meaning will be read into the formularies of faith, which with a strange irony will be the exact opposite of the Sabellian sense that once hung about the Latin word. In modern language personality is taken to be determined by self-consciousness and by the power of will. In this modern sense we correctly speak of the One God as a Personal Being, not an impersonal force; but if we read this meaning into the distinction of the three Divine Persons, we make three distinct Beings, having three distinct Wills; that is to say, three Gods. Using the words which the practice of Christendom has consecrated to the expression of Divine things, we must be careful to use them in the sense intended by those who brought them into use.

We believe therefore in one eternal undivided Being or Substance of rational and spiritual nature; our own nature being so far similar that we can, however imperfectly, apprehend what is revealed on this head, and can use the terms of our own nature, by an imperfect analogy, in speaking of the Divine Nature. We believe this one Divine Nature to exist, not like the human nature of each several man in one single hypostasis or person, but in three distinct Persons, each Person being whole, eternal, undivided God. The Father is not the Son, the Son is not the Holy Ghost, the Holy Ghost is not the Father. The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God; but we cannot say that God is the Father, or God is the Son; we can only say that God is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. This is the Name of God, revealed by Jesus Christ, the Name into which we are baptized as sons of God. The Name of God

given by revelation in the Old Testament bore witness to the eternal Unity; the Name given in the New Testament bears witness to the eternal Trinity.

The Persons of the Holy Trinity are distinguished by mutual relations. The Father is the Begetter, the Son is the Begotten; or again the Father is the eternal Thinker, the Word is the eternal Thought eternally uttered. The Father is the Source whence the Holy Ghost proceeds, the Holy Ghost is the Proceeder. We are here using terms not of theology, nor even of the Church's proposition, but of actual revelation. The Lord Jesus Christ himself used these words as sufficiently, though imperfectly, expressing the truth of the Divine Nature. He taught us to believe on the Name of "the only begotten Son of God." He announced the coming of the Comforter, "the Spirit of truth, which proceedeth from the Father." ¹

Theologians have sought a reason for the use of these terms. They have shown that procession is of two kinds; it is an action relative to an object without the agent, or an action which terminates within the agent. The coming of the Son of God into the world by way of Incarnation, the sending of the Holy Ghost upon the Church, are actions of the former kind, relative to creation. The eternal generation of the Son and the eternal procession of the Holy Ghost are actions of the latter kind, terminating within the Divine Nature. An example of such action is found in the formation of an idea within the mind of a thinking man; something proceeds from the mind, yet remains within the mind. There is here some analogy to what takes place in the Divine Nature. It is argued that of a purely spiritual Being there are only two actions terminating thus within

¹ John iii. 18; xv. 26.

the agent. They are *Thought* and *Will*. There are therefore in the Divine Nature two corresponding Processions. There is the Procession of the Word. This Procession is called Generation or Begetting, by analogy with that kind of procession found in nature, whereby a living being produces a being like itself. The Son is God of God.¹ There remains a Procession by the action of Will. We know this within ourselves as love. Love is a going forth of oneself to the object of love. If this object be within oneself, as in some sense it always is, being a conception of beauty or goodness or perfection of some kind which awakens desire, then the procession terminates within oneself. Now the eternal activity of the Will of God is the mutual love of the Father and the Son, by reason of which it may be said that God is Love. There is therefore in the Divine Nature a Procession of Love. It is not called Generation, for the analogy which furnishes that name here gives place to another. It is called nothing else but Procession; and that which proceeds is called nothing else but Spirit, which means, as we have seen, the going forth of the Divine Activity.

All this is in the region of speculation; it belongs to the analytical science of religion, not to the practical knowledge of Christian truth; but I have set it down briefly, because it may help to meet some obstinate questionings which cannot be silenced. When all is said the mystery remains inscrutable; and this we may expect, since we are speaking of things beyond our experience, made known to us in Revelation by words

¹ The expression in John xvi. 28, ἐξῆλθον παρὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς, may possibly refer only to the mission of the Incarnate Word; but reading it with the following words, καὶ ἐλήλυθα εἰς τὸν κόσμον, we seem to have a reference both to the eternal procession or Generation, and to the temporal procession or Incarnation.

which are derived from our experience, and can therefore express the truth only by imperfect analogy.

A question that cannot be avoided is that which has for centuries divided Eastern and Western theologians. Westerns say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son. The expression has found its way into the Creed. Easterns say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father alone. They are jealous for the truth that the Father alone is the Source of Godhead, which the Western formula may seem to impugn. But on the other hand the Fathers of the Eastern Church, who wrote before the controversy arose, use without hesitation language which would now be regarded as peculiarly Western ;¹ and when Greeks and Latins have met in amicable discussion, as at the Council of Florence in the fifteenth century and at the Conferences held at Bonn in 1874 and 1875, they have agreed that in different forms of speech they express the same truth.

It is clear that the temporal mission of the Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son. The Lord Jesus Christ spoke of the Comforter, "Whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, which proceedeth from the Father."² But more than this is meant by the double Procession. It concerns the eternal relations in the Divine Nature. In this sense it has been explained by showing that the Father and the Son are in all respects One, save only as regards their mutual relation of Fatherhood and Sonship. The Father is in the Son, and the Son is in the Father, and every operation of the Father is the operation also of the Son, save that operation whereby the Son is begotten.

¹ There is a useful note on the language of the Greek Fathers in Mr. Darwell Stone's *Outlines of Christian Dogma*, p. 276.

² John xv. 26.

Therefore the Father and the Son are the one Source whence the Holy Ghost proceeds. But since the Son is himself of the Father, it remains that the Father is the one ultimate Source of Godhead. There is however a difficulty here, for it might with equal reason be said that since the Father and the Holy Ghost are in like manner One, save only in their mutual relations, therefore they are the one Source whence the generation of the Son proceeds ; and the Son is in that case begotten of the Father and the Holy Ghost. A safer explanation may therefore be sought in the conception of the Holy Ghost as the personal existence of the love eternally going forth from the Father to the Son, and in return from the Son to the Father. It still remains that the Father is the one ultimate Source ; and the explanation connects the Western formula that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son with the expression preferred by Eastern theologians that he proceeds from the Father through the Son.

The two errors which on either side threaten the doctrine of the Holy Trinity are Tritheism and Unitarianism. Tritheism is belief in three several Principles, or the division of the Divine Substance into three several Beings. It is a mistake into which men may imperceptibly slip through careless thinking about the mystery of the Faith, but which is not likely to be held with conscious intent. Its most common form is, perhaps, the several attribution of justice to the Eternal Father, and mercy to the Son. Unitarianism, on the other hand, is an error consciously adopted and pertinaciously defended. It is the denial of the existence of personal relations in the Divine Substance. From the third to the fifth centuries it troubled the Church in two forms. Sabellianism was the opinion that one Divine

Being has manifested himself in three modes, according to which he is known on divers occasions as the Father, as the Son, or as the Holy Ghost. Arianism was the opinion that the Son and the Holy Ghost are created beings, far indeed above all other creatures and immeasurably anterior in time, but not eternal, not consubstantial or one in essence with the Eternal Father, not therefore truly God. The great historical development of Unitarianism, however, is to be found in the system of Islam. Mohammed, deriving his belief partly from Christian sectaries and partly from the later Jews who were in revolt against the doctrine of the Incarnation, took for his watchword the assertion that God is neither Begetter nor Begotten. Within the pale of Christianity Unitarianism reappeared among the disorders of the sixteenth century, and was firmly established in Poland by the work of Faustus Socinus. Socinianism is properly the assertion that Jesus Christ began to be with his conception by the Holy Ghost; that he is therefore in no sense eternal or very God, but is rightly called the Son of God, and has been raised to a share in the Divine sovereignty, and made in a sense equal to the Father. Later Unitarianism has shaken off these pagan ideas, and stands upon belief in the single personality of the incommunicable essence of God, regarding our Lord only as a man exceptionally endowed with Divine graces.

SECT. III.—*The Attributes of God*

Several qualities are in Revelation attributed to God. He is good and holy, just and merciful; he is almighty; he has perfect knowledge of all secret things. Here as elsewhere our language is inadequate to express the

whole truth. These attributes are in reality indistinguishable from the Divine Nature. As humanity cannot exist apart from man, and is separable only in thought from individual men, so divinity and all that is meant by divinity can be distinguished from the Being of God only by a mental abstraction. Theologians say that the attributes of God are God. The word *Divinity* expresses them all; but this one quality is presented to us in several aspects, since it is obviously impossible for us to take in the whole meaning as a single idea. We therefore speak, and necessarily speak, of the several attributes of God.

Most of these are attributes of the Divine Being or of the undivided Godhead; others are attributes of the Divine Persons as distinct. These latter are called *relative* attributes, being founded exclusively on those mutual relations by which alone the Persons are distinguished. They may be rapidly summarized. The relative attributes of the Father are Unoriginate Being¹ in Himself, Fatherhood in relation to the Son, Promise² in relation to the Holy Ghost. The relative attributes of the Son are Sonship in relation to the Father, Promise in relation to the Holy Ghost. The relative attribute of the Holy Ghost is that Procession for which we have no other name.

In comparison with the foregoing, the attributes of the Divine Being common to the three Persons are called *absolute*. They include all possible perfections of Spiritual Being. It is therefore impossible to treat them exhaustively, for we have no complete knowledge of

¹ In Greek, ἀγεννησία. Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.*, v. 51. 1: "The substance of God with this property *to be of none* doth make the Person of the Father."

² Προβολή. Latin theologians use the term *Spiratio*.

God ; nor is it possible even to enumerate those which are expressly revealed, for we have no complete knowledge of the content of Revelation. It opens out before us with a growth of knowledge, to which we can see no end, save in the Vision of God which is the promised beatitude of saints. Nevertheless it is not without profit to enumerate some of the Divine attributes, which stand out most prominently in Holy Scripture, not gathering them from isolated texts, but giving in sum the effect of what is revealed.

We may conveniently distinguish between the attributes of Pure Being, and attributes regarding the two great functions of Spirit, the intellectual and the moral, or Knowledge and Will. But further we may consider God either as he is in himself, or as the cause of all things that are made ; and in the latter case his attributes, without ceasing to be absolute attributes of the Divine Nature, will have a new meaning for us and may require a new name, regarded as relative to his creatures. We can therefore gather the attributes of God under three heads.

In the first place we may regard the attributes of Pure Being. Foremost among these are Unity and Eternity, which enter, as we have seen, into the primary idea of God. Akin to these, but less obvious, is the attribute of Infinity. The word is negative ; it signifies the absence of all those limitations which are imposed on created things. These are distinct, themselves and not other things, only by virtue of those limitations. Therefore infinity is not to be found in the world ; it is equivalent to nothingness ; it is a mere abstraction, the removal of all that constitutes sensible reality. But God is All, without ceasing to be Himself. We use a negative term to express this, denying limitation ; but the meaning is positive. The Infinity of God is the Fulness of him that filleth all in all.

Upon the Eternity of God follows the attribute of Immutability. "I am the Lord, I change not." For change involves both end and beginning; the end of that which is passing away, and the beginning of that into which it passes. Upon the Infinity of God follows the attribute of Singleness or Simplicity. That which is infinite cannot be conceived as divided into parts, or made up of components, for these ideas both import limitation. With one exception everything that we know by experience is composed, and may be resolved into its elements. The exception is our own spiritual nature, which our consciousness of complete personal identity forbids us to regard as made up of the several modes of its activity. Here only in the range of our experience we find an image of the Singleness or Simplicity of God. The importance of this attribute lies in the necessity of guarding against that division of the idea of God which leads to polytheism. God is not a compound of attributes, or a many-sided being, to be approached, now on this side, now on that, according to the needs of the moment. It will guard also against those false ideas of the Divine action which set the Justice and Mercy of God in opposition, and suppose the need of some arrangement for their reconciliation. The Immutability and Simplicity of the Divine Nature constitute in our thought the idea of Perfection. To the attributes thus distinguished we must add the attribute of Life. We believe in the Living God. The idea of life, which we form from our knowledge of ourselves, is used in Revelation as an image of an essential quality of the Spiritual Being of God.

In immediate sequence upon this we may regard the attributes which belong to Spirit as working in Knowledge and Will. In human spirit we have an image of

the Divine Spirit. The attributes of human spirit are images of the Divine attributes, but we cannot safely argue from the image to the archetype without the help of Revelation, by which we are directed to that in human spirit which does in some measure reflect the Divine. We begin with the attribute of Knowledge. Knowledge is in the first place self-consciousness; and since God is All, or Infinite, the knowledge of God is infinite. It follows, moreover, from his Immutability and Simplicity that his knowledge is not extended in parts, so that he should know all things successively; but all is eternally present to him; a truth which is feebly expressed by the saying that with him a thousand years are as yesterday.

The attribute of Will is but faintly imaged in us. The human will is determined by various influences, among which is the choice of the man himself. This element of choice is in ordinary circumstances so far dominant, that a man's action is ultimately self-determined, and he is therefore a free and responsible agent; but other influences are continually pressing upon him, sometimes with overwhelming force. By abstracting these influences we can arrive at the idea of an absolutely self-determined will; and such is the Will of God. This does not mean that he is without law. His own Immutability is in the place of law to him; and whereas in man self-will is the defiance of law, and consequent disorderliness, the self-determined Will of God is the perfection of order.

Upon the attribute of Will follows that of Power. The human will, even when determined, is often inoperative, because it has to work upon resistant material. The Will of God is absolutely operative. Himself being All, there is nothing without him to resist; and being perfect in Simplicity, there can be no conflict within.

We turn to the moral attributes of the human spirit, and we find two which are pre-eminently reflections of the Divine attributes : Righteousness and Goodness. We form the highest possible conception of righteousness, as shown in the dealings of the just man, or in the administrative justice of an incorruptible judge, and we are taught to see in this a faint image of the Righteousness of God. In the kindness of human fatherhood we are taught to see an image of his Goodness. But further, human kindness raised to its full height is known as love, and the crowning truth of Revelation is that God is Love. And whereas in human love there are two moments, desire and satisfaction, which are at best successive and are often severed, in the Love of God, by reason of his Immutability and Simplicity, there can be no such severance. The essential Love which is in the Holy Trinity has therefore the attribute of satisfied desire, which is Beatitude. God is blessed for evermore.

These are revealed attributes of God, as he is in his eternal Being. We shall have to consider in the third place these attributes regarded as relative to the creature. But this we cannot do until we have taken account of the act of creation, what it is, and what are its results. It remains in this place only to note the possibilities of error concerning the Divine attributes.

As we have said, the attributes of God are not separable from the Divine Nature. We are taught that God is righteous and loving. We are taught also that he is Righteousness, that he is Love. Each attribute is indeed a mode of presenting to our apprehension the One Infinite Being. It follows that God may be regarded, and therefore worshipped, as Love, as Righteousness, as Power, as Life. But in this practice there lurks a danger. Failing to grasp the simplicity of the Divine Nature, men

may worship the several attributes as several existences. Such is the nature of the higher and more philosophic polytheism. The Divine Being is approached in different fashions at different times. An appeal to his Power is regarded as a different thing from an appeal to his Goodness. There follows the idea of contrariety between the attributes ; and for the Divine Unity the mind substitutes an assembly of independent or even of mutually resistant powers.

The error which without breaking up the Divine Unity separates the attributes as coexisting in a single Being, is Anthropomorphism. Human attributes image, with more or less of distortion, the Divine attributes, and the names of the human are used for the Divine ; but if we attempt to argue directly from the image we shall not arrive at the truth of God, but only at a gigantic copy of man—the shadow of a shadow. In ourselves, because of the limitations of our activity, attributes are really separate and sometimes contrariant. Our will is not the same as our power, nor even commensurate with it. Justice does not coincide with goodness, but may require a man to act in opposition to the impulse of natural love. Anthropomorphism attributes to God a like division and contrariety. It practically denies the attributes of Pure Being, substituting for eternity the idea of boundless duration, for infinity the idea of ubiquity. The Divine attributes being thrown into confusion, schemes are then devised for reconciling the Justice and Goodness of God, his Will and his Power, not unlike those by which men struggle to maintain their own consistency. It is a grosser, but not a more mischievous Anthropomorphism, which fastens upon the words of Scripture where for the sake of vivid presentment God is spoken of in material terms, and

attributes to him parts and passions, and the limitations proper to corporeal existence.

SECT. IV.—*The Creation of the World*

God is the First Cause of all things that are. This, we have seen, is a truth of Natural Religion. In Revelation the truth is assumed, but much is added which the natural understanding could only feel after, and apprehend imperfectly, if at all. Much yet remains unrevealed; for God makes known to us only that which it concerns our spiritual welfare to know. Much is gradually unfolded before the search of human science. Christian doctrine is properly concerned only with what is revealed; but the understanding of Christian doctrine may be retarded by mistaken experience, or aided by better investigation.

In considering the doctrine of Creation we are met by a difficulty at the outset. Things which are caused have a beginning. Revelation repeats the truth of nature that "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." But beginning means change; it implies also a point of time standing in relation to successive moments. How then can we speak of a beginning in the work of God the Eternal? Even as the act of God which we call Procession or Generation is eternal, must not the work of God that we call Creation be eternal? If God be the Creator, must we not say that he eternally creates? The creature will then be coeternal with God.

The answer is that this *beginning* is relative only to the succession that follows. It does not imply a point in eternity, dividing eternity into a before and after. Such a conception contradicts the idea of eternity, in which is no past and future. The beginning of creation

is therefore not a beginning of God's action, but the beginning of that sequence of time which is the effect of God's action. Human reason is a part of creation, and time is a form of created thought ; we know things only as they are presented to us in time, that is to say, in sequence ; and a sequence or series cannot be conceived without beginning. A sentence therefore like that in which the Divine Wisdom says—

“The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his way,
Before his works of old,”

is an instance of the accommodation of eternal realities to the limits of human thought. We may say that creation, in so far as it is the action of God, is eternal, since God himself is pure eternal activity ; but creation, in so far as it is the effect of God's action known to us by natural sense, has a beginning and sequence of time.¹

There is another difficulty of the same kind. If God be infinite, he is All. How then can there be anything which is not Himself? Or, conversely, if he create a world which is other than Himself, as the effect is other than the cause, how is he infinite? He is limited by the coexistence with him of that which is not Himself.

This difficulty is partly to be solved in the same way

¹ Prov. viii. 22. St. Thomas Aq. says (*De Potentia*, iii. 17, ad 4), “Non ponimus Deum causam mundi ex necessitate naturae suae, sed ex voluntate ; unde necessarium est effectum divinum sequi, non quandocumque natura divina fuit, sed quando dispositum est voluntate divina ut esset, et secundum modum eundem quo voluit ut esset.” The word *quando* seems however to import inaccurate matter of thought ; as also do the words *post non esse* in the corresponding passage of the *Summa Theol.*, i. 46. 1, “Ex actione Dei aeterna non sequitur effectus aeternus, sed qualem Deus voluit ; ut scilicet haberet esse post non esse ;” unless indeed *post*, like *sequitur*, signifies only a logical, not a temporal sequence.

as the former. So far as the supposed limitation depends on the existence of the universe in space, it is sufficient to note that space, the perceptible extension of things known, is, like time, a form of created thought. But this touches only the fringe of the difficulty. Apart from all idea of extension, it remains that if we distinguish the universe logically as not God, we seem to destroy the infinity of God.

Of this difficulty there is no solution to be found in nature, and in revelation the two opposed terms of the problem are affirmed without reconciliation. The denial of this opposition is Pantheism. Pantheism regards the world as a manifestation of God. According to this system, we know the Divine Nature in two modes, as Spirit and as Matter. These two, inseparably one, are God, as soul and body are Man. The system raises new difficulties, moral and logical; but they are little, if at all, greater than those which attend a belief in the distinction of Creator and Creature. It is not because of its inherent difficulties that Pantheism is condemned, but because it is the denial of truths upheld by external evidence. The distinction of Creator and Creature, of First Cause and effect, is found in nature, and is confirmed in Revelation; and here moreover is taught the still deeper mystery, that a certain antagonism also is possible, the rebellion of the creature against the Creator. But the distinction is not such that the creature excludes the Creator, who is the fulness of all things, while at the same time transcending all. This is the truth of God's immanence in the world, expressed by St. John: "He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not." Of this truth Pantheism is a travesty. We express the same truth more crudely by saying that God is omnipresent—

a term which labours under the disadvantage of suggesting diffusion through space, but which is sound if understood in the sense that wherever I put myself in space I am equally and in the same way in the presence of God. But God, present to all alike that are in space, is not himself to be conceived in terms of space, and so remains in his proper Infinity.

We are taught that God created all things by his Word. "By the Word of the Lord were the heavens made." "God said, Let there be light: and there was light." "He spake, and it was done." This was interpreted by Philo and the Alexandrine school generally of that Eternal Word whose personal subsistence was in a measure perceived by them; and their interpretation is confirmed by its adoption in the Gospel of St. John, who says of the personal Word, "All things were made by him, and without him was not anything made that hath been made." The expression has passed into the Creed, where, having confessed God the Father as Maker of heaven and earth, we say that all things were made by the Son. The Father gives being to the Son, "through whom also he made the worlds." The Father is the one Source of being and becoming; the Son is one with the Father, as in all else, so in the act of creation.¹

The meaning of creation by the Word of God may be illustrated by facts of our own consciousness. We are

¹ Ps. xxxiii. 6, 9; Gen. i. 3; Heb. i. 2. The Arians argued, from the preposition *διὰ* in John i. 3 and Heb. i. 2, that the Son was only the *instrument*, *ὄργανον*, of creation, and so himself a creature, though of higher order. The error lay not so much in the use of the word as in the supposition that the *ὄργανον* must be a creature, different in essence from the Creator. The preposition does signify, as St. Thomas Aq. says (*Summa Theol.*, i. 45. 6), that the Son is "Causa media, sive principium de principio."

conscious of the power of forming an idea. We form this of material presented to our senses, but the formative principle is the intelligence. An idea thus formed in thought has a proper existence of its own; yet it has no existence apart from the thinking mind. It is an object of thought, and yet is not constituted in dual existence apart from thought. It exists in the mind, but is not the mind or part of the mind; the sum total of all ideas contained in the mind does not constitute the mind; they are constituted by the mind, which transcends them all. There is here something analogous to creation. The analogy is very imperfect. If we could form ideas without material given through sense, it would be somewhat closer. Let us then suppose this power in God. We have considered the intellectual activity of God as the eternal generation of the Word, the idea of Self, the express image of the Father, who is coessential with the Father. Suppose now the formation in the Divine Thought, the subsisting Word, of an idea which is not Self, the idea of the world. That idea has a proper existence of its own, though not apart from God. It is an object of God's regard; yet is not constituted in dual existence apart from God, so as to exclude God. It has a proper existence, which is the natural existence of all created things. We distinguish here two operations of God: generation, which is the procession of the Word; creation, which is the formation of the idea of the world. Philo and his school conceived only one operation, identifying the Word with the archetypal idea of the world. We are taught to distinguish these, and so to distinguish the two operations.¹

¹ Philo, *De Mundi Opificio*, p. 5 C, ed. 1691: Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρχέτυπος σφραγίς, ὃν φάμεν εἶναι κόσμον νοητὸν, αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀρχέτυπον παράδειγμα, ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν, ὁ Θεοῦ λόγος.

As we see it, the work of creation is a process, with beginning and sequence, for we can think only in the forms of time and space. So regarding it, we are compelled to think of God as continually working, as directing the progress of events in the minutest particular. This direction of the world we call Providence. It is asserted with great plainness by the Lord Jesus Christ. The very hairs of our head, he taught, are numbered, and not a sparrow can fall to the ground without our heavenly Father.

Against this truth of God's providence is set the idea of creation which was once known as Deism. According to this scheme, God created the universe and set it going with a system of natural laws, which produce a sequence of cause and effect independent of any continuous Divine action. The rise of Deism in the seventeenth century was partly due to a revival of Epicurean conceptions, but in part it followed from the growing sense of invariable sequence in phenomena which was the foundation of modern science. There seemed to be no room for the continued intervention of Will; and the Divine action, ruled out of the physical government of the world, was with logical consistency ruled out of its moral government as well. The whole Christian dispensation seemed incredible.

This difficulty is caused by applying to the Divine action the limitations of time, of antecedence and consequence. It is not by a succession of separate acts of will that God directs the world, but by his one unchanging act which is creation. Religion is not intended to supplement natural science, or to come to its aid when at a loss, but the Christian doctrine of God does incidentally supply an explanation of that uniformity of sequence which is for science merely an inexplicable fact. The

immutability of the Creator is reflected in the uniformity of creation. By whatever process in time the world and all that is in the world has come to be what we now see it to be, all, down to the smallest detail, is provided for in the one original act of creation. If the physical theory be true that primary matter existed without form, and that from such matter all has been evolved by differentiation, then, it has been said, "primary matter was already, in eternal Thought, all that it has become."¹

The work of creation is not only assumed in Holy Scripture; it is described. The description is contained in the first two chapters of Genesis, and is referred to in many other places. It is clear even to a superficial reader that two separate accounts are joined together without any attempt to harmonize them. The conjectures and conclusions of experts in Biblical criticism upon this and other similar combinations are foreign to our argument. The two accounts of creation may be remains of a primeval tradition; they may be imaginative reconstructions of the truth which nature taught; they may be the record of visions in the nature of prophecy. We receive them as incorporated in the sacred books; and we are concerned with the truth which they affirm, not with the manner of the affirmation. It is not surprising that, until good reason was shown for the contrary

¹ I transcribe this sentence, with all reserve, from my notes of a lecture of the late Professor T. H. Green. Compare the language of St. Augustine, *De Fide et Symbolo*, 2: "Nullo modo credendum est illam ipsam materiam, de qua factus est mundus, quamvis informem, quamvis invisam, quocunque modo esset, per se ipsam esse potuisse, tanquam coaeternam et coevam Deo: sed quemlibet modum suum quem habebat, ut quoquo modo esset, *et distinctarum rerum formas posset accipere*, non habebat nisi ab omnipotente Deo, cuius beneficio est res non solum quaecunque formata, sed etiam quaecunque formabilis."

opinion, men accepted the account of the six days in a literal sense. Yet we must not forget that Philo thought this ridiculous, and some of the Christian Fathers with more reserve suggested other interpretations.¹

What is actually revealed in Scripture appears to be the production and ordering of the world by the Word of God, and perhaps the distinction between things immediately produced, and things produced mediately out of preajacent material. Some writers have thus distinguished the works of the first three days from those of the last three. This would be the distinction between the creation of matter and the evolution of organisms. But such a distinction belongs rather to physics than to Christian doctrine. It is safer to say that so far there is one only truth revealed, the creation of all things by the Word of God. The creation of man will have to be further considered.

Regarded as relative to creation, the attributes of God appear to us in a new light. There are not new attributes consequent upon creation. Such novelty is contrary to the truth of God's Being. The variation is in our apprehension. Thus the attribute of Infinity becomes for us, in relation to the expanse of space, the attribute of Omnipresence. The attribute of Knowledge becomes, in relation to the multitude of created objects, Omniscience; it becomes Wisdom, when regarded as meetly ordering all things. The attribute of Power becomes Omnipotence when regarded as exercised in relation to created forces, and becomes Providence when related to the continual government of the world. As we distinguish between the absolute attributes because of our inability to comprehend all in a single idea of

¹ Philo, p. 41 A: Εἶηθες πάνυ τὸ οἶεσθαι ἐξ ἡμέραις ἢ καθόλου χρόνῳ κόσμον γεγονέναι.

God, so we distinguish between the attributes relative to creation, because of the necessity under which we labour of conceiving creation in the forms of time and space.

SECT. V.—*The Spiritual Creation*

Man knows himself as body and spirit. In the study of his own nature he finds many difficulties, which increase rather than diminish with the increase of his knowledge. The problems of biology and psychology are the result. With these Christian doctrine has no proper concern; it is concerned with the facts of which those sciences attempt the interpretation. Interpretations which amount to a denial of the facts are hostile to the faith. The materialism which reduces spirit to a motion of the body, and the spiritualism which regards the body as an alien envelope or prison of the soul, are equally opposed to Christian truth. But no interpretation which takes account of the facts will be directly hostile, though an erroneous interpretation may be a hindrance to belief.

In Holy Scripture there are two accounts of the creation of man, each of which puts forward a separate truth. In the first chapter of Genesis we read that God created man in his own image. In the second chapter it is said that God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul. The latter account contains nothing on the face of it but the statement that man is composed of body and spirit; that his body is formed of the same matter as the earth, and that his soul or spirit is a separate creation. The former account adds the statement that man has a likeness to God; and this likeness cannot be sought elsewhere than in the spirit.

We know the spirit of man as animating the body, and

we know it naturally in no other way. So regarded, we call it properly the *soul*. We know the body as animated by the soul. We know it also as the instrument of the soul, a knowledge which modern science seems likely to render very precise. We can trace no action of the soul without the body; the merest exercise of thought calls into play certain bodily functions; a lesion of a small part of the brain paralyses functions the most purely spiritual. It is natural to infer that the body is the necessary instrument without which the soul can have no activity. But we further know the body as inanimate in death, and afterwards dissolved into its elements. It is natural to infer that when the body thus ceases to exist as body, the soul also either ceases to exist, or passes into a condition of wholly inactive existence. But the human mind is possessed by an obstinate conviction that when the body is dissolved the soul continues to exist in some sort of activity. The conviction was obscurely supported by the revelation of the Old Testament. It receives a glorious confirmation from the teaching of Jesus Christ. It is therefore an essential point of Christian doctrine that the soul of man does not perish with the body, but is capable of a separate existence in some sort of activity. The soul is not merely a force animating the body, but is a proper spirit.

What sort of existence the disembodied spirit has we do not know. Very little is revealed, and except by revelation we know nothing positive. This kind of existence is subject however to one obvious limitation. The disembodied spirit is not the whole man; it can have no activity which requires for its integrity the use of the body as instrument, and whatever action there be is not the action of the man taken as a whole. Theologians have discussed this point under the

question whether the disembodied spirit be a person. They deny this, taking personality not as determined according to modern use by self-consciousness alone, but as signifying the whole human being, with all his natural capacities and responsibilities. What is clearly taught by revelation is that in death the human spirit retains consciousness, and in particular the capacity of sorrow and bliss. St. Paul had no doubt that for him to depart and to be with the Lord Jesus was far better than to remain in the body. But the state thus described is not perfect or permanent. The doctrine of the Resurrection will be considered elsewhere; here we do but note that our Christian hope is the reconstruction of the whole man, body and soul; the promises of the New Testament more often concern the state of the resurrection than the state of the disembodied spirit.

By revelation, then, we know the soul of man to be a distinct and separable spirit. This human spirit, an image of the Divine Spirit, has the functions of knowledge and will. These are normally exercised through the body as instrument, but they continue apart from the body. St. Paul insists that love will never fail in life or in death; and love is an energy of the will, determined towards an object that is known.¹

The existence of the human spirit being established, we naturally ask if there be any other created spirit. We know other kinds of life than human life, other bodies animated by other souls. We trace orders of incorporate

¹ 1 Cor. xiii. 8, *seqq.* Observe that *γνῶσις*, or knowledge such as we now have, will be done away, but only to pass into *ἐπίγνωσις*, or more perfect knowledge, while *ἀγάπη* will continue always as now. It does not concern the present argument to decide whether the change from *γνῶσις* to *ἐπίγνωσις* be referred to death or to the resurrection.

life through stages of diminishing complexity, until we come to organisms of which it is hard to say whether we should class them as living beings or no. In the higher orders we find a likeness to man; they seem to have knowledge of a kind and the rudiments of will. The general opinion of civilized man is that certain functions, distinguished as purely animal, are here in play, which differ essentially from the rational and spiritual faculties of man, though resembling them in the use made of the bodily organs. The definition of man as a *rational animal* proceeds on this supposition. But whatever be the conclusions of psychology, nothing is taught by revelation about the nature of animal life.

There is a persistent human tradition that spirits exist which are unconnected with a material body. This tradition is confirmed in the fullest measure by revelation. In the language of the New Testament, some of these spirits are called *demons*,¹ a familiar Greek name for such beings; others are called *angels*, as being messengers and servants of God. The doctrine of angels and demons has been made the occasion of much theological ingenuity. For our present purpose it is sufficient to note that they are equally with the human spirit creatures of God, endowed with the same spiritual faculties of knowledge and will, and equally ably to act upon material things. The difficulty of understanding how this last power can be exercised is great, but not greater than the

¹ How entirely colourless the word was in itself is shown by the fact that St. Ignatius, *Ad Smyrn.*, iii., reports our Lord as saying after his resurrection *οὐκ εἰμι δαιμόνιον ἀσώματον*, where St. Luke (xxiv. 39) uses the word *πνεῦμα*; but except in Acts xvii. 18; 1 Cor. x. 20; and Rev. ix. 20, if those passages be really exceptions, the word is used in the New Testament only of depraved and evil spirits. I will only allude to the opinion of St. Augustine that the demons have a sort of subtle body (*De Civ. Dei*, xv. 23; xxi. 10).

difficulty of understanding how the human spirit can set in motion the obscure machinery of nervous and muscular tissue which does the work of man. In the one case we know something of the process, but nothing of the impulse that starts it; in the other case we know nothing at all of the process.

The spiritual faculty of Knowledge is exercised by man in the body, and through the body as instrument. It is therefore subject to limitations imposed by the conditions of the body. It begins with sense, and can act only by using, even while transcending, the materials given through sense. Weakness of the body may hinder it; disorder of the body may confuse it; bodily discipline is needed for its perfect working. The mode in which unembodied spirits use this faculty is unknown to us. All spirits alike have the power of knowing God—in the body, by the perception of his works and by the hearing of his Word; out of the body, by what sort of intuition we know not. St. Paul asserts that by our natural powers something may be known of God; the promise of the Old Testament is that all men shall come to know the Lord; knowledge of God is declared by the Lord Jesus Christ to be the true life of the soul: "This is life eternal, that they should know thee the only true God, and him whom thou didst send, even Jesus Christ."¹

About the faculty of Will in created beings there are some hard questions to consider. We are assured of its reality alike by nature and by revelation. It can be set aside only by sophistical evasions which ignore facts that we know. But the facts which prove the working of Will are not easily co-ordinated with other facts equally certain.

¹ Rom. i. 19; Isa. xi. 9; Jer. xxxi. 34; John xvii. 3.

We note this first, that no created will is perfectly free. God is self-determined in action; but every creature is bound by conditions; and first, by the limitation of his power. He cannot effectually will anything which is impossible for him. But further, we know our own will to be determined in part by many influences within us and without us—passion, prejudice, habit, the domination of another, allurements of pleasure, revulsion from pain, and the like. Some of these are bodily conditions; others would seem to affect spirit apart from body. To be set free from them, so as to act by deliberate choice according to the Will of God, is the hope of the gospel.

But how does created will consist with the infinity of God? There are two difficulties. In the first place, if all things be governed by God's providence, what room is there in creation for any will but his? Or conversely, if there be any freedom of will in the creature, how is the whole creation governed by God's providence? It is the question which St. Paul encountered: "Who withstandeth his Will?"¹ And again, if the Knowledge of God be infinite, all things that shall be are already known to him; and they cannot be known if they are not already fixed and determined. How then is there room for determination by the choice of the creature?

To these two questions no explicit answer is possible. St. Paul could but say in reply that even if man had no freedom, even if he were passively subject to the Will of God as the clay to the hand of the potter, he would yet have no complaint against God. "Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why didst thou make me thus?" St. Paul was regarding the moral aspect of the question. It is equally unanswerable if looked at

¹ Rom. ix. 19.

from the intellectual standpoint. There are two facts, each of which is known to us in part by nature, perfectly by revelation. The one fact is that we have the faculty of will, and a measure of freedom ; the other fact is that the Knowledge and the Will of God are infinite. We have no means of correlating these apparently contradictory facts. Analogies may be found in the science of mathematics. We define parallel straight lines by saying that they never meet, however far produced. But the higher calculus shows that if produced to infinity they meet. In every science our experience is only of that which is limited ; when we transcend our experience, reaching truths that lie beyond, we find contradictions to experience ; and yet our experience is true within its limits. Within the range of our experience we know that we are in a measure free and self-determined.

In the order of creation, therefore, the Will of the Creator can be opposed by the will of the creature. Regarded in this relation, the Will of God assumes the character of Law, and opposition is lawlessness or sin. The result is disorder and evil in that which God made good. The possibility of this evil is involved in the creation of spirit. As soon as there comes into being a spirit which is not God, the opposition of will becomes possible. The objection sometimes raised that God is thus made the author of evil is merely superficial. To create a being capable of evil is not to be the author of evil, unless the created being is so formed as to be under the necessity of doing wrong when the opportunity occurs. We are to think of the human spirit not as we now know it in ourselves, hampered and confined in will by acquired habits, but as originally created in a freedom bounded only by the limits of natural possibility, free to will the good as God wills.

A superficial objection may be thus easily answered, but the truth reaches beyond this reply. For the perfection of created spirit, the capacity of sinning is necessary. The perfection of every other creature is to fulfil God's purpose passively by being what he has said; the perfection of created spirit is to fulfil God's purpose actively by working together with him in knowledge and will. For the attainment of this end freedom is needed; and freedom is unreal if there be not a real choice; and choice is unreal if there be not a real alternative. The one alternative being concord with the will of God, the second is necessarily discord, lawlessness, or sin. The possibility of evil is therefore involved in the possibility of good for created spirit. The possibility of evil is a part of that work of creation which is wholly good.

Our knowledge of created spirit extends to the human spirit, and to those other spirits which are called angels or demons. All these alike were created with a capacity of good and evil; and this very capacity being their good, we may say that they were created good. Their actual good or evil depends upon the exercise of their free will. Of man we shall have more to say. Of angels and demons it is enough to say that some have chosen the good and continue in perfect obedience; others have chosen evil and continue in rebellion, their choice being apparently final. Of these we know by revelation that one great and malignant spirit, called by men Satan, the Devil, the Enemy, is peculiarly engaged in plotting against the spiritual welfare of man, and that by his envy man was first beguiled to evil. The demons are thought to be in some degree subject to him and doers of his work, but in many cases they would seem, from the little we know of their doings, to be not so

much malignant as mischievous and worthless spirits. St. Paul says very plainly that the objects of pagan worship were demons who intercepted the honour due to God, and this opinion was generally held during the first Christian ages. It may with all reserve be doubted whether he spoke by revelation, or was expressing only his own judgment of the particular cases before him. It is however certain that demon-worship, intended for such, prevails in some regions.¹

Regarding the attributes of God in relation to created spirit, we have to observe that the immutability of God is, in respect to our understanding, the attribute of Truth. Truth is the conformity of expression to reality. God expressing himself to his creatures by his Word, in creation or in revelation, is "God who cannot lie."² The Perfection of God, considered relatively to created spirits in rebellion, is the attribute of Holiness; by which attribute he was specially revealed in the Old Testament. Holiness signifies principally separation from everything that mars perfection, or, in the language of Scripture, defiles. God is "of purer eyes than to behold evil."³ The distinction of the Law between clean and unclean was intended to suggest this Holiness or unmingled Purity of God; and his chosen people were for the same reason to be separate from others, not mingled with the heathen. The Will of God, as we have seen, takes the form of Law for those creatures that have the power of free obedience. The Love of God becomes Goodness when regarded as ordering his dealings with men; contrasted in our thought with his Holiness and Justice, it becomes the

¹ 1 Cor. x. 20; cf. Rev. ix. 20. I do not know whether to include among forms of demon-worship the vagaries of latter-day *Spiritualism*.

² Titus i. 2.

³ Hab. i. 13.

attribute of Mercy for those who have transgressed his Law.

SECT. VI.—*The End of Man*

We are not to ask why God made man, for we cannot think of his operation as determined by any motive external to himself. In their true nature, things are what they are purely because God wills them so to be. But since in the order of creation the human will is able to oppose the Divine Will, we may ask to what intent man was created. It is not enough to know what he now is. We have no certainty that he is what he was intended to be. On the contrary, we know by revelation that he is not now fulfilling the intention of God the Creator. But before we can profitably consider this failure, we must see what is the end which he fails to attain.

Since man is created a spiritual being, with the faculties of knowledge and will, the end of his being is found in the exercise of these faculties. The faculty of knowledge is to be exercised upon the highest of objects. Man is created to know God. In this knowledge, according to the word of the Lord Jesus Christ, the eternal life of man consists. The capacity of such knowledge is the principle of life; the exercise of it is actual living. The faculty of will is to be exercised in harmony with the Divine Will. It is obvious that man cannot fulfil the end of his being if he oppose the will of the Creator. But further, it is only by the voluntary subordination of his own will to the Divine Will that he can find perfect happiness or bliss, for only in this way can he hope to obtain the perfect realization of his desires. But our knowledge of

the love of God makes it certain that he intends man, made in his own image, to reflect also his own Blessedness. We conclude therefore that the end of man is to know God and to exercise his will in harmony with the Divine Will.

This which reason persuades we find also broadly set forth in revelation. The object of the Old Testament was to bring men to the knowledge and fear of God. The perfect man is he whose delight is in the law of the Lord. The Lord Jesus Christ himself, setting the pattern of the perfect life, said that he was come into the world to do the will of the Father which sent him.

It is needless to labour this point, but we may glance at two other modes of expressing the same truth. Man is said to be created to know God and to love God. The image of God is found in the two interior actions of the Divine Nature, knowledge and love, thus reflected in him.¹ But to love God is an act of the will bent upon him, and drawn to harmony with his own Will. That for which man is created is therefore in the first place to use his will in subordination to the Divine Will. The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom : but there follows upon this the perfect love that casteth out fear. It is said again, as in the Scottish Catechism, that the true end of man is to glorify God and to enjoy him for ever. But this expresses rather a consequence of the right exercise of the faculties of man's spiritual nature. To glorify, or to worship God, is the natural, inevitable act of him who knows God, unless the will be set contrary. To enjoy God is to have the fruition of

¹ August., *De Trin.*, xiv. 12 : " Haec igitur trinitas mentis non propterea Dei est imago, quia sui meminit mens, et intellegit ac diligit se ; sed quia potest etiam meminisse et intellegere et amare a quo facta est."

love, which we know in the two successive phases of desire and satisfaction.

These two modes of expressing the truth show that in the order of creation there is naturally a progress towards the fulfilment of the end of man's being. The perfection of creation is indeed, as we have seen, contained in God's eternal purpose, but for us, in the order of time, there is beginning and process. We are not therefore to suppose man, at the beginning of creation, perfect in development ; we must regard him as endowed with a capacity of becoming perfect by fulfilling the end of his being, the exercise of his spiritual faculties.

Questions have been raised by theologians about the mode in which man was intended to attain the perfection of his being, in case he did not oppose his will to the Will of God. Some of these questions are unprofitable ; some can hardly be avoided. To none of them is an answer given which is, strictly speaking, a part of Christian doctrine ; for this doctrine deals with men as they are and as they may become, not as they might have been. That only is revealed about the original state of man which is needed for rightly understanding his present state. Those questions which cannot be avoided will arise in this connection, and will be considered in their place. It is sufficient for the present to note the certainty that if man had uniformly applied himself to know God and to love God according to the measure attainable by him, he would in some way have been brought on to the perfection of blessedness for which he was created.

The capacity of knowledge in man, reaching out beyond the bounds of sense, finding no positive limit set where progress becomes impossible, and yet having by nature no means of proceeding further, yearns for the

comprehension of the infinite, and remains dissatisfied. "All other things," says Field, "seek no higher perfection nor greater good than is found within the compass of their own nature, by nature's guiding without the help of any other thing attaining thereunto; but men and angels, which seek an infinite and divine good, even the everlasting and endless happiness which consisteth in the vision of God, at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore, cannot attain their wished good, which is so high and excellent and far removed from them, unless by supernatural force, which we call grace, they be lifted unto it." The end of man is to be the recipient of Divine grace, and by that grace to be raised to perfect knowledge, and lifted up to high and heavenly desires which God himself alone can satisfy. "Thou hast made us for thyself, and our heart is restless until it rest in thee."¹

¹ Field, *Of the Church*, bk. i. ch. ii. Aug., *Confess.*, lib. i. c. 1: "Quia fecisti nos ad te, et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te."

CHAPTER II

CONCERNING HUMAN LIFE

SECT. I.—*The Original State of Man*

THE record of creation shows us man made in the image of God, and after his likeness. So made he has dominion over all other living creatures on earth, a dominion which can be ascribed only to his superior powers of reason. He is pronounced, like all the other works of God, very good. Does this imply that he was created in the fulness of his perfection, or does it mean that he was perfectly adapted to the attainment of his end? The second chapter of the record supplies the answer. Here we see man made of the dust of the ground, like all other living bodies, and becoming a living soul by the inspiration of the breath of life. He is then described as placed by God in a garden to dress it and to keep it. There are two mystical trees, the Tree of Life, and the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil. The fruit of the former he may eat, but the latter is forbidden. The allegory is not obscure. The knowledge of good and evil, as distinct and opposed one to the other, could come to him only by experiment; and that experiment would consist in setting his will against God's Will. The knowledge was not forbidden by an arbitrary, unmeaning decree; in the nature of things it could be obtained only by disobedience. That knowledge on

the other hand which is the true life of man, the knowledge of God, or of good alone, was to be his by patient working in obedience to the Will of God. Man was not therefore created in the fulness of his perfection, but found himself in a condition perfectly adapted to the attainment of perfection.

There has been much fanciful discussion of the words which say that God breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul. The Alexandrine Jews read into the record their belief that the human spirit was an emanation of the Divine Word, and took it to mean that man was composed of an earthly substance and a Divine spirit.¹ Their interpretation was not without effect on some of the Christian teachers trained in the same school. The words are evidently meant to convey an important truth, but their weight is sufficiently accounted for as distinguishing the human soul, with its capacity of knowing and loving God, from the merely animal souls of the brute creation. Starting from these very words, St. Paul contrasts with this living soul of original man the life-giving spiritual power of the second Adam, the Lord Jesus Christ. Man was first psychic, he says, and afterwards became spiritual; that is to say, he was endowed first with the powers of his own natural soul; he has since been enriched with higher spiritual gifts.²

The mode of the production of man from earth is not revealed. The nature of animal life, the building up of particles of matter into a living organism, is left to the investigation or the contented ignorance of human science. The life of man, regarded as merely animal, is

¹ Philo, *De Mundi Opificio*, p. 30 E: *Σύνθετον εἶναι φησιν ἐκ γεώδους οὐσίας καὶ πνεύματος θείου.*

² 1 Cor. xv. 45-48. See Note C.

put by revelation upon the same level with that of all other animals. Belief in the specific creation of man stands or falls with belief in the specific creation of other species. If the origin of these be traced, probably or certainly, to an evolutionary process, the origin of the animal man is presumably the same. But since man is by nature not merely animal but also spiritual, there seems to be an advance of another kind in the process, if there be such, from animal to perfect man. It is a step as marked as that which comes in the process from inorganic matter to a living organism. However that be, it is important to remember that nothing is revealed on the subject. The nature of this step, though unlike anything else investigated by physical science, is matter for scientific inquiry. Such inquiry does not raise any question strictly speaking theological, however interesting it be to theologians. Still less does it come within the limits of Christian doctrine. We are concerned only with the truth that, whatever such step there be, it is the work of God the Creator. Such a step may possibly be indicated in the words which say that God breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life. But the words do not necessarily bear that meaning, and we cannot infer it from them as a truth of revelation.

Many theologians have thought it necessary to suppose that man was originally created with perfect knowledge of all things naturally knowable. But this idea, when analysed, is found to involve great difficulties. It involves the further supposition that knowledge was conveyed to man otherwise than by the use of his natural organs, a miracle for which there is no evidence. It is not supported by any warrant of revelation ; for only by a great straining of language can it be deduced from the statement that Adam gave names to all living creatures.

This statement may, indeed, imply the exact contrary; it may indicate the first beginnings of language in human experience. Nor is such knowledge necessary for the perfection of original man. For this it is sufficient that he was created with perfect faculties of knowledge, so that all the knowledge he should acquire would be the natural consequence of his creation.

The question whether man ever existed in a state of pure nature is one that we may put aside. We know him in his original state only as endowed with supernatural gifts. These are an addition to his natural faculties. He would be true man without them; he may lose them and remain true man. They are represented by the allegory of the Tree of Life. Employed in the record of creation, this allegory is resumed in the Revelation of St. John, where it is connected with the new creation of the new heaven and the new earth.¹ The meaning of it is thus determined. The fruit of the Tree of Life is that supernatural grace which raises man beyond his own natural powers. Such grace was freely bestowed upon him in his original state.

We know by experience and by revelation the effect of grace in man as he now is; the effect upon original man is less definitely known. We are assured that if he had continued in perfect obedience to God he would not have been liable to death. After all allowance made for the mystical sense in which death and life are spoken of in Scripture, it seems clear that ordinary physical death is here intended. But there seems to be no reason for

¹ In LXX. and N.T., τὸ ξύλον τῆς ζωῆς. Gen. ii. 9; iii. 22; Rev. ii. 7; xii. 2, 14. In the Book of Proverbs, iii. 18, the Tree of Life is identified with the Divine Wisdom. In Prov. xi. 30 and xiii. 12 occurs a similar phrase, δένδρον ζωῆς, apparently used more generally. The use of the article varies.

supposing that the human body is naturally different in this respect from other animal bodies; it was made subject to the same law of growth and decay. It was therefore by the effect of supernatural grace that man would be preserved from death. But further, since life is so emphatically spoken of as consisting in the knowledge of God, we may safely infer that by the fruit of the Tree of Life is meant a strengthening and illuminating of the understanding which should enable man to lay hold of the truth of God presented to him in whatever manner. The natural life of the body and the spiritual life would alike be preserved and amplified by the gift of grace.¹

The moral condition of original man was in the first place one of innocence. This quality is purely negative. Its root is in ignorance of evil. It consists in the absence of any determination of the will against the Will of God. The freedom from shame, noted in the record of creation, is the characteristic mark of innocence. "They were both naked, the man and his wife, and were not ashamed." But the will of man being free, every act of obedience would raise him from the state of innocence to the higher condition of actual and habitual righteousness; and this righteousness, being fortified by the Divine grace, would be raised to a supernatural degree. In this original righteousness, partly natural, partly supernatural, theologians have agreed to find the *likeness* to God, as distinct from the *image*, in which man was created. They say that man is naturally constituted in the image of God; his manhood consists therein, and therefore he cannot altogether lose that image without ceasing to be man; but the likeness to God after which

¹ Compare John x. 10, "I came that they may have life, and may have it abundantly."

he was created was to be attained by grace and by obedience, and might be wholly lost.

In sum, man was created with his natural human faculties in perfect order for his proper course of life, for the acquisition of all natural knowledge, and for the right determination of his will. To these natural faculties were added the supernatural endowments of grace, preserving them, and raising them to a higher order of experience. He was created in perfect innocence, and was capable, at least, of natural and supernatural righteousness.

SECT. II.—*The Fallen State of Man*

From this original state man fell by disobedience. The consciousness of being in a fallen state appears in many human traditions, which may preserve some faint record of the event, or may be the result only of attempts to explain the present fact. One form of the tradition is included in Holy Scripture, and is thus to be received as a divinely authenticated explanation. It is needless to distinguish between history and allegory in reading the account of the Fall. We have only to read what is written for our learning.

The Tree of Knowledge of good and evil corresponds to the Tree of Life. As the one stands for the knowledge of God, to be attained by submission to his will, so the other stands for the experimental knowledge of evil, and its distinction from good, which could be attained only by rebellion against the will of God. This was forbidden, not by an arbitrary decree, but because it was in itself contrary to the good of man, its attainment being an aberration from his true end. In human laws there is a distinction between that which is wrong

in itself and that which is wrong only because it is forbidden. The same holds good of those Divine laws which are adapted by an economy to a temporary state of things; for these are indeed a kind of human law. But the distinction does not apply to the absolute Divine law. God wills all good; and his law is the expression of that will to the creature. His commands are good; and we may say with equal truth that he forbids a thing because it is evil, and that a thing is evil because he forbids it. Disregard of the Divine law is sin; and human sin began when man formed the purpose of acting not according to the will of God but according to his own will.¹

The points which stand out clearly in the record of the Fall, and which are referred to elsewhere in Scripture as of doctrinal importance, are these: (1) Man was tempted by the devil, of whom the serpent is the ordinary symbol. This great spirit had, therefore, himself become evil beforehand. (2) The beginning of sin was in woman, who in turn tempted man to his fall. (3) The first step towards sin was doubt of the word of God declaring that death would be the consequence of disobedience; the woman was beguiled. (4) The second step was indulgence of desire. "When the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof and did eat." The description answers to St. John's threefold expression of all that is contrary to God in the world: "the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the vain-glory of life." (5) The first human

¹ 1 John iii. 4: ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία. Sin is lawlessness; that is to say, not a mere act of transgression, but a determination to disregard law.

sin was an act of one man, or rather of one pair, male and female, from whom all men are naturally descended.¹

The first result of the Fall was death. The decree was: "In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." This clearly means that by sin man became at once liable to death. The process of natural decay, which would otherwise have been hindered by supernatural grace, began its course, and man was already dying.² But more is meant. Natural death and mystical death are constantly joined in the teaching of Scripture. The death which was the instant penalty of sin must include the loss of that grace by which man was raised to a supernatural life consisting in the intimate knowledge of God. His natural capacity for knowing God remained; he was still a spiritual being with spiritual life; but this was brought down to a level which, in comparison with his previous condition, may be called death. He was driven out of Paradise, and forbidden access to the Tree of Life.

The death which is the wages of sin, whether animal or spiritual, is thus seen to be consequent on the loss of grace. But why this loss? It is a penalty for the guilt of disobedience, exacted by the justice of God. We must here step warily and measure the precise value of words. To be guilty is to be liable to a penalty. We derive our terms from the ordinary course of justice. But in human judgments there is always something of the arbitrary. Offence and penalty are roughly adjusted; offence and guilt are related by fallible estimates. Guilt and penalty, again, are related by an arbitrary decree;

¹ 1 John ii. 16; Rom. v. 12; 1 Cor. xv. 22.

² Athan., *De Incarn.*, p. 56 C, ed. Colon: Εἰ δὲ παραβαῖεν καὶ στραφέντες γένοιτο φαῦλοι, γινώσκοιεν ἑαυτοὺς τὴν ἐν θανάτῳ κατὰ φύσιν φθορὰν ὑπομένειν.

the penalty may be suspended or remitted, while the guilt remains. In transferring the terms to the judgments of God we must put aside these elements of imperfection. The loss of supernatural grace was imposed as the penalty for disobedience, not by an arbitrary decree, but because of its absolute fitness; and being so imposed it followed immediately. Grace was given to original man as a means to the more perfect attainment of his true end. Therefore, when his will was averted to another end, this grace, if still left in his possession, would have been wasted; and it was consequently withdrawn. Immortality, when man had lost the way to that blessedness which was his true end, would have been for him the worst of miseries. Death was not the less a penalty; but it was a penalty in some measure remedial, bearing witness to the identity of justice and mercy in the Divine judgment. Death was ordained for the ending of sin.¹

The first result of the Fall, then, starts from the guilt of disobedience, the consciousness of which appears in the sense of shame; there follows immediately the penalty, which is loss of supernatural grace and, consequently upon this, animal and spiritual death.

The second result of the Fall is the corruption of man's nature. To set his own will against the will of God was to mar the work of God in himself. Created free to will, he would find the perfection of his nature in willing as God willed. By willing otherwise he set up a warp in his nature, which is known as concupiscence. We mean by this a depraved inclination to what is wrong, even when it is clearly seen to be wrong, and perhaps the more because it is seen to be wrong. This element of perverseness in human nature is apt to be neglected by

¹ So Irenaeus, iii. 37 (23).

moral philosophers, because of the difficulty of working it into any system; but poets, even the most superficial, have observed it, and the mystery of it has inspired some of the greatest tragedies.¹ The facts of human experience are acknowledged by the Divine word, and further illuminated. St. Paul shows that perverseness extends to a crippling of the will. "The good which I would I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I practise." He speaks of it as "the law of sin which is in my members," and as "sin which dwelleth in me." It is in effect "the bondage of corruption." The freedom in which man was created is impaired by this perverseness, which in a measure determines him to evil action.²

The corruption of nature is perhaps not confined to morals only, or to the action of will. The disorder would presumably extend to the faculty of knowledge. There may be some truth in the rhetorical declaration of a famous preacher, that an Aristotle was but the rubbish of an Adam, if we understand it not of acquired knowledge lost, but of natural capacities impaired. The capacity of knowing God, in particular, we may suppose to be weakened. But of this there is no certain revelation. Still less is there of that which might equally be assumed as probable, a certain degeneration of the bodily powers. It has indeed been thought that some such degeneration of mind and body is indicated in the allegory of thorns and thistles by which the labour of fallen man should be hindered; but the figure suits with equal fitness the moral hindrances of concupiscence.

¹ Among the most striking expressions of it are those in the well-known lines of Ovid—"Nitimur in vetitum semper, cupimusque negata" and "Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor."

² Rom. vii. 17-23; viii. 21.

What man became by sin, that he continued to be in his descendants. He transmitted to them his nature as it was ; deprived of the support of supernatural grace and righteousness ; marred by the intrusion of concupiscence. This fallen state, into which every man is born, is known as Original Sin. It is sin, not in the same way in which the conscious rebellion of the individual is sin, but as being a declension from the good which is proper to man, according to the purpose of the Creator.¹ It carries with it the guilt of sin, and the penalty ; for, as St. Paul says, "Death reigned from Adam until Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the likeness of Adam's transgression." His argument is that until Moses there was no universal positive law, for the breach of which death was the appointed penalty ; and yet death reigned. But man dies only by reason of the guilt of sin. Therefore the guilt must have passed in some way from Adam to all his seed. All are by nature children of wrath. Death passed unto all men, for that all sinned. "In Adam," he says elsewhere, "all die." As St. Thomas Aquinas puts it, all men are to be regarded as in some sort a single person, sinning in Adam.²

The Scotist theologians of the Middle Ages held that original sin was nothing else but the loss of supernatural righteousness. This explanation is sufficient to account for the universal imputation of guilt, if it be considered that man was created expressly for supernatural advancement. It is a paradox, but true, that to be supernaturally endowed is natural to man ; for the true nature of a thing is that which God intends. To fail of super-

¹ *Sum. Theol.*, 1-2. 109. 2 : "Peccare nihil aliud est quam deficere a bono quod convenit alicui secundum suam naturam."

² Rom. v. 12-14 ; 1 Cor. xv. 22 ; Eph. ii. 3. *Sum. Theol.*, 1-2. 81. 1.

natural advancement is then to fall short of the good which is the proper end of man's being; it is to run counter to God's law. It is therefore sin, and death. But this does not account for all the facts; for the element of perverseness in human nature as we know it; for those beginnings of evil which the Psalmist describes in strong hyperbole: "As soon as they are born they go astray and speak lies." Man comes into the world not liable only to corruption, but already in the grip of corruption. Forthwith upon the Fall, says St. Athanasius, men began to die, and corruption thenceforth grew upon them, developing throughout the whole race, even beyond the measure of nature.¹ Not only is human nature left without the succours of grace to the natural process of decay, but every man comes into the world with his nature already corrupted. He has not the full exercise of his natural free will; he is held in the bondage of concupiscence.

There is therefore a fact of human consciousness, which is accounted for in Christian doctrine as original sin. The name, and the fuller development of teaching on the subject, are proper to Western theology, and indeed to the system built up by the genius of St. Augustine against the errors of Pelagius. But however elaborately developed, the teaching rests on the simple truth of revelation that every man has received from his fathers a nature that is corrupted and guilty before God. The manner of this transmission of guilt and corruption is not revealed, nor have theologians been happy in their attempted explanations. It is one of the

¹ Athan., *De Incarn.*, pp. 57, 58: Τούτου δὲ γενομένου οἱ μὲν ἄνθρωποι ἀπέθνησκον, ἢ δὲ φθορὰ λοιπὸν κατ' αὐτῶν ἤκμαζεν, καὶ πλείον τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἰσχύουσα καθ' ἑαυτοῦ τοῦ γένους.

inexplicable facts of life with which we have to reckon. Christian doctrine does reckon with it, faithful, as always, to the fact.¹

SECT. III.—*Actions and Habits*

Life is manifested in action. Human actions in the state of pure nature are conceived as determined partly by the inevitable laws of nature, that is to say, by the sovereign will of the Creator, partly by man's free will. Among the laws of nature are to be included the habits or dispositions of man himself. These are partly inbred, partly acquired by repeated action. Those that are inbred or implanted by the Creator, so long as man's nature remains in its integrity, can lead him to nothing but good ; those acquired under the same conditions will be equally wholesome. In this condition, then, we may say that human actions would be determined (1) by external laws of nature, (2) by good habits, and (3) by man's free will.

In the state of original righteousness there will be added to these determining forces the aid of God's grace controlling and directing the human will. This aid may be distinguished as of two kinds, ordinary and special ; the former infusing into the soul what is known as habitual grace, a general disposition to seek after supernatural good and to do what is necessary for its

¹ Robert Browning, in *Gold Hair*, suggests this as the prime reason for holding to the Christian faith.

“ I still, to suppose it true, for my part,
See reasons and reasons ; this, to begin ;
'Tis the faith that launched point-blank her dart
At the head of a lie—taught Original Sin,
The Corruption of Man's Heart.”

attainment; the latter moving the will to determine particular acts of the same tendency.

In the state of fallen nature the human soul is deprived of habitual grace; but the history of revelation affords conclusive proof that special aid of this kind is still granted. That history is indeed nothing else but a record of such special graces, and the use or abuse of them by men. But further, in the fallen state an evil habit, called concupiscence or perverseness, is in every man by birth, and particular evil habits are rapidly acquired as the result of perverse action; by which means the freedom of the human will is impaired. We have, moreover, to reckon with the instigation of the devil and his attendant spirits, as also of evil men moving their fellows to perverse deeds. These are known as the temptations of the Devil and the World, as the moving force of concupiscence is called the temptation of the Flesh. In the state of fallen nature, therefore, human actions are determined (1) by the external laws of nature, (2) by inbred habits implanted by the Creator, (3) by good habits acquired as the result of good actions, (4) by evil habits inbred or acquired, (5) by external temptations to evil, (6) by an impaired will, and lastly, (7) by the special aid of God moving the will in the direction of supernatural good.

By the first three of these forces fallen man is moved to good actions according to the will of God who made him. Such are the ordinary duties of life, the labours of the hand, the generation and the rearing of children, and the cultivation, social or individual, of the natural virtues. The image of God in which he was created is not wholly obliterated in man by the corruption of his nature. He still has the spiritual power of knowing and willing the things of God; but this power is grievously impaired, so

that he judges amiss. He can still see within himself as in a mirror the reflection of the Divine likeness ; but all is confused by the intrusion of evil habits and the suggestion of external temptations, so that he forgets, as St. Athanasius says, that he is created in the image of God, and he fails to order his life accordingly. Human actions therefore are not wholly bad, are never determined by pure malice, and even at the worst contain some element of a good purpose ; but on the other hand they are never unmixed with evil. "We are all become as one that is unclean," says the prophet, "and all our righteousnesses are as a polluted garment." Those who are in this condition—who are in the flesh, as St. Paul has it—cannot please God.¹

A question has nevertheless been raised by theologians, whether fallen man can by his natural powers keep the commandments, either of the natural or of the revealed law, and in particular whether he can keep that first and greatest commandment which is to love God above all. It is argued that for God to command what is impossible is against his justice, and that to love God is natural to man, and not only to man, but also to every created being after the measure of its power. Therefore it is not impossible for man to love God with all his heart and with all his soul and with all his strength. And further, it may be said, we have in the Psalter the most perfect expression of the love which man owes to God ; but the Psalter is the expression of the heart of fallen man.

To the last point the reply is obvious, that in the Psalter we have the expression not of the unaided powers of human nature, but of human nature aided by special grace. The commandments of the natural law, being

¹ Isa. lxiv. 6 ; Rom. viii. 8. Athanas., *Contra Gentes*, p. 8. *Sum. Theol.*, 1-2. 109. 2. See Note D.

a part of the order of creation, are designed for man as unfallen, who could therefore keep them. It is no imputation upon the justice of God to say that man as he is now born into the world, far removed from original righteousness, cannot observe them. The commandments of the revealed law were given to man already fallen, and are adapted to his case. These he is able to keep. St. Paul was bold to say that as touching the righteousness that is in the law he was found blameless; but this righteousness he counted refuse, and the very purpose of the law, he taught, was to render men dissatisfied with their condition.¹ The great commandment concerning the love of God can be kept by men according to the measure of their existing powers, perfectly by unfallen man, imperfectly by fallen man with all that remains unspoiled of his heart and soul and strength.

Fallen man therefore has no actions entirely unmixed with evil. The sinful habit infects them all. But this truth needs careful guarding on two sides. The natural virtues in fallen man are true virtues. They are not, as was rashly said, splendid vices. They fail to please God, because they fall short of that perfection for which he created man. They are good works, but they are not done as God willed and commanded them to be done; they are tarnished by the effect of the sinful habit. They have a certain moral value or merit, as being done by man's will, however impaired its freedom, in obedience to Divine command or to the impulse of the Creator. Again, the inability of fallen man to fulfil the Divine law does not free him from the imputation of guilt. The inability is a part of his sinfulness, and though it diminish the particular guilt of a particular action even to

¹ Phil. iii. 6; Rom. vii. 7-25; Gal. iii. 24.

vanishing point, as in the case of complete ignorance, yet the general guilt of fallen nature covers all such actions. It is probable that no sin committed by fallen man can equal in guilt a simple act of disobedience on the part of unfallen man ; but every action which is tarnished by the habit of sin shares the condemnation passed upon the habit. By continuing in a course of sin a man may add to his incapacity for doing right, and take yet more away from the freedom of his will ; yet he clearly does not by this diminish the general guilt of his subsequent action. What is true of progressive is true also of initial incapacity. The injury done to man's freedom does not therefore undo him as a moral agent or deprive him of responsibility, though in the judgment of particular actions there is room for the many or the few stripes according to the capacity of the agent.¹

Man being created to live in society, the corruption of nature extends to his social order. This is the ruin of the world. The bond of social order is human law, which is partly an expression of natural law, partly the positive expression of collective human will. In the state of unfallen nature such law would be an accurate reflection of the Divine will, organizing man for the perfection of his natural life. In the state of fallen nature human law is liable to a twofold corruption. In the first place, the community as well as the individual, either from ignorance or from malice, may choose evil rather than good. Human law will then command actions which are definitely wrong. Under this head we bring all evil customs, public injustice, and tyranny. War in general springs from the same source, though a particular act of war may be good by virtue of its particular end. But however great this corruption, human society does

¹ Luke xii. 47.

not, any more than a human individual, become wholly bad ; the ruler is still the minister of God.¹

The second corruption of society is found in the toleration of evil. This is a necessary consequence of the fallen state, extending, as we shall see, even to renovated human society in the Church. It is necessary because of the impossibility in many cases of discerning accurately between good and evil, and also because man, while imperfect himself, cannot root out the imperfection of his fellows. The aspiration of the Psalmist, "I shall soon destroy all the ungodly that are in the land," is an ideal beyond the reach of fallen man. But there are degrees of such toleration, which mark the progress of the corruption or the recovery of human society.

Harder to understand is the toleration of evil by the will of God. In the generations gone by, says St. Paul, God suffered all the nations to walk in their own ways, though leaving himself not without witness among them. These times of ignorance, he says, God overlooked. The nations were left to frame their own laws and customs according to the light of nature, however obscured, and these laws and customs had a sanction from the Divine permission, though they tolerated or even commanded things that were evil. But more is to be said. The Divine Law given by revelation contains precepts which directly countenance actions contrary to the will of God. Of the divorce allowed by the Law of Moses our Lord said, "For your hardness of heart he wrote you this commandment." In the Epistle to the Hebrews, the law of the Aaronic priesthood is spoken of as a carnal commandment, which is disannulled because of its weakness and unprofitableness. The precepts of the Law, says St. Paul, were weak and beggarly rudiments.

¹ Rom. xiii. 4.

Our Lord said that he was come to fulfil, not to destroy the Law ; but his mode of completing it indicates grievous imperfections.¹

The explanation is that God's Law, given by revelation under the Old Covenant, was designed for human society in the condition of fallen nature, and for that society in a certain state of development. It was to be administered by men, according to the method of human law, and was consequently subject to the necessary limitations of human law, working in the same condition. It therefore not only tolerated imperfections in the way of leaving them unforbidden, but also commanded actions in themselves contrary to the absolute measure of right. Such actions were relatively good, by virtue of the mediate or temporary end to which they were addressed. Because of the hardness of men's hearts divorce and polygamy were relatively good, though absolutely evil, and as such were provided for in the law. In like manner we read of men being specially moved by God to actions, such as the intended sacrifice of Isaac, which are absolutely evil, but are good in relation to the condition of the agent and the end proximately set before him.

These considerations clear the way for a conclusion about human actions in general. In the state of fallen nature every ordinary human action, individual or social, is mingled of good and evil. It is good in so far as it is an act of nature ; it is evil in so far as it is affected by the fall of nature. It is good because ultimately moved by the will of the Creator, in whom alone we live and move and have our being ; it is evil because moved in part by the perverted habit of the agent or by his

¹ Acts xiv. 16 ; xvii. 30 ; Mark x. 5 ; Heb. vii. 16-18 ; Gal. iv. 9 ; Matt. v. 17-45.

rebellious will.¹ Every such action is absolutely both good and evil ; it is relatively either good or evil according to the balance of the forces determining the agent, or, in other words, of the ends proposed. An action done by constraint is counted neither good nor evil, since the will has no part in it. But if the chief determination be that of the will acting in harmony either with the natural habit and disposition to do the will of the Creator, or with a special indication of God's will, then the action is counted good, whatever the admixture of perversity or ignorance. If the chief determination be that of the will acting in harmony with evil habit or yielding to temptation, then the action is counted evil. For example, the individual act of taking human life is counted good, if determined either by the natural instinct of self-preservation or by obedience to law ; it is counted evil if otherwise determined. The law which commands this act is counted good if the end be justice and the bettering of human life ; evil, if the end be tyranny or a callous avoidance of responsibility. An individual act of war is counted good if determined by obedience to authority evil, if baser motives predominate. A national act of war is counted good if the end be justice, and the means be duly proportioned to the end ; evil, if otherwise ordered.

It remains to be said that every individual action which is rightly to be counted evil is actual sin. Sin is lawlessness. Original sin is a condition of habitual contrariety to the eternal law of God. Actual sin is a voluntary action contrary to the known law of God. Where there is no law, says St. Paul, sin is not imputed. "If ye were

¹ August., *De Civitate Dei*, xix. 13 : "Esse autem natura in qua nullum bonum sit, non potest. Proinde nec ipsius diaboli natura, in quantum natura est, malum est, sed perversitas eam malam facit."

blind," said the Lord Jesus Christ, "ye would have no sin : but now ye say, We see : your sin remaineth." The light, either of nature or of grace, is granted in varying measure to every man. Every action done against the light which a man has, or may have if he will, is actual sin.¹

SECT. IV.—*The Promise of Salvation*

St. Thomas Aquinas distinguishes the states of fallen and unfallen nature by saying that while in both alike the help of grace is needed, unfallen man requires it for one purpose, that he may will and do supernatural good ; fallen man requires it for two purposes—first for the healing of his nature, and secondly that he may do supernatural good.² By supernatural good we mean that perfection which is beyond man's natural powers considered in themselves. Man was indeed created by God for this, and therefore it is in a sense natural to him, as being the perfection of his nature, but the attainment of it is due to a separate gift of God. The Tree of Life in the original Paradise is the symbol of that gift, by eating of which man was to be raised to powers beyond his nature. Of the Tree of Life in the final Paradise the leaves are for the healing of the nations.³

This healing or salvation was promised by God from the first. It is that about which, says Zacharias in his

¹ Rom. v. 13 ; John ix. 41.

² *Sum. Theol.*, I-2. 108. 2: "Virtute gratuita superaddita virtuti naturae indiget homo in statu naturae integrae quantum ad unum, scilicet ad operandum et volendum bonum supernaturale ; sed in statu naturae corruptae quantum ad duo, scilicet ut sanetur, et ulterius ut bonum supernaturalis virtutis operetur."

³ Rev. xxii. 2.

song, "he spake by the mouth of his holy prophets which have been since the world began." In the mysterious judgment pronounced on the serpent at the Fall, there is indeed but the faintest adumbration of what was to come: "I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed: it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel." But this crushing of the serpent implies the undoing of his mischief, and St. Paul uses the figure to express the complete renovation of man: "The God of peace shall bruise Satan under your feet shortly."¹

The hope of salvation, the conviction that what is gone wrong in human nature will in some way be set right, appears dimly shadowed in the beliefs of many nations. We cannot however safely attribute this hope to any other source than a consciousness of evil as a disturbance in the order of nature, which it is reasonable to suppose will pass away. There is a desire for perfect happiness, and for the reign of perfect justice; the desire breeds a hope; but, as Hooker well says, in the natural constitution of man there is no possibility of attaining it, nor even the power of imagining a means to its consummation. "There resteth therefore either no way unto salvation, or if any, then surely a way which is supernatural, a way which could never have entered into the heart of man as much as once to conceive or imagine, if God himself had not revealed it extraordinarily. For which cause we term it the Mystery or secret way of salvation."²

The hope of salvation rested therefore on the promise of God, obscurely intimated from the beginning, repeated

¹ Rom. xvi. 20.

² *Eccl. Pol.*, i. 11. 5. See also the eloquent passage in § 6, "Concerning Faith," etc.

with growing clearness in the revelation of the Old Testament. Righteousness and salvation are the principal keynotes of the Psalter ; the righteousness of God, which is in some way to work the salvation of man. Concerning this salvation, says St. Peter, the prophets searched diligently what time the Spirit which was in them signified. It was future to them. The Law also foreshadowed the same, though men of little understanding thought to find health and life in the precepts of the Law themselves. The peculiar privilege of the children of the stock of Abraham was to have the certainty of future salvation kept always before them, and to look for it in the coming of one who should be of themselves. It is therefore called expressly the hope of Israel. But equally it is called the desire of all nations ; not because all were looking for it with intelligent expectation, but because it was the attainment of that health and life in which alone they could find satisfaction.¹

Salvation was not only for individual men. It was promised to God's people. When the time of fulfilment is come, we find the promise extended to the whole world. To say that the Lord Jesus Christ is the Saviour of the world is not the same thing as to say that he is the Saviour of men, or that he would have all men to be saved. This might signify only the healing of individual souls. But the world, in the language of the New Testament, means human society. This should be the most orderly thing in creation ; it is the most disordered, and the healing of its disorder is intended.²

¹ 1 Pet. i. 11 ; Acts xiii. 26 ; xxviii. 20 ; Hagg. ii. 7.

² John iii. 17 ; iv. 42 ; 1 John iv. 14 ; 1 Tim. ii. 4. The original signification of the word *κόσμος* is not to be neglected, though its use in the sense of human society, first in the Book of Wisdom (ii. 24 ; vi. 26 ; x. 1 ; xiv. 6, 14) and afterwards in the New

For this end the world was prepared during long ages by the providence of God. A pious imagination may trace in all secular history the course of this preparation, which would seem to be a necessary part of the Divine government. With greater confidence we may recognize such preparation designed and effected in the sacred history of God's ancient people, whose are the promises, and of whom is Christ as concerning the flesh. The Law, says St. Paul, was a tutor bringing men to Christ. In the passage where he uses this bold figure he is maintaining, with the help of a strange exegesis, the unity of that seed of Abraham to which the promise was made. It was not made to the several individuals naturally born of Abraham, but to one, that is Christ, and is thereupon extended to all who are as one man in Christ, and so collectively Abraham's seed. The preparation of the gospel is the preparation of human society in the family of Abraham. Its fulfilment is the extension of the promise of Abraham to a wider society which knows no limits of nationality.¹

In this preparation there are two points which call for attention. The first is the grace of prophecy. We have seen that in his fallen state man is moved by God to good in two ways: in the way of nature, by the guiding impulse of the Creator continuing always; in the way of grace, by a special supernatural impulse. The grace of prophecy is an impulse of this kind moving men to apprehend truths unattainable by natural means, and to speak them forth for the instruction of God's people. Future things are obviously matter for such apprehension; to the popular mind in all ages the prophet would

Testament, and especially in the Johannine writings, may have no conscious connection with the primary idea of order.

¹ Rom. ix. 4; Gal. iii. 16-29.

appeal most strongly as the foreteller, and indeed in the Law accurate prediction is spoken of as a warrant of Divine mission. On the other hand this very same warrant was not to be accepted in the case of a prophet stirring up rebellion against the God of Israel. In fact, definite prediction fills a very small part of the accepted prophetic writings. For some time there were organized bodies of prophets, while at an earlier date they would seem to have been a professional class. We read of them also as sharply opposed to each other, advising different parties in the nation.¹

We are not then to suppose the prophets habitually and ordinarily moved by Divine grace. They were the professed teachers of religion, and it was chiefly members of their class who received the impulse which we know as the grace of prophecy. It was not, however, confined to them. "I am no prophet," says Amos, "neither am I one of the sons of the prophets; but I am a herdman and a dresser of sycamore trees; and the Lord took me from following the flock, and the Lord said unto me, Go, prophesy unto my people Israel."² The matter of prophecy was usually found in things immediately concerning those who were addressed. Predictions were of things near at hand; counsel was given for present needs. But above all this, and permeating all the words of prophecy, there is the great work of maintaining and expanding the Hope of Israel. There is perpetual reference to a salvation more or less remote in a future as yet undetermined. We are taught in the Gospel to consider this the real meaning of prophecy. Encouragements and warnings which referred unquestionably

¹ Deut. xviii. 22 : with which compare xiii. 1-5 ; 1 Sam. ix. 6-9 ; 1 Kings xxii. ; Jer. xxviii.

² Amos vii. 14.

to events of the present or of the near future, are taken as referring also, more obscurely, to the fulfilment of God's purpose in the healing of mankind. The Lord Jesus Christ himself used the writings of the Old Testament in this way: "Beginning from Moses and from all the prophets, he interpreted to them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself."¹

The grace of prophecy was therefore intended to prepare men for the gospel of salvation by maintaining in the chosen people of God a growing sense of need and a living hope of satisfaction. This was effected by means not of definite predictions which might paralyse present effort, but of stimulating counsels for the present which suggested larger possibilities in the future. In this way that knowledge of God's purpose was gradually unfolded which one day, it was predicted, would fill the earth, as the waters cover the sea.

The other point in the preparation that calls for attention is the law of Sacrifice. A sacrifice in the broadest sense is an offering made to God in acknowledgment of his supreme dominion. The idea of such offering is common to the whole human race; it is elaborated in the Mosaic Law. The offerings commonly made are of two classes. In the first class are the fruits of the ground, restricted in the Mosaic ritual to corn, wine, and oil. In the case of these offerings the simple and fundamental idea is that of rendering to God, in acknowledgment of his bounty, a part of that which he bestows on men for food; but there appears also the idea of sharing in a common table with God. The offering is partly consumed by fire, partly eaten by the worshipper. In the second class are the offerings of blood, when a living animal is slain, the blood poured

¹ Luke xxiv. 27.

out before God, and the flesh either burnt with fire or eaten by the worshippers.

It is impossible within our small compass to speak in detail of the sacrifices, whether of the heathen world, of the patriarchs, or of the Law. Intricate questions of exegesis and of theology are involved. The general ideas upon which all turns are, however, simple enough. In all offerings of blood there is contained an idea, expressed in Hebrew as *covering*, which we denominate *expiation* or *atonement*. What is covered is the guilt or shame of him by whom or for whom the offering is made. Sin is in man hindering him from access to God. To cover this up is not indeed to make it non-existent, still less to hide it out of sight in a pretended non-existence, but to deprive it of power to sunder man from God.¹ By virtue of this covering, man, though alienated from God by sin, is able to approach him in worship. The ground of atonement is the substitution of the victim for the offerer. Knowing his own life to be forfeit for sin, man offers to God's acceptance in place thereof the life of an innocent beast, symbolized by the blood. The forfeit is thus acknowledged and symbolically paid, and the sinner is after a sort allowed that access to God which he lost by sin.

There follows the disposal of the flesh, which is either wholly burnt upon the altar, or partly burnt and partly consumed in a sacrificial feast. There can be no doubt that by the feast is symbolized reconciliation and friendship with God; it is a partaking of the Lord's Table.² With less assurance we may say that by eating the flesh

¹ Kurtz, *Sacrificial Worship*, etc., § 28, p. 67, Eng. tr.

² So also to partake of heathen sacrifices was, according to St. Paul, to partake of the table of demons (1 Cor. x. 21).

of the victim the offerer symbolized his own identification with the victim, which was not merely a substitute, but was mystically his very self. The flesh burnt upon the altar is unquestionably the portion of God, symbolizing the surrender of self, to be purified and sublimated by the spiritual force which the fire represents.

These are the common features of all sacrifice. In the Mosaic ritual they were minutely elaborated, and three forms of the offering of blood were distinguished. In the sin-offering, or trespass-offering, the idea of atonement was predominant. In this the Aaronic priesthood had peculiar duties and privileges. The priest, and he alone, could perform a precise and mysterious ritual of the blood, and partake of the flesh. In the whole burnt-offering the idea of pure worship was predominant, the whole of the flesh being surrendered to God through the fire of the altar. In the peace-offering, a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, there was added to the ritual of expiation and worship the sacred banquet, in which the offerer and his friends feasted with God in token of reconciliation.

“It is impossible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sins.”¹ The obvious inadequacy of these sacrifices, which nevertheless were accepted and even commanded by God, showed them to be typical of something which should afterwards be revealed; an atonement which should have a real and sufficient efficacy, a means of access and communion which should in very deed restore man to the presence of God. In this way the Law was, by its very imperfection, a tutor bringing men to Christ. But not the Law only; all

¹ Heb. x. 4.

ethnic religion as well, by insisting with whatever obscurity on the principle of sacrifice, bore witness to the need of what he should do, and prepared the way for him who was alike the Hope of Israel and the Desire of the Nations.

CHAPTER III

CONCERNING REDEMPTION

SECT. I.—*The Incarnation*

“THE Word was made Flesh, and dwelt among us.” We have already considered the personality of the Eternal Word. This Divine Person, we are taught, became man; that is to say, he took into the unity of his Person our human nature in its completeness, body and soul. He did not take only a human body, to which his Divine nature stood in the relation of soul; for a human body alone is not man. In the language of Scripture, the flesh is the whole composite humanity. The word is used by St. Paul for that which is opposed to the spiritual or godly, when it stands not for the body, which is equally sacred with the soul, but for the corrupt nature that we inherit. “They that are in the flesh,” he says, “cannot please God.” It is the “flesh of sin,” and in the likeness of this flesh God sent his Son.¹

It is an obvious truth, and for that very reason, perhaps, not stated in express terms of revelation, that by the act of taking this flesh into union with himself he cleansed it from sin.² Such is indeed the purpose of the Incarna-

¹ 1 Cor. vi. 13-20; Rom. viii. 3, 8.

² I do not touch the question whether the Flesh which he took of his Mother was already cleansed in her. Such cleansing would only anticipate the effect of the Incarnation.

tion. According to the bold figure of St. Athanasius, man was a portraiture of God graven out of created matter, but obliterated by accumulations of filth. For the restoration of the likeness, he who was the very Image depicted, and for whose sake the dishonoured material was saved from destruction, came in his own Person.¹ The created image of God, as we have seen, is the rational nature of man; the likeness of God was the original righteousness in which man was created. The image, defaced by the obliteration of this likeness, was restored, and more than restored, by the assumption of manhood into the Person of the Eternal Word. Human nature was thus endowed with the unchangeable holiness of God himself, and the Divine purpose in creating man was definitely fulfilled: *Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.* The image was there from the first and was indestructible; the likeness was impressed on man as he came from the hand of his Maker; but notwithstanding this, we have seen reason to suppose that he was created not in his ultimate perfection, but in the way to it, and that his progress was turned aside by the opposition of his own will to the Divine Will. This was remedied, and the ultimate perfection was attained, when the Word was made flesh. The Incarnate Word is therefore called, in his human nature, the second Adam, and that for two reasons. He is the firstborn

¹ Athans., *De Incarn. Verbi*, c. xiv., Op., tom. i. p. 66: 'Ὡς γὰρ τῆς γραφείσης ἐν ξύλῳ μορφῆς παραφανισθείσης ἐκ τῶν ξέωθεν ῥύπων, πάλιν χρεία τοῦτον παραγενέσθαι, οὐδὲ καὶ ἔστιν ἡ μορφή, ἵνα ἀνακαινισθῆναι ἢ εἰκὼν δυνηθῆ ἔν τῇ αὐτῇ ὕλῃ· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐκείνου γραφὴν καὶ αὐτῇ ἢ ὕλῃ ἐν ᾗ καὶ γέγραπται, οὐκ ἐκβάλλεται, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῇ ἀνατυποῦται· κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ πανάγιος υἱοῦ Πατρὸς Υἱὸς, εἰκὼν ὦν τοῦ Πατρὸς, παρεγένετο ἐπὶ τοὺς ἡμετέρων τόπους, ἵνα τὸν κατ' αὐτὸν πεποιημένον ἀνθρώπον ἀνακαινίσῃ.

of restored and perfected humanity, and he is also the origin of a restored and perfected race; his work is to bring many sons to glory.¹

This work of cleansing and restoring human nature is the purpose of the Incarnation. We can speak of this purpose only so far as our knowledge extends. Theologians have debated the question whether, if man had not fallen, the Son of God would nevertheless have become incarnate. It is a question of purely speculative theology. The answer is no part of Christian doctrine. God does not reveal to us what would have been, if things had been other than they are. He reveals that which it concerns us to know, things being as they are. We know indeed that God the Creator has an eternal purpose, which he purposed in Christ Jesus our Lord; that a mystery of Christ, hidden from all ages in God, is now revealed by the gathering in of men as fellow-members of his Body, and fellow-partakers of the promise in him. That is to say, we are forbidden to think of the work of Christ as an after-thought of mercy consequent upon the Fall, even if such a conception were not contradictory to the Divine attributes. But nothing is revealed as to the manner in which this work would have been done, if sin had not been. Revelation is of realities; and the fallen state of man being his actual state, the Incarnation of the Son of God is revealed as relative to that state. He came to seek and to save that which was lost. The religion of Jesus Christ appeals to the heart by the revelation of God's good will toward us, even in our rebellion: "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have eternal life."

¹ Heb. ii. 10. ² Eph. iii. 4-11; Luke xix. 10; John iii. 16.

About the Person of the Incarnate Word there has been long and shameful controversy. Definition by the Church has been made necessary through the persistence of heresies. No such definition has ever been wantonly undertaken. The difficulty of expressing in human language the circumstances of a fact so inexplicable and so incomparable as the Incarnation, is sufficient ground for avoiding definition if possible. The idea of incarnation was not, indeed, unknown to the ancient world ; it appears in more than one form of Eastern belief. Here, as elsewhere, the facts of the gospel fulfil the desires of men. But the existence of these ideas endangered more than it helped the right understanding of the truth. False ideas, imported from divers sources, impaired the hold of Christians upon the faith of the gospel. The definitions of the Church are nothing else but the declaration of that faith in a form adapted to meet the false ideas imported.

The doctrine of the Incarnate Word, regarded historically as developed in controversy, has been called Christology. For our purpose it will suffice to sum up the doctrine as guarded by the definitions of the Church against various forms of error.

The Body of Christ is real, not a phantasm, as held by the Docetics, who seem to have derived their idea from the pagan theophanies, or appearances of the gods in human form. He was really born of the Virgin Mary his mother ; he hungered and thirsted ; he suffered and died a real death.

The Soul of Christ is a true human soul, complete in all its natural powers. The Apollinarians held that Christ's Body was informed with life by the Divine Word, in place of the rational human soul. His complete humanity was thus denied ; if this were true, he was not

made man, but assumed only the material organization of man. But we are expressly taught that he advanced in wisdom as in stature; that he is able to sympathize with our weakness; that he endured all our trials, save only those which come from the existence in us of the sinful habit.¹

The Body of Christ was therefore formed in the womb of his Mother, though without the impregnation of human seed, yet otherwise naturally, being compacted of her blood; was born, though, it is piously believed, without injury to her virginity, yet otherwise naturally; was nourished in the ordinary course of nature, suffered and died by the common death of all men. This Body was animated by a true human Soul, created as other souls are created, but untouched by the taint of original sin. This Soul was fully equipped with all natural powers and capacities of understanding and will, with all the supernatural endowments bestowed upon original man, and further with other supernatural endowments, on which little light is thrown by revelation, consequent upon the personal union of the manhood with the Divine Nature.

Nevertheless he, whose Soul and Body these were, was none other than the Divine Person, the Eternal Son of God. Many attempts have been made to avoid this truth. Apart from the heresy of Arius, who made the Word himself a creature, the root of all these attempts will be found in the teaching attributed to Theodore of Mopsuestia, that a man Jesus of Nazareth, miraculously born of the Virgin Mary, was by a supreme and unique operation of Divine grace united to the Eternal Son. In the form of Nestorianism this became the assertion of two distinct *hypostases* or personalities. The Divine

¹ Luke ii. 52; Heb. iv. 15.

Person of the Son and a human person were supposed to be joined together in a way passing understanding. It was a minor question at what point of time the union took place, whether immediately upon the conception of the human person, or, as some held, when he was grown to man's estate, and specifically at the baptism in Jordan. An error near akin to this, but complicated with denial of the Trinity of Persons, was that of the Polish Unitarians in the seventeenth century, who held that the man Jesus of Nazareth was by reason of his perfect obedience made partaker of the Divine attributes, and therefore was to be worshipped as God.¹

The Church met these subtleties by the plain declaration that he who was born of Mary was God. The Council of Ephesus closed the way to evasion by attributing to Mary the title of *Theotokos*, God-bearer. One only indivisible Person was God from the beginning, was made man, was born of the Virgin Mary, died, and rose again, and lives for ever more, both God and Man.²

In the unity of this one Person are the two complete and perfect Natures, Divine and Human. The Godhead is not converted into flesh; humanity is not deified. This truth, surpassing our understanding equally with that of the Holy Trinity, is known as the doctrine of the Hypostatic Union. It was defined at the Council of

¹ Racovian Catechism, p. 106, ed. 1659: "Qui etiam Dei titulo iure appellandus;" p. 136: "Eum necesse est et potestate atque imperio, virtute seu potentia et sapientia et, ut alia nunc mittam, honore et cultu Deo esse similem."

² The Latin and English expressions, *Mater Dei*, *Mother of God*, are too well established in use to be excluded, but they are not satisfactory renderings of Θεοτόκος. *Dei Genitrix*, suggesting origin, is even less happy. *Deipara* is the exact equivalent.

Chalcedon, to meet the heresy of Monophysitism, which makes of the Incarnate Word neither true and perfect God nor true and perfect Man, but a new nature compounded of the two.

Each of the two Natures, being perfect and entire, has its own proper operation. The Lord Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Word, acts truly as God, and also acts truly as Man. He has therefore both Divine knowledge and human knowledge, distinct and without confusion. He has also his Divine will and his human will, equally distinct. The importance of this truth we shall see when we come to speak of his human life. The truth of the double operation was secured by the Church in long and acrimonious controversy with the Monothelites.

In all this labour of definition the Church has added nothing to the truths revealed in the gospel. The one purpose of it all has been to guard the simple truth of the Incarnation, that the Lord Jesus Christ is true God and true Man, against the subtleties of error which would impair the truth either of his Godhead or of his Manhood. The Church does not pretend to explain the mystery. The terms used in definition do not make it easier to believe or to understand. They do not even express the truth more clearly than it is stated in the gospel, for that is impossible. They only guard against a perverse misreading of the gospel, or exclude attempted explanations of the mystery which in trying to simplify it empty it of meaning.

One further point must be touched. Everything which is said of the Lord Jesus Christ is said, in the rigour of speech, either of his Divine Nature or of his Human Nature. When we say that he was born, that he hungered, that he died, we are clearly speaking of his Human Nature, his human operation,

When he said, "Before Abraham was, I am," he was speaking in respect of his Divine Nature. But so complete is the unity of his Person, that alike in Scripture and elsewhere the distinction is not always observed. He who is God was born, hungered, and died. He who is Man had seen Abraham. Therefore the same thing may be asserted alike of God, who is also Man, or of Man who is also God. While yet on earth, he spoke of himself as "the Son of Man which is in heaven." St. Paul could say that God had purchased to himself a Church "with his own Blood," and to speak thus of the *Blood of God* became the common use of the Church. In exactly the same way is the word *Theotokos* used. This mode of speech is technically termed by theologians *communicatio idiomatum*, the interchange of properties.¹

The Word was made Flesh of the seed of Abraham. He came, that is to say, not as if by chance, but in fulfilment of the Divine promise. In a well-known passage St. Paul insists that the seed of Abraham, to whom the promises were made, is in the first place Christ himself, and signifies only in a secondary sense the line of descent and the nation of Israel through whom it ran. In like manner he is unquestionably the seed of the woman who should bruise the serpent's head. His genealogy is for this reason traced, by St. Luke from Adam, by St. Matthew from Abraham. The new dispensation of God which he introduced was not a violent supersession of the old, but an orderly development. He came not to destroy the Law and the Prophets, but to fulfil. The

¹ In Greek, ἀντίδοσις. John viii. 58 ; iii. 13 ; Acts xx. 28, where the alternative reading *Κυρίου*, removing a startling turn of speech, is so obvious a substitute that the canon of the more difficult reading effectually disposes of it. St. Ignatius has ἐν αἵματι Θεοῦ, *Ad Ephes.* i. ; and Wetstein, *ad loc.*, cites many others who use the phrase.

work of Redemption is thus shown to be continuous with the work of Creation. The one Eternal Word by whom the worlds were made is he who came in the fullness of time to restore and complete his own work. Nothing was set aside as failure; nothing was abrogated, save that which was only preparatory to his coming. "For how many soever be the promises of God, in him is the yea; wherefore also through him is the Amen, unto the glory of God through us."¹

More particularly he was born of the lineage of David; and the genealogy of St. Matthew, as compared with that given by St. Luke, seems to show that, whether by some law of adoption or otherwise, he was the lawful heir of David's house. The construction of the genealogy is not clear, but the meaning can hardly be doubted. He was shown to be the Messiah, the Anointed of the Lord in regular descent, who should receive the kingdom of his father David. The manner of the kingdom was not according to the expectation of men; but it grew naturally out of the older form according to the purpose of God. Human kingship and human law, like all that is good in human life, are a shadowed image of the Divine; the Son of God came as Messiah, not to supersede them, but to perfect them by personal union with the Divine Nature.

He took Flesh of the substance of the Virgin Mary his Mother. For what cause it was the will of God that he should be born of a pure Virgin, without impregnation by the seed of man, theologians may inquire with reverence. Christian doctrine is concerned only with the fact. By the visitation of the Holy Ghost, by the overshadowing of the power of the Most High, Mary was enabled to give life and form in her womb to the

¹ Gal. iii. 16; Gen. iii. 15; Matt. v. 17; 2 Cor. i. 20.

flesh which the Son of God took of her substance. He was not only conceived, he was also born of the Virgin Mary, as the Church confesses in the Creed; her virginity remaining constant with maternity. The Virgin-birth was not essential, in the nature of things, to the incarnation of the Son of God. Other modes of taking flesh were open to the omnipotence and sanctifying grace of God. But this mode was seemly. The truth of the Incarnation, and all that flows therefrom, does not rest upon the Virgin-birth, which for that reason, perhaps, is little insisted upon by the writers of the New Testament. It is in fact barely mentioned. But for us the fact is important as emphasizing the solitary dignity, even in his human nature, of the Incarnate Word. It does not injure the truth of his manhood. In all other respects, save the virginity of the Mother, the process was normal. The child grew in her womb, nourished by her blood, and was born in due course, a Babe like any other. Here also we note the persistence of order. The course of nature was varied as little as might be. The Incarnate Word was truly and naturally the Son of Man, born of a woman.¹

The Babe thus born lived a normal human life, advancing in wisdom and in stature. "For both he that sanctifieth and they that are sanctified are all of one: for which cause he is not ashamed to call them brethren." This was necessary for the completion of his work. "It

¹ Gal. iv. 4. It is perhaps significant that the phrase *born of woman* is used to signify man in his natural condition, Matt. xi. 11; Job xiv. 1, and elsewhere. See St. Thomas Aq., *Sum. Theol.*, 3. 33. 4: "Si enim consideremus id quod est ex parte materiae conceptus, quam mater ministravit, totum est naturale. Si vero consideremus id quod est ex parte virtutis activae, totum est miraculosum."

behaved him in all things to be made like unto his brethren. . . . For in that he himself hath suffered being tempted, he is able to succour them that are tempted." Though welcomed at the first by solemn portents, his life was not such as to attract extraordinary attention. His Mother alone would seem to have stored in her memory the events of the sacred infancy, and those among whom he had grown up to manhood were of all men the most amazed at the revelation of power attending his public ministry.¹

We touch a difficult question that cannot be set aside as merely one of speculative theology. St. Paul says that Jesus Christ, "being in the form of God, counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant."² This emptying has exercised many minds, more especially of late years. The personal union of the Divine Word and the perfect manhood involves a relation between the two Natures which is to us inexplicable. We know only what is revealed. Inferences cannot be drawn from what is known without grave peril of mistakes; they should be made, if at all, with the greatest reverence and reserve. The Lord Jesus Christ personally, as the Divine Word, has the inalienable possession of the Divine glory, power, knowledge, and blessedness. But personally also he took human flesh to be the instrument by which he should do a certain work. The emptying of which St. Paul speaks might mean nothing more than this condescension. But the word seems a very strong one if used to express no more. It may refer to the manner in which he made

¹ Luke ii. 51, 52; Mark vi. 3, and parallel passages; Heb. ii. 11, 18. St. Athanasius (*Contr. Apollin.*, tom. i. p. 617) shows that ἐξ ἐνός must signify common origin from Adam.

² Phil. ii. 6.

himself known to men, veiling the glory of his Godhead, not merely in the form of a creature, but in the lowliest guise of human life. The meaning may reach beyond this into regions of thought impenetrable to us. The only interpretation which must be rejected is any which implies a change in the Divine attributes.

Again, the Lord Jesus Christ speaks of himself in the Gospel as ignorant of something in the future. "Of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father."¹ He seems to attribute this ignorance to himself personally, as the Eternal Son. This we can only account for as an example of that *communicatio idiomatum* of which we have spoken above. In saying that he knew it not, he must have been speaking in respect of his Human Nature. He could not be ignorant as God. But how could he personally both know and not know? It is the standing question of the two operations in the one Person.

A limitation of knowledge in his human Soul is clearly indicated; nor is this any more than is involved in his advancement in wisdom. But on the other hand he came to reveal the truth of God, and this by the word of his mouth. If in his Human Nature he was of limited knowledge, how could he do this? A superhuman knowledge is in many places of the Gospel attributed to him, and that not by inspiration as in the case of the prophets. It is emphatically said that he knew things *in himself* which were apart from the knowledge of sense. Not otherwise can he be accepted as the sure and final Teacher of the

¹ Mark xiii. 32. I dismiss, with Liddon (*Bampton Lectures*, p. 459, 8th ed.), as unsatisfactory the patristic interpretations of the ignorance as *economic*, meaning only that this was knowledge which the Incarnate Son was not to reveal.

hidden things of God. The purpose of his coming in the flesh could not be fulfilled without such knowledge. His Soul was therefore illumined by personal union with the Word. It is not only that he, though Man, knew all things, in the sense in which he, though God, suffered and died. He knew things, as Man, in his human Soul, which are beyond the compass of human knowledge. Theologians call this the *infused knowledge* of Jesus Christ. In addition, he had the ordinary *acquired knowledge* common to all men.

His knowledge we have seen to be limited. This is allowed on all hands of his acquired knowledge. He lived, in this respect, the true human life of his time and country. But in regard to his infused knowledge, there has not been perfect agreement among orthodox Christians. Some, and more particularly Western theologians, have held that from the moment of conception the Soul of Jesus was filled with all knowledge. It is not impossible, though there are passages in the Gospel hard to reconcile with such a supposition. It seems safer to say, with the greatest of the Eastern Fathers, that as he assumed the human weakness of hunger and thirst, so also he clothed himself in the proper weakness of human ignorance.¹ If it be asked what was the extent of his infused knowledge, it may safely be answered that, as Man, he knew all things which it was necessary for him, as Man, to teach men. We are not bound to limit such knowledge to that which he actually

¹ Athanas., *Contra Arian. Orat.* iv., tom. i. p. 496: Τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶν ἴδιον τὸ ἀγνοεῖν, καὶ σάρκα ἀγνοοῦσαν ἐνεδύσατο. And again, p. 497: "Ὡσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος μετὰ ἀνθρώπων πεινᾷ καὶ διψᾷ καὶ πᾶσχει, οὕτως μετὰ μὲν ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἄνθρωπος οὐκ οἶδε, θεϊκῶς δὲ ὡν ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ὡς Λόγος καὶ Σοφία οἶδε· καὶ οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ὃ ἀγνοεῖ.

taught, but in passing beyond this we enter the region of speculation. Apart from his teaching we have little evidence of what was in the mind of Christ ; his infused knowledge may have extended beyond our imagining, but the truth of the Incarnation does not require us to attribute to his human Soul the knowledge of anything which did not concern his mission as Incarnate. As the Eternal Word he could not fail to know all things ; as the Word Incarnate, according to the truth of his Manhood, he could be ignorant of some things. Such is the twofold operation of knowledge in the Incarnate Word.

The twofold operation of will is even more important, though less debated. There is the same inexplicable difficulty. As the one Person could know and not know, so the one Person could will and not will. There is however a subtle difference between the two cases. Not to know what God knows implies no defect in a human soul, for human knowledge is naturally and essentially finite ; but not to will what God wills would be moral failure. Knowledge and ignorance might coexist in the Person of Christ ; was it possible for him at once to will and not to will ? Could he in his Divine Nature will one thing, and in his Human Nature will otherwise ? A conflict of the two wills would mean resistance of the human will to the Divine ; and this would be sin. Can we speak of the Incarnate Word as liable to sin ? The answer is that sin was for him a moral impossibility. We do not attribute to his Human Nature a natural incapacity for sin, which would be the denial of free will and so of his perfect humanity, but a boundless capacity for avoiding sin. A real effort was required to hold his human will in perfect harmony with the Divine Will, but the effort was never lacking, and there never was any doubt as to the issue. The supreme effort is recorded in

what we read of the Agony in Gethsemane, where the human will, naturally recoiling from the prospect of the Cross, and expressed in broken utterance of prayer, was brought into subjection with sweat of blood. The meaning of the Lord's temptation is nothing else but this. He strenuously put aside suggestions made to his human will which involved a conflict with the Divine Will. It is obvious that, for these temptations to be real, they must have been fitted to appeal to his nature in its sinlessness. Appeals to unworthy motives or depraved desires would not have touched him. He was tempted as we are, with the one exception of temptations based on the sin that is within us.¹

The human life of the Incarnate Word was thus a continuous and successful effort after submission to the Will of God. "My meat," he said, "is to do the will of him that sent me, and to accomplish his work."² His Human Nature being taken sinless by the Word, there was perfectly restored in him the freedom of the will. In this respect also he was the second Adam; and he succeeded, where man had originally failed, in freely adhering to the Will of God. Such was the immediate effect of the Incarnation. In the Person of Christ Man was restored to the perfection of nature, and supernaturally exalted according to the eternal purpose of the Creator.

SECT. II.—*The Atonement*

The Christian use of the word Atonement or Reconciliation begins with St. Paul. In five places he speaks of the reconciliation of the world, or of men, to God. In one of these places he indicates the means by which this

¹ Heb. iv. 15.

² John iv. 34.

reconciliation is effected: "Ye that once were far off are made nigh in the Blood of Christ."¹ This expression directs our attention to the many passages in which we read of expiation, or the cleansing of sin by the sacred Blood: to the words of St. John Baptist announcing the Lord Jesus as the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world; to the mystery of the Lamb that was slain, in the Revelation of St. John; and above all to the argument of the Epistle to the Hebrews, which reveals the Lord Jesus Christ as our High Priest, offering himself for the sins of the whole world, and through his own Blood entering into the Holy Place, having obtained eternal redemption.

Gathering this whole revelation into one head of doctrine, we understand by the Atonement the work of the Incarnate Son, cleansing us from the stain of sin, and redeeming or delivering us from the power of sin, so that we may return to that relation towards God for which we were created—the relation of trusting and trusted children towards their Father. And this we understand to be effected by his offering of himself, a sacrifice for sin.

To understand the meaning of sacrifice, so far as it can be understood, we must go to the Old Testament. It is developed in the New Testament, but on the principles taught in the Old. The writers of the New Testament, when they speak of sacrifice, assume a knowledge of the teaching and practice of the Law. The Lord Jesus Christ on one great occasion, as we shall see, spoke words that are unintelligible without this knowledge.

¹ Rom. v. 10, 11; xi. 15; 2 Cor. v. 18-20; Eph. ii. 13-18; Col. i. 20-22. The word *καταλλαγή* and the corresponding verb *καταλλάσσειν*, or intensively *ἀποκαταλλάσσειν*, occur nowhere else in the New Testament, except in 1 Cor. vii. 11, where *καταλλάσσειν* is used of the reconciliation of a wife to her husband.

We have briefly considered the practice of the Old Testament and the significance of the sacrifices there recorded.¹ We have now to consider their fulfilment in Jesus Christ, his priesthood and his offering.

He is a Priest for ever, after the order of Melchizedek. This designation is used in the Epistle to the Hebrews to distinguish the Christian priesthood from the Levitical in two respects. It points on the one hand to an older and wider order than that of Aaron. The Levitical priesthood was peculiar to the nation of Israel. Melchizedek was the high priest of a religion which was not confined even to the family of Abraham, but to which Abraham was subject. It was the religion of the Most High, the Creator and the Father of all men. In the second place, while the Levitical priesthood was inherited by descent, Melchizedek, standing alone, a mysterious figure whose origin is left unmarked by genealogy, represents a priest appointed directly by the act of God. Such is the priesthood of Christ, superseding that of Aaron by a return to an older and wider order of Divine appointment, as foreshadowed in the Book of Psalms.²

But Christ, appointed Priest for ever, superseded the priesthood of Aaron only by way of fulfilment. The Levitical priesthood was a true forecast of the Christian priesthood. There is no breach of continuity. We see this the more clearly if we consider the origin of the Levitical institutions. They were not wholly new. They were a continuation of the old order under special conditions. The meaning of the sacrifices which had been offered from the beginning was made clearer by the distinction of the sin-offering, the whole burnt-offering, and the peace-offering. But all these were implicitly contained in the simpler patriarchal

¹ Above, pp. 138-140.

² Heb. vii. ; Ps. cx.

offerings. For the sin-offering a special ritual was ordered, in which were involved the peculiar functions of the sons of Aaron; once a year were offered the sacrifices of the Day of Atonement, in the ritual of which was found the proper function of the high priest, the representative of Aaron himself; but all this ritual of the sin-offering was a true development of the patriarchal law which forbade the eating of blood. The rule confining sacrificial worship to the one sanctuary served by the Levitical priesthood was designed as a temporary measure to maintain religious unity, nor did it, until the last days of the kingdom, put an end to the wider practice. The history of Elijah sufficiently illustrates this.¹

In the Levitical institutions there was thus a narrowing and particularizing of sacrifice and priesthood. In Christ there is a return to the larger order of Melchizedek, but not to primitive vagueness. The lessons of the Levitical order are not dropped. The argument of the Epistle to the Hebrews shows how exactly the significance of the special function of Aaron is carried to fulfilment in the one Sacrifice of the New Testament. The ritual of the blood, with the entry of the high priest into the second tabernacle on the Day of Atonement, is there treated as typical of the ascension of Christ into heaven by the power of his own Blood. But whereas the Levitical high priest repeated this ritual year by year, the expiation or redemption being continually renewed, we see it fulfilled in Jesus Christ once and for all. He has obtained an eternal redemption.²

We must not however regard the Lord's death as an isolated event working the Atonement. It was because

¹ Acts vii. 42-50: cp. Deut. iv. 19; xvi. 3, 11, etc.; Josh. xxii. 9-29; 1 Kings xviii. 23, *seqq.*; Jer. vii. 12-14; xix. 12, 13.

² Heb. ix. 1-14.

he was "holy, guileless, undefiled, separated from sinners, and made higher than the heavens," that he was able to consummate redemption by one offering. He was perfected, or consecrated to his priesthood, through sufferings. His life of humiliation was a coherent part of his offering; he was heard for his godly fear; his Body was prepared for this. Without the obedience of the Incarnation there could be no Atonement. The two are emphatically conjoined by St. Paul: "Being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, becoming obedient even unto death, yea, the death of the cross."¹

The Birth, the Life, the Death of Jesus Christ are to be regarded as one act of self-oblation; the outpouring of the sacred Blood upon the Cross was the visible consummation of the offering. But equally his Resurrection was necessary. He was raised, says St. Paul expressly, for our justification.² The acceptance of the offering, as doing away the effect of sin, was declared by his triumph over death. And finally in the Ascension, bringing the Blood of the Sacrifice, he brought also the redeemed humanity which it represents into the presence of God, and so completed the reconciliation. The whole of the gospel therefore is the revelation of the Atonement.

On the completeness of the one offering there follows an important development of the Sacrifice. Under the Old Testament the blood of no sacrifice might be eaten, nor might the flesh of a sin-offering be eaten by him who offered. Of those brought by individual offenders, a part was burnt on the altar, the rest of the flesh was eaten by the priests with peculiar solemnity; of those offered for the whole nation, or by the priest on his own behalf, the flesh was wholly consumed by fire. The

¹ Heb. vii. 26; ii. 10; v. 7-10; x. 5; Phil. ii. 8.

² Rom. iv. 25.

sin-offering was thus carefully distinguished from the peace-offering, so as to indicate the inadequacy of the expiation or atonement effected. "It is impossible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sins."¹ But the Lord Jesus Christ spoke of eating his Flesh and drinking his Blood. He spoke of this first, as recorded in the sixth chapter of St. John, in general terms. But he spoke of it a second time with special reference to sacrifice. In the night before he suffered, after eating the Passover with his disciples, he took bread, blessed and gave it to them, saying, "Take, eat; this is my Body, which is being given for you;" the cup also of wine, saying, "Drink ye all of it; for this is my Blood of the Covenant, which is being shed for many unto remission of sins." He added the command, "Do this in remembrance of me."²

This language can be understood only by reference to the Old Testament. A comparison with the Law shows it to be essentially sacrificial. It is not this or that term only, but the whole context which looks that way.³ The Blood which is being shed unto remission of sins is the Blood of the Sin-Offering. The Body which is being given for man is the Flesh of the Sacrifice. In the actual record of the Lord's death there is no clear indication of its sacrificial character; we have this in the institution of the Lord's Supper which went immediately before. The words of the institution recall the sin-offering of the Old

¹ Lev. iv. 3-21; vi. 25-30; ix. 8-11; Heb. x. 4; xiii. 11.

² Matt. xxvi. 26-28; Mark xiv. 22-24; Luke xxii. 19, 20; 1 Cor. xi. 23-25. The four records should be compared, and the slight verbal differences noted. It seems right to insist on the exact force of the present participles *διδόμενον* and *ἐκχυνόμενον*.

³ More stress has been laid on the words *ποιεῖτε* and *ἀνάμνησις* than, taken by themselves, they will bear. Their sacrificial sense is determined by the context and the occasion.

Testament, and the special covenant-offering that was made at Sinai. The occasion recalls the Passover, and this connection St. Paul brings out: "Our passover also hath been sacrificed, even Christ: wherefore let us keep the feast."¹ The Passover, a sacrifice which preceded the special institutions of the Law and was continued side by side with them, had the closest connection with the peace-offering. At the same time it was eminently a sacrifice of redemption, and by the importance attached to the sprinkling of the blood it was linked to the sin-offering. In the Sacrifice of the New Testament all these distinctions are gathered into unity.

The command of the Lord, "Do this in remembrance of me," marks the continuance of the sacrificial action by the Church. There is only one Sacrifice, one Victim, a final and sufficient oblation, satisfaction, and propitiation for the sins of the whole world; and this abides continually. In the Lord's Supper, by the separate representation of the Body and the Blood, Christ is mystically set forth in victim-state. We proclaim the Lord's death, says St. Paul. Certain theologians have sought to identify the sacrifice of the Church with the perpetual presentment in heaven of the "Lamb standing as though it had been slain." Heaven and earth are held to be linked together in worship. The sacrifice of the Mass, says Thomassin, is identical with the sacrifice of Heaven. But this opinion is seriously contested. The emphatic language of the Epistle to the Hebrews, declaring that Christ, having offered his one sacrifice, "sat down on the right hand of God," seems, it is said, purposely to exclude the idea of a continued sacrificial act in heaven. His entrance into heaven "through his own Blood" is unquestionably sacrificial; but the effect

¹ Exod. xxiv. 5-8; 1 Cor. v. 7.

was at once complete. And again, the Ascension is the fulfilment of the type of the annual entry of the high priest into the Holy of Holies. But the high priest's offering of the blood within the veil did not continue throughout the year; the effect of his entry was to sanctify the courts of the Temple for the continual offerings. In like manner, it is urged, the entry of Christ into the heavenly sanctuary hallows the Church for the continuance of the one offering. Sacrifice indeed is a mode of approaching God proper to earth and not to heaven.¹

Between these diverging opinions it is needless to judge. Equally needless it is to enter into the elaborate reasonings of those who since the sixteenth century have discussed the nature of the Christian Sacrifice. This only should be noted, that where the word *sacrifice* is used to signify the death of the victim, there the Sacrifice of Christ will be regarded as an act complete in a moment of time upon the Cross; but when the word is used in its truer and fuller sense, it signifies the whole action which is continuous till the end of time.

This continuous offering effects a continual atonement, not only for sins that are past, but for those which daily recur. The atonement is perfect; therefore the Church that offers eats also the flesh of the sin-offering. "We have an altar, whereof they have no right to eat which serve the tabernacle."² The sin-offering and the peace-offering are one. But more than this: we are bidden to drink of the Blood. That symbol of life was all poured out before God in the sacrifices that were before Christ: the offerer gave the whole life in substitution for his own.

¹ 1 Cor. xi. 26; Rev. v. 6; Heb. ix. 1-14; x. 12. Thomassin, *De Incarn. Verbi*, x. 24-5.

² Heb. xiii. 10.

But the Atonement being complete, the Life itself of the Lamb of God, which he laid down for us and took to himself again, is given also to us. He not only died for us, and rose again, but he lives in us, and we in him.

There are some words used in presenting the doctrine of the Atonement which call for a passing note. Of Justification we shall have to speak more at length. The terms *propitiation* and *expiation* are even more characteristic of Gentile sacrifices than of the Mosaic or Christian. They were derived from an imperfect conception of the Divine Nature: the wrath of God was thought of as arbitrary and removable by means of gifts. This idea, chastened and corrected in the Old Testament, is in the New Testament absorbed into the larger truth of the Love of God, who desires the self-surrender of his creatures, that in him they may find their perfect blessedness. The wrath of God is then seen to be nothing else but his perfect will, addressed to the correction of evil. In the Christian sense God is propitiated, and sins are expiated, by an action that brings the sinner under the sanctifying influence of the Love of God.

Not altogether dissimilar is the history of the word *satisfaction*. Starting from the crude idea that by sin God was defrauded of his rights, and that something must be given as a *quid pro quo*, men were led through the teaching of the Law to recognize the utter inadequacy of any such transaction; in the Gospel is revealed the perfect holiness of God, and his requirement of a corresponding holiness in his creatures, a requirement that is satisfied in the sacrifice of Christ, not so much by his death as by his obedience in dying.

The word *redemption*, though not unknown to Gentile religion, is more proper to revelation. Its meaning is deliverance at a price from slavery or from the power of

an enemy. It is a figure drawn from the ransom of captives. The idea lies at the root of all sacrifice; it was made prominent in the Law, and remains not less prominent in the Gospel.¹ It has given occasion, almost from the first age of Christian teaching, to speculations, rather curious than profitable, concerning the payment of the ransom and its recipient. All that is certain is contained in the statement that man, being by sin deprived of his liberty and subject to death, is now set free and receives the gift of life. This was symbolized in the Old Testament by the substitution of a victim bound and delivered to death; it is effectually realized in the New Testament through the submission and death of Christ.

This introduces the remaining word that needs comment. A sacrifice is a *substitution*. The Lord Jesus Christ is said to have suffered for us vicariously. Crudely stated, this appears to be an act of mechanical justice. Examined a little more closely, it seems to involve a profound injustice. The sinless would seem to be punished instead of sinners, their guilt being transferred or imputed to him, his innocence to them. Indeed the language of Christian teaching, and still more of Christian devotion, not unfrequently assumes this colour. The exceeding love of Christ is thus commended to us, in that he has taken our place and borne the curse for us. But this is only part of the truth, and to stop here does involve radical injustice. In the doctrine of Sacrifice

¹ The words *λύτρον*, *λυτροῦσθαι*, *λύτρωσις*, and intensively *ἀπολύτρωσις*, are of frequent occurrence. In Gal. iii. 13, iv. 5, the word *ἐξαγοράζειν*, which emphasizes more the idea of purchase, is exceptionally used for deliverance from the special burdens imposed by the Mosaic Law. This verbal distinction is not preserved in the Latin or English versions. The word *ἀγοράζειν*, in 1 Cor. vi. 20; vii. 23; 2 Pet. ii. 1; Rev. v. 9, and elsewhere, appears to be used in a similar but not an identical sense.

substitution must pass into identification. It is a moral identification, founded on a perfect union of wills. The Incarnate Word in the exercise of his human will offered himself for all men; that is to say, in the greatness of his love he desired his perfect obedience unto death to be not his alone, but that of all whom he draws to himself. His sacrifice is finally effectual for those who respond to his desire—who seek, as St. Paul says, to fill up that which is lacking of the afflictions of Christ, knowing his sufferings, and becoming conformed to his death. On his part the Atonement is complete; on our part is needed the response of love.¹

SECT. III.—*The Doctrine of Grace*

The Incarnation is the redemption of man in the Person of Jesus Chrst. The Atonement is the redemption of men collectively and individually by the offering of Christ. This redemption is universal. He died for all. He gave himself a ransom for all. He took flesh in order that by the grace of God he should taste death for every man. He is the propitiation for our sins, says St. John: and not for ours only, but also for the whole world. Through one act of righteousness, says St. Paul, the free gift came unto all men to justification of life.² There is no truth on which the sacred writers more strongly insist. It is strange that any should be found, as among Calvinists and Jansenists, to empty their words of meaning, and to maintain that Christ offered himself for the redemption only of certain chosen souls.

¹ Col. i. 24; Phil. iii. 10.

² 2 Cor. v. 15; 1 Tim. ii. 6; Heb. ii. 9; 1 John ii. 2; Rom. v. 18.

The effect of the Atonement is to raise men to the state of Grace. We have already used this word when speaking of the original state of man. We must now consider very carefully what it means. Grace means, in the first place, beauty, regarded as giving pleasure to the beholder. By the writers of the New Testament the word is used exclusively of spiritual grace or beauty of character, and chiefly of this regarded as pleasing to God. Secondly, it stands for the favourable regard which the beholder has for those with whom he is well pleased, and so for kindly favour in general; in particular, for the good will of God toward his people. Thirdly, it signifies the special act of kindness which bestows on a man more than he deserves, more than he can claim by right, or, as St. Paul puts it, more than is reckoned as of debt. Fourthly, it is used for the sense of gratitude in the recipient of such bounty. These are the natural meanings of the word, fixed by the ordinary use of language. They enter in varying degree into the specific sense which it bears in Christian teaching.¹

Man lost by sin the spiritual beauty with which the Creator endowed him. Supernatural grace was gone, and the natural graces of the human character were marred. But even if these last were recovered in their perfection, if man should develop his natural excellencies to the highest degree, still he would not become all that God meant him to be. He was designed for something better, and until that better were attained, he would fall

¹ Rom. iv. 4. We argue, of course, from the Greek *χάρις*, with its derivatives *χαρίζεσθαι*, *χάρισμα*, and *χαριτούν*. The Latin *gratia*, the English *grace*, are used as equivalents, and their sense follows that of the original. The use of the word as a rendering of *εὐπρέπεια* in the English version of Jas. i. 11 is unfortunate.

short of the end of his being. Therefore, although moral effort after good, even in the most abject of creatures, must be always pleasing to God, yet there is something lacking; God cannot be rightly well pleased with the merely natural man, still less with fallen man. Nor is it possible for man by the exercise of his natural powers to earn for himself supernatural endowments. He may conceivably earn all possible rewards that are in the order of nature, but no more. If he receive more, it can only be of the free bounty of God, not as of debt. We are shut up then to this, that we can enter into favour with God and become well pleasing to him, only by receiving of his bounty that supernatural beauty which is required for our perfection according to his will.

This is what we mean by the Grace of God. We may pass by the instances of such grace given to individual persons under the Old Testament; they were exceptional, and we know not the measure of the gift. We may on the same ground pass by the case of the ever-blessed Mother of God, hailed by the angel Gabriel as endued with grace. We come to the Incarnate Word himself, who dwelt among us full of grace. In his perfect manhood, as well as in the truth of his Divine Nature, he was the beloved Son, well pleasing to the Father. We see in him the perfection of all natural graces, the perfection also of supernatural grace, his manhood enriched by personal union with the Godhead. Both are perhaps indicated when we are told that he advanced in grace, in favour with God and men; we need not too curiously ask which is meant when we read that men wondered at the words of grace proceeding out of his mouth. The power of holiness that was in the humanity of Jesus Christ was the free gift of God. It was not a reward for his obedience; it was

that which made his obedience possible. God anointed him with the Holy Ghost and with power, crowned him with glory and honour. For his obedience there was more given; he was heard for his godly fear; he was perfected for his work by his suffering obedience; but still it was by the grace of God that he tasted death for every man.¹

In the Person of Jesus Christ man was brought into favour with God. But the immediate effect extends beyond his own Person. He redeemed all men. All, by the virtue of his Atonement, are brought into a new relation to God. "The grace of God hath appeared, bringing salvation to all men."² A new dignity is given to the human race, bought with such a price. As the redemption of Israel from Egypt brought the nation as a whole into a new relation of favour with God, so the redemption of the world by Jesus Christ endues all mankind with a corresponding favour. The love of God is one unchanging act of will, but in regard to its manifestation we distinguish between the love that brought to pass the Incarnation, and the love that is bestowed upon redeemed humanity. This latter is a favourable regard towards those whom the beloved Son represents, rendering in the community of their flesh his offering of perfect obedience, a perfect human service. There is a grace which is universal.

But we mean more than this by the state of grace.

¹ Luke i. 28; ii. 52; iii. 22; iv. 22; John i. 14; Acts x. 38; Heb. ii. 9, 10; v. 7.

² Titus ii. 11. The alternative rendering, which connects *ἐπεφάνη* with *πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις*, does but slightly weaken the force of the words, making them mean that the light of God's favour has extended to all. Compare the collect, "Deus, qui humane substantiæ dignitatem mirabiliter condidisti, et mirabilius reformasti," etc.

To stop here is to rest in a kind of Semipelagianism. Complete Pelagianism is the denial of original sin, the assertion of a natural power in man to rise to all perfection. It is hardly a less pernicious error to hold that a soul once redeemed,¹ and so brought into a new relation of favour with God, is able to advance by virtue of this liberation to all supernatural excellence. This opinion with regard to the operation of grace is not unlike that of the Deists in regard to the operation of nature. It assumes an original impulse given by the Divine Will, but excludes the abiding activity of God. The broad teaching of the New Testament is that for the attainment of salvation each man needs, not only an original acceptance into favour, but a continual outpouring of God's grace. The grace of God is multiform; we have gifts differing according to the grace that was given to us; of his fulness we receive grace for grace, favour upon favour.² To be in the continual reception of that which God thus bestows is to be in the state of grace.

There follows from this a meaning of the word which is peculiarly and characteristically Christian. We owe it perhaps to St. Paul himself, but to St. Paul as delivering the truth which he had received from the Lord. It signifies the help of God, without which no man can either escape from sin or continue in the way of salvation. The need of this continual help, as alone making

¹ Or even regenerate: this being one of the forms of Semipelagian error condemned by Celestine I. in his Epistle to the Bishops of Gaul, c. vi. (Denzinger, *Enchiridion*, p. 26).

² 1 Pet. iv. 10 (ποικίλη); Rom. xii. 6; John i. 16. I take this last difficult passage in the sense given to it by St. Augustine, *Tract. iii. in Joan.*, § 10: "De bonitatis eius accepimus. Quid? Remissionem peccatorum, ut iustificaremur ex fide. Et insuper quid? *Et gratiam pro gratia*; id est, pro hac gratia in qua ex fide vivimus, recepturi sumus aliam." See p. 177, note 1.

man able to please God, was maintained with the greatest emphasis by St. Paul against the Judaizing opinion that a careful observance of certain rules of life could of itself secure the Divine favour. This is the moral significance of his favourite antithesis between law and grace. The doctrine was little in evidence, because little needed, during the first Christian centuries. The rise of the Pelagian heresy gave it a new importance, the antithesis now being between nature and grace, and the Church found in St. Augustine the doctor who was to formulate the teaching of the gospel in reply to the question thus forced to the front. It cannot be denied that in the stress of controversy St. Augustine was pushed to exaggeration. He was careful to guard some of his own expressions in his book of *Retractations*. He left others unguarded which in later days were made to shelter new errors. But in the main his exposition of the doctrine of grace, fortified by many conciliar decrees, was adopted by the whole Church. In Western Christendom it entered most peculiarly into the language of public worship. The collects of the Latin Sacramentaries were saturated with its terms, which survive, but little obscured, in our English version.

Christian doctrine is concerned chiefly with this auxiliary grace. But the primary meaning of the word is never to be lost sight of. It determines the nature and the purpose of the help given. Bearing this in mind, we may briefly summarize the doctrine of grace as follows.

Man is born in a state of sin. He is necessarily displeasing to the holiness of God. Out of this state he cannot raise himself. He cannot even choose what is good, save in a halting way, since the freedom of his will is impaired by the corruption of his nature; still

less can he perform even the imperfect good that he purposes. He thus lies in the wrath of God. But by reason of the perfect service of the Incarnate Word, the Son of Man, the whole of mankind is brought into a new relation of favour with God; human nature has become pleasing to him. There is grace for all. Individual men however are still alienated from God by the aversion of their wills. But in pursuance of the new favour or grace that is come by Jesus Christ, God enables men severally to address their wills to the choice of good. If a man respond to this enabling grace, which he receives by the free gift of God, and which he is free to use or to neglect, he is brought into the state of grace; he is the object of God's favour, he receives further help, enabling him to develop graces of character, and to live a life of grateful service; continuing thus he receives the final grace of perseverance to the end. At every stage without the gracious help of God he can do nothing further; and equally at every stage he is free to resist the Divine influence, and to decline from the grace received.

We may distinguish between grace regarded as the mere gift of God, and grace regarded in its effect as making the recipient well pleasing to God. It is wider in the former regard, and will include those special gifts which are called by St. Paul *charismata*. These are powers bestowed by God not so much with a view to the personal salvation or perfection of the recipient, as for the purpose of enabling him to fill his place in the company of God's people. They belong therefore more especially to the doctrine of the Church.

We are not here concerned with the profound questions of theology which gather round the doctrine of grace, and which at various times, and especially in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, have been the subject of

strenuous controversy. One question however is too fundamental to be wholly passed by. The insoluble problem of reconciling the freedom of the creature with the sovereignty of the Creator reappears in this connection. God wills the salvation of a man; he appoints the means of salvation, and gives them by his grace. How can his Will be frustrated? An exaggerated answer on the one hand says that grace, which God gives to whom he will, is an irresistible influence; that as no man can be saved without it, so no man to whom it is granted can fail of salvation. This is the teaching of Jansenism and Calvinism. An exaggerated answer on the other side leans to Pelagianism, and exalts the freedom of man to the extent of making the grace of God little more than a general support of human effort. As we have seen before, we have no means of correlating the two facts of God's infinite will and man's freedom. We can say only that God wills man to be free, and leave the problem there unsolved.¹

Setting aside these questions, we must ask what are the effects of grace in the individual man. The first effect is Justification. This word means in common language the acquittal of an accused person.² In the language of revelation a man is said to be justified when he is discharged of the guilt of sin. But how can God, the righteous Judge, acquit sinners? It is not enough to say that he does it of grace, for we may not set his attributes of mercy and justice in opposition. A human tribunal

¹ See Note E.

² I do not forget that *δικαιοῦν* is used by Greek authors alike of condemning and acquitting. It was to *do justice* one way or the other. There is a curious parallel in the Scottish use of the word *justify* in the sense of *execute justice*. But this other sense does not appear in the Scriptural or theological use of the word.

may acquit the guilty through ignorance or carelessness, or by an arbitrary act of mercy. Not so God. If then he discharge sinners of their guilt, it is because in some way their guilt ceases to be. In strict justice, a human tribunal can only declare the man innocent who was not guilty in fact. But God, who calleth the things that are not as though they were, can do more.

The grace of God which is won for us by the merits of Jesus Christ, moving a man to will what is good, moves him also to recognize in Jesus Christ the power of holiness triumphing over sin, a power which he sees made accessible to man. This recognition is faith in Jesus Christ. He is further moved by grace to a grateful love and service, and enabled to make a beginning herein by some act of self-surrender. The power of the life of Christ, who was raised for our justification, is communicated to him, so that henceforth Christ may live in him, and he may live his life in the power of the Son of God. Hereupon his sins are not merely forgiven; they are done away. The guilt of sin being nothing else but the aversion of the man from God, so soon as he is effectually turned to God his guilt ceases. The man is justified. He still has to bear the natural consequences of his natural acts and of the nature which he received from his fathers; he must suffer and die. But in his new condition he is approved of God, and accounted righteous.

It is not therefore difficult to see why St. Paul teaches that we are justified by grace, and almost in the same breath asserts that we are justified by faith apart from the works of the Law, while St. James emphatically declares that a man is justified not by faith only but by works. They are three partial statements of the whole truth, which St. Paul gathers up elsewhere by saying that

to rely on Law for justification is to fall away from grace, and that what avails is faith working through love.¹

We have so far considered the justification of a conscious subject, who responds to the first movement of grace and surrenders himself to its operation. But infants are justified as well, and brought into the state of grace. In their case the operation is simpler, and at the same time less intelligible. It is simpler because there is no element of personal action on the part of the recipient of grace. It is less intelligible because all takes place in a soul that is not conscious of itself, a region that lies outside our experience. Of the fact we are assured. The infant was born in sin ; he is freed from the inherited guilt and stain of sin. The operation is obscure, an act of the hidden wisdom of God. Grace cannot be said to move the infant's will, for his will is not yet capable of movement ; still less can he be moved to faith. It may be said however that the movement of the will is not part of the active cause of justification ; it is necessary only because the human will, acting under the impulse or constraint of sinful nature, opposes the action of grace, which opposition must be removed by the conversion of the will. But the faculty of will in the infant is not yet active ; it does not therefore interpose any bar to the action of grace. The self-surrender of faith, again, is necessary only because the mind has been actually turned away from God ; but the mind of the infant, though born with a native tendency in that direction, has not yet acted. There is thus nothing to hinder the free action of grace upon the soul, purging its inherited corruption, correcting its native tendency to evil, and so rendering it acceptable to God or justified. But these considerations belong rather to speculation than to

¹ Rom. iii. 24, 28 ; Jas. ii. 24 ; Gal. v. 4-6.

doctrine. What we are taught is the fact that infants are freely justified by grace.

The effect of continuing grace is the development of holiness, or sanctification. Justification and sanctification are not to be set apart by a hard and fast distinction. They are the beginning and the carrying on of the same operation. God does not justify without imparting holiness; the first vocation of the Christian is to be a saint. Nor is the operation necessarily one of unbroken continuity. A man may fall from the state of grace by an act of deadly sin; his renewal by repentance is a fresh justification. Repentance means precisely that change of attitude towards God, produced by grace moving the will, which makes it possible to discharge the sinner of guilt.¹ The work of sanctification is then resumed. The true distinction is that between the power of grace effecting a change in the man's state, and the same power maintaining and perfecting him in his new state, the state of grace, called also the state of salvation.

We have set aside the complications of theological science, but it may be useful to note the principal terms and distinctions used in discussing the doctrine of grace. Theologians distinguish *actual* and *habitual* grace. The former is an influence directly moving the will or helping the recipient to perform that which he wills. The latter is the Divine influence abiding in the soul, directing the ordinary course of Christian life, and rendering the possessor pleasing in the sight of God. They distinguish *prevenient* and *subsequent* grace. These terms are

¹ No language of Western Europe has a word answering exactly to *μετανοεῖν*, which is rendered in Latin *paenitentiam agere*, in English *repent*. The sense of the words in use must be determined by the sense of this, the original term of Christian teaching.

relative to the effect of grace. The help of God works in us a given effect, and following that up works a further and consequent effect. By prevenient grace, says St. Augustine, we are healed; by subsequent grace when healed we are quickened and refreshed; by the one we are called, by the other we are glorified.¹ In much the same way grace is distinguished as *operating* and *co-operating*, the one moving the will, the other aiding in the accomplishment of what is willed. It is distinguished again for deeper questions, into *sufficient* and *effectual* grace. The former term is derived from the encouragement given to St. Paul, "My grace is sufficient for thee,"² but the meaning is extended. On the principle that he who wills the end wills the means, it is said that God, willing the salvation of men, gives them grace sufficient for the attainment of salvation, but in some only does it become effectual. On the relation between these two aspects of grace have turned some of the darkest of controversies. It has not been the will of God to reveal to us the whole of his working.³

In reviewing these distinctions, however, it is important to bear in mind that the grace of God, though diverse in its effect, is one undivided operation of his love and power. Essentially it is nothing else but that partaking of the Divine Nature which is conferred on us through Jesus Christ our Lord.⁴

¹ Aug., *De Nat. et Grat.*, c. 31: "Praevenit ut sanemur, quia et subsequetur ut etiam sanati vegetemur; praevenit ut vocemur, subsequetur ut glorificemur." It is the distinction noted in the collect, "Prevent us, O Lord, in all our doings with thy most gracious favour, and further us with thy continual help," etc.

² 2 Cor. xii. 9.

³ See Note E.

⁴ 2 Pet. i. 4. *Sum. Theol.*, I-2. 112. 1: "Nihil aliud quam quaedam participatio divinae naturae."

SECT. IV.—*Eternal Life*

Death came into the world by sin, and to every man severally death is the wages of sin. This natural consequence of the sinful state in which we are born does not disappear when guilt is done away by the grace of justification. The pardoned and justified sinner still has to live the life which is a progress towards death, and to undergo the death to which it leads. But the first entrance into the state of salvation is spoken of as the beginning of a new life. It is at once a death and a birth; a death unto sin, and a new birth unto righteousness. We are dead with Christ, says St. Paul; we are mystically made to share his death, and by thus dying we are justified from sin. From this death we rise again, by the power of his resurrection, to walk in newness of life. Here we obviously have figurative language, but in the figure is solid truth. The truth is expressed elsewhere under the figure of a new birth. "Except a man be born anew, or from above," said the Lord Jesus Christ, "he cannot see the kingdom of God." He must be born of water and the Spirit. This, in the language of St. John, is to be born of God. "We are saved, says St. Paul, through the laver of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost."¹

The new birth, or regeneration, is thus in a measure identified with justification, but there is an important distinction. The grace of justification is many times renewed: regeneration is a gift of life once for all. However often a man fall by deadly sin from the state of salvation, he may be restored by a fresh act of justifying

¹ Rom. vi. 1-11; John iii. 3, 5; 1 John iii. 9, *et alibi*; Titus iii. 5.

grace ; but this restoration is not described in the terms of death and birth which are used of the original justification.

We must carefully observe how death is spoken of in this connection. The word is used in two ways which, on the surface, are contradictory. It is used to signify the effect of sin, not only as a future consequence, but as present even now in those who yet live in the flesh. "Ye were dead," says St. Paul, "through your trespasses and sins, wherein aforetime ye walked." "He that loveth not," says St. John, "abideth in death." It is needless to multiply examples. On the other hand the way of escape out of this state of death is itself called death. "Ye died," says St. Paul to the Colossians, "and your life is hid with Christ in God." "We who died to sin," he asks, "how shall we any longer live therein?" We died with Christ; we were made dead to the Law through the body of Christ. It was thus by death that we passed into a new life. But yet again there may be a return from this new life into the former state of death. There is a sin unto death, says St. John, which a brother, a member of the redeemed and sanctified company, may sin. This may be what is spoken of in the Apocalypse as the second death; it is certainly what is meant by St. Jude where he speaks of autumn trees without fruit, twice dead, plucked up by the roots.¹

From this second death no possibility of revival is anywhere suggested. In the third century there appeared a hard and fierce doctrine, prompted perhaps by growing laxity among Christians, according to which any single grievous sin committed after baptism brought the soul into this death. Novatian of Rome taught thus, forming

¹ Eph. ii. 1; 1 John iii. 14; Col. iii. 3; Rom. vi. 2, 8; vii. 4; 1 John v. 16; Rev. xx. 6; Jude 12.

a schism which long continued ; but the general Christian tradition held fast to the hope of pardon and restoration for the fallen. In the language of the Church deadly sin is not a sin which plunges the soul at once into death, but one which, if continued without repentance, will certainly have that effect.¹ The remedy for such sin is the grace of justification, regarded not as giving new life but as arresting the approach of death. The sinner has fallen from the state of salvation which is spiritual health ; he is restored, not to a new life, but to the use and enjoyment of the life which was in danger. In one difficult passage St. John seems to speak of this restoration as a gift of life. "If any man see his brother sinning a sin not unto death, he shall ask and shall give him life."² But this may well be understood of extension or continuation of a threatened life. Nowhere is the repentance of a Christian spoken of as a passage through death into life. St. Paul desired to become conformed to the death of Christ ; but this was a continuance, not a renewal, of the mystical death by which he attained the new life. The life itself is *necrosis*, mortification. Because we died, and our life is hid with Christ in God, therefore we are to mortify our members which are upon the earth. St. Paul would bear about in his body the dying of Jesus, that the life also of Jesus might be manifested in his body. Such dying is not for renewal

¹ To use the words of St. Cyprian, death *creeps on* by reason of such sin. Penitence liberates "non utique ab illa morte quam semel Christi sanguis extinxit, et a qua nos salutaris baptismi et redemptoris nostri gratia liberavit, sed ab ea quae per delicta postmodum serpit" (*Epist.*, lv. 22).

² 1 John v. 16. There is no ground for the insertion "God shall give him." The Vulgate rendering turns the difficulty by using the passive ; "petat, et dabitur ei vita."

by penitence ; it is the law of continuous advance in sanctification.¹

We may now see the meaning of the difficult passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews : " As touching those who were once enlightened . . . and then fell away, it is impossible to renew them again unto repentance, openly crucifying to themselves the Son of God afresh." For those who have once been admitted to the life of grace there can be no fresh beginning. They were once crucified with Christ, openly brought into union with his death, and so into the light and the gifts of the Holy Ghost, the powers of the age to come. If they fall back, repentance is not indeed denied them with its effect of restoration, but there is no complete renewal, no repetition of the death unto sin or of the new birth unto righteousness. It is a powerful exhortation to continuance and progress in the way of salvation. We cannot be ever beginning afresh ; we must go on to perfection.²

There is then a definite beginning of justification, which cannot be repeated. It is a new birth, and therefore the beginning of a new life. It is the beginning only, and from that beginning there is to be an advance. We are to grow in grace. We are not to remain children, but are to become as full-grown men, attaining to the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ.³

Life is an assemblage of powers. These may be possessed before they can be exercised. It is so in

¹ Phil. iii. 10 ; Col. iii. 3-5, *νεκρώσατε* ; 2 Cor. iv. 10, *νέκρωσιν* ; cf. Rom. viii. 13, *θανατοῦτε*. These three words are found nowhere else in this sense, until they came into common use among Christians by direct derivation from St. Paul.

² Heb. vi. 4-6. See Note F.

³ 2 Pet. iii. 18 ; Eph. iv. 13, 14.

nature. The human child is born with capacities which are developed with bodily growth. It is so in grace. Powers are given to the soul to be gradually brought into use. Their development does not depend upon natural growth. It is true that without a certain measure of his proper animal growth man remains incapable of exercising his spiritual faculties; but the faculties implanted by the grace of the new birth have a proper growth of their own, which depends on the continual supply of grace upon grace.

From the time of Aristotle the Greek mind was familiar with the antithesis of power and energy, the potential and the actual. The metaphysical terms passed into the common language, losing, as usual, something of their sharpness in the transit, but retaining a flavour of the technical sense. In delivering his message, St. Paul makes use of these terms, more specially and more precisely in the Epistles to the Ephesians and the Colossians, where he is dealing with vagaries of Greek thought, but elsewhere as well.¹ He presents the Christian life as a potentiality imparted by grace, which is energized or rendered actual by the continued operation of the Holy Spirit and the persevering response of the human heart. This answers very well to the conception of new birth, for life in the newly begotten is an assemblage of powers not yet actualized.

Another figure of the new life demands attention. "I am the Vine," said the Lord Jesus Christ, "ye are the

¹ Eph. i. 19; ii. 2; iii. 7, 20; iv. 16; Col. i. 29; ii. 12. But compare 1 Cor. xii. 6, 10, 11; Gal. iii. 5; v. 6; Phil. iii. 21. The words appear to be used more generally in Rom. vii. 5; 2 Cor. i. 6; iv. 12; while in Gal. ii. 8; 1 Thess. ii. 13, and 2 Thess. ii. 9-11, *ἐνέργεια* and *ἐνεργεῖν* are probably to be taken in a purely popular sense.

branches ; he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same beareth much fruit : for apart from me ye can do nothing. If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch and withered." The figure is taken up with variation by St. Paul, who speaks of the converted Gentiles as branches of wild olive engrafted in a good olive tree, and partaking of the root of its fatness. The new powers of fruit-bearing superadded to the natural life of the wild olive represent the powers of the life of grace superadded to the natural powers of humanity.¹

"God gave unto us eternal life," says St. John, "and this life is in his Son. He that hath the Son hath the life; he that hath not the Son hath not the life." In abundance of figures we are taught that the life of Christ himself is in some sort communicated to us. St. Peter uses even bolder language. We are made partakers of the Divine nature ; to have the Son of God means nothing less than this. We have the mind of Christ, says St. Paul. Herein is the nature of the new life. The powers of which it is the assemblage are summed up as the capacity of knowing God. "This is life eternal," said the Lord, "that they should know thee, the only true God, and him whom thou didst send, even Jesus Christ." His Divine power, says St. Peter again, has granted unto us all things that pertain unto life and godliness, through the knowledge of him that called us. Knowledge and love, according to St. John, are twin powers of this life, and hardly distinguishable. "Every one that loveth is begotten of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God, for God is love." The spirit of the new life is the spirit of truth. "The natural man," says St. Paul, "receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God : for they are foolishness unto him ;

¹ John xv. 5, 6 ; Rom. xi. 17-24.

and he cannot know them, because they are spiritually judged. But he that is spiritual judgeth all things, and he himself is judged of no man. For who hath known the mind of the Lord, that he should instruct him? But we have the mind of Christ.”¹

Regeneration is the gift of this power or capacity of knowing God, which is to be energized in the Christian life now and hereafter. It is a power transcending that natural capacity for knowing the existence of God which is the foundation of natural religion. It is called *spiritual* because they who possess it are raised by the power of the Spirit of God to a higher intellectual perception. The life resulting is therefore called, though not expressly so in Holy Scripture, spiritual life. It is called also life eternal. The word, so used, is obviously to be taken in a sense differing somewhat from that in which we speak of the eternity of God—unbeginning and changeless existence. The life that is given us had a beginning in the gift; it can be lost; but it participates in eternity, as St. Thomas Aquinas puts it,² because of the possibility of immutable continuance. It has no natural term. It may be violently cut off, but in its own nature it is everlasting. Unlike our animal life it has in it no seed of corruption. “Whosoever is begotten of God sinneth not,” says St. John; and yet we, who are now children of God, if we say that we have no sin, deceive ourselves. We have the two lives: the one after the flesh, in which the effect of sin still abides; the other after the Spirit, which shares in the sinlessness of eternity.³

¹ John xvii. 3; I Cor. ii. 14-16; 2 Pet. i. 3, 4; I John iv. 7, 8; v. 11. I quote 2 Peter without intending any judgment as to its source. See Note C.

² *Sum. Theol.*, I. 10. 3.

³ I John i. 8; iii. 2; v. 18.

With this gift of spiritual and eternal life is intimately associated the doctrine of the Resurrection. Man's immortality and the eternal judgment of God are truths of natural religion which are rather assumed than revealed in the gospel, and we cannot even say that much light is thrown upon them. The judgment is continually insisted upon as a tremendous fact. What we become in this life by the use or abuse of God's grace, that we must continue to be eternally. The truth is impressed by awful description; the searching nature of the inquisition, the rending of all veils of self-deceit, the trying and purifying flame, the fire and the worm of punishment, are brought into the picture; but the time and the manner of the judgment remain obscure. Purely temporal judgments, such as the ruin of Jerusalem, are purposely combined in prophetic description with the final judgment of the world, and this again with the trial of individual souls. The ignorance of the day and hour which the Incarnate Son professed is characteristic of authentic Christian teaching on the subject.

The doctrine of the Resurrection, put in the forefront of their teaching by the Apostles, adds this to the already accepted idea of immortality, that we look forward not only to conscious existence after death, but also to the full restoration of our whole nature, body and soul. The body which is the instrument of the soul will be laid aside in death, but resumed, with what change of material circumstance we know not, in the consummation of all things. The appearances of our Blessed Lord after his resurrection were so obviously adapted to the needs of those whom he visited, that we cannot safely argue from them to the constitution of the resurrection body. It is a glorious body, says St. Paul, and a spiritual body, as contrasted with the animal body that now is, the

body of our humiliation. More definite knowledge is denied us.¹

It is clear that in the beginning of their teaching the Apostles were expecting a speedy return of the Lord and the end of this world. This eager expectation, coupled with the doctrine of the death unto sin and the new life, seems to have led some men to suppose that nothing else was meant by judgment and resurrection but the approval of converts and the grace of regeneration. Early in his teaching St. Paul had occasion to correct the idea that the Day of the Lord was already come. Soon afterwards he had to impress on the Corinthians the literal reality of the bodily resurrection. At the very end of his course he had to condemn certain who said that the resurrection was past already, which was to overthrow the faith. There was an obvious danger to Christian morality in such teaching, which made the condemnation the more necessary.²

The resurrection of the flesh, though intimately associated in doctrine with the new life, is not to be thought of as a consequence of it. There are sayings that seem to imply as much. "If the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwelleth in you," says St. Paul, "he that raised up Christ Jesus from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies, through his Spirit that dwelleth in you." But to read this in such a sense would be to contradict the patent teaching of other passages, where the resurrection is spoken of as general. It seems to be the will of God, irrespective of redemption, that the human soul should not be permanently deprived of its natural organ the body. In one of our Lord's obscure sayings about the future of the saved and the

¹ 1 Cor. xv. 44 ; Phil. iii. 21.

² 2 Thess. ii. 2 ; 1 Cor. xv. ; 2 Tim. ii. 18.

lost he speaks of soul and body alike being destroyed in Gehenna.¹

The grace of eternal life is connected with the resurrection of the body, as ensuring to the reunited soul and body the possession of life in the highest sense. Eternal life, the power of knowing God, is even now given to the soul ; but the body remains subject to death. The body of the saint will rise again a spiritual body, sharing in the powers of the spiritual life. The whole man, body and soul, will enter into possession of the vision of God, which is the first and supreme beatitude. For this reason eternal life, which is sometimes said to be already granted, is at other times spoken of as a gift belonging to the world to come. Not until the resurrection can the saints enter upon its fulness. The consummation of eternal life is the unalterable joy of body and soul in the vision of God. Its correlative, eternal death, is unchanging banishment of body and soul, eternal destruction from the face of the Lord and from the glory of his might.²

Concerning the state of the separated soul between death and resurrection little is revealed. St. Paul knew that for him to be absent from the body was to be at home with the Lord. He had the desire to depart and be with Christ. When he had finished his course and the time of his departure was come, he spoke of a crown of righteousness thenceforth laid up for him which the Lord should give him *at that day*. The expression commonly refers to the coming of the Lord and the final judgment. It may refer here to the particular judgment at the hour of death ; but more probably St. Paul is

¹ Rom. viii. 11 ; Matt. x. 28. Destruction is not to be confounded with annihilation.

² Matt. xxv. 46 ; Mark x. 30 ; Rom. ii. 7 ; 1 Thess. i. 9.

speaking of final entry upon the perfect state of glory at the resurrection, and contemplates in the mean time the blissful unalterable assurance of that which is in store for him.¹ A particular judgment at the hour of death is clearly indicated, since the righteous are adjudged worthy of admission to the presence of the Lord. On this judgment will depend the reward which each man shall receive according to his own labour. The work will be made manifest, revealed in fire; the fire itself shall prove each man's work of what sort it is. That which is built on a sure foundation will stand, even if it include some wood, hay, and stubble. These defects will be cleared away by the searching, purging fire, not without suffering; but the rest will stand. "If any man's work shall abide which he built thereon, he shall receive a reward. If any man's work shall be burned, he shall suffer loss: but he himself shall be saved; yet so as through fire."²

In this figure St. Paul clearly teaches that a soul which has received and retained the grace of eternal life will pass through a fiery trial of suffering. This will at once test and purify the work which the soul has done. If the work be all sound and pure, if the soul be already before death thoroughly purged from all earthly dross, it will pass through the fire scatheless. If any admixture of evil remain, the fire must purge it. The soul in either case lives on with the life of grace, and when thoroughly purged receives the reward, which will after the resurrection be shared also by the glorified body. Theologians have debated whether the saints already before the resurrection have the beatific vision of God. The overwhelming weight of opinion is for the affirmative, but it remains opinion; what is certain is that the souls of the

¹ 2 Cor. v. 8; Phil. i. 23; 2 Tim. iv. 8.

² 1 Cor. iii. 8-15. See Note G.

perfected saints are at home with the Lord. St. Peter passed by martyrdom, says St. Clement, into the place of glory that was his due.¹

Concerning souls that have not received or have lost the grace of eternal life still less is revealed. We may doubt whether our Lord, in using for the parable of the rich man and Lazarus the opinions and the figures current among the Jews, intended to convey any formal teaching on the subject. At the same time we must be assured that if these opinions had involved any serious falsehood he would not have so used them. In the parable we see the souls of the lost in hell, the place of the dead, tormented in flame and denied all hope of escaping into rest and felicity. Concerning this fire of hell two opinions have held ground in the Church. The one opinion, which prevails in Eastern Christendom, identifies it with the searching and purifying fire to which the souls of the saved are subject. These can pass through it, with whatever loss and suffering, into the place of joy. The lost will remain therein, even to the resurrection and beyond.² The other opinion, general in the West, is that from the hour of death the souls of the lost and the souls that are to be saved as through fire are segregated into several places; those pass into hell, these to a purging fire through which they attain to Paradise and the state of beatitude. It is obvious that when we speak of place in relation to the separated soul, we are accommodating our language to the conditions of corporeal existence. Such accommodation is unavoidable if we are to speak of these things at all, and it has

¹ Clem., *Ad Cor.* v. : εἰς τὸν ἀφειλόμενον τόπον τῆς δόξης.

² Such is the teaching of the Council of Bethlehem, c. xviii. The Russian Catechism is less explicit. See Blackmore, *Doctrine of the Russian Church*, pp. 98, *seqq.*

the sanction of Scripture. The general belief about Purgatory, though defaced by gross imaginings, rests on a true basis of revelation. Through a fiery trial, testing and purging their work, the souls of faithful but faulty Christians pass into the fruition of eternal life.

CHAPTER IV

CONCERNING THE CHURCH

SECT. I.—*The Christian Society*

THE Lord Jesus Christ is the Saviour of the world. Of the meaning of this there can be no doubt. Those who need a Saviour are those who are ruined by sin, and under this head comes the whole human race. He is the Saviour of all men, specially of them that believe.¹ He is the Saviour of all men potentially and in purpose, since he died for all ; he is the Saviour of believers actually and with effect. But not individual souls alone are saved, for that would not be the saving of the world. As we have seen above, man is by nature a social being ; he is what he is, and still more he is potentially what he may become, by reason of his place in human society ; apart from society, if he can be conceived as so existing at all, he would be other than he is, other than he was designed to be by the Creator. The social order of mankind is no less disturbed and ruined by sin than are the lives of individual sinners, and this also needs restoration. The saving of the world is the healing of the social order.

The end of this saving work is spoken of as the creation of a new heaven and a new earth wherein

¹ 1 Tim. iv. 10.

dwellleth righteousness. It was promised in prophecy, looked for in the apostolic age, seen in the apocalyptic vision of St. John. It was figured in the same vision as the Holy City, the new Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven. Here it is a thing future, beheld in finished completeness. In like manner, as we have seen, eternal life is spoken of as perfect in the future, but at the same time as given to us now in possession. So too the Holy City is a present reality. Jerusalem that is above is our mother, says St. Paul. Our commonwealth is in heaven, he tells the Philippians, and he bids them live the common life in a manner worthy of the gospel of Christ. They are themselves individually new creatures in Christ, and they are taken up into a new social order. The same truth is eloquently expressed in the Epistle to the Hebrews: "Ye are come unto mount Zion, and unto the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to innumerable hosts of angels, to the general assembly and church of the first-born who are enrolled in heaven." Our state is not yet perfect: "We have not here an abiding city, but we seek after the city which is to come." Yet even now we are of the commonwealth of Israel, fellow-citizens with the saints and of the household of God.¹

The word which became the fixed expression of this new social order is used in the above quotation from the Epistle to the Hebrews—the Greek word *Ecclesia*. It has passed through the Latin to most languages of Western Europe, but we render it in English by the word *Church*. To ascertain its meaning we must keep close to the

¹ Isa. lxxv. 17 ; lxxvi. 22 ; 2 Pet. iii. 13 ; Rev. xxi. 1, 2 ; Gal. iv. 26 ; Phil. iii. 20 ; i. 27 (where for the force of *πολίτευμα* and *πολιτεύεσθε* see the margin of the Revised Version) ; 2 Cor. v. 17 ; Heb. xii. 22 ; xiii. 14 ; Eph. ii. 12, 19.

original, and see how it was used in the first delivery of the gospel.

At the time when the Greek language took its lasting form the word *Ecclesia* meant the legal assembly of citizens in a free commonwealth. The figure of a commonwealth is used, as we have seen, by St. Paul; but we are not to seek here the origin of the term; rather, we may say, the use of the term suggested the figure. The New Testament word *Ecclesia* is drawn immediately from the Greek rendering of the Old Testament. It is there the equivalent of two Hebrew words, the one signifying properly the whole nation of Israel regarded as an organized society, the other meaning strictly the assembly of the heads of the nation. The former word went gradually out of use, and the latter was used in both senses. The Greek word representing it "would naturally," says Dr. Hort, "for Greek-speaking Jews mean the congregation of Israel quite as much as an assembly of the congregation." It was a term of distinctly social import; as Dr. Hort says again, it "suggested no mere agglomeration of men, but rather a unity carried out in the joint action of many members, each having his own responsibilities, the action of each and all being regulated by a supreme law or order."¹

With its meaning thus fixed, the word passed into the New Testament. It is found only twice in the Gospels: both places are in St. Matthew, and both are critical.

¹ Hort, *The Christian Ecclesia*, ch. i. pp. 7, 15. The Hebrew words are *ēdhāh* and *qāhāl*, distinguished in the Revised English Version by the words *congregation* and *assembly*. An alternative rendering, much the more common for *ēdhāh*, is *συναγωγή*, which in the course of time shifted its significance, and came to be used almost exclusively, as we see it in the New Testament, of a mere local assembly.

The chronological order of the narrative is so uncertain that we cannot build anything on the priority of occasion, but we may take the passages as they stand. The Lord Jesus Christ, having drawn from St. Peter the confession, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God," pronounced a blessing on him, and continued: "I also say unto thee, that thou art Peter (*Petros*), and upon this rock (*petra*) I will build my Church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. I will give unto thee the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in Heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in Heaven."¹ Here the Lord speaks of the establishment of the Church in the near future. He will build it; a figure of speech frequently used in the Old Testament in respect of the congregation of Israel. He gives it the familiar name designating that congregation, but at the same time he calls it *My Church*. He points at once to the old and to the new; to the old order remaining and yet made new, as always in the work of redemption and salvation.

In the other place where the word is found the Lord is laying down a rule of social order for dealing with an erring member of society. "If thy brother sin against thee, go, show him his fault between thee and him alone: if he hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he hear thee not, take with thee one or two more, that at

¹ Matt. xvi. 18, 19. It has been acutely suggested that our Lord may have said, in accordance with his usual diction, τὴν βασιλείαν μου, for which the evangelist has substituted the latterly more significant word ἐκκλησίαν, in the same sense; but Hort will not hear of any doubt about the text (*Chr. Eccl.*, p. 9). The constant use of the word in the apostolic writings from the first would be unintelligible if the Lord had never used it himself.

the mouth of two witnesses or three every word may be established. And if he refuse to hear them, tell it unto the Church: and if he refuse to hear the Church also, let him be unto thee as the Gentile and the publican. Verily I say unto you, What things soever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in Heaven: and what things soever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in Heaven.”¹ The Church is here spoken of as already established. The direction has been thought to refer to the existing constitution of the Jewish Church in local organized communities or synagogues. The language used is proper to them; the Gentile and the publican were those alien from them, and kept severely apart; a man cast out of the synagogue was reduced to their condition. But even if there be a reference to this existing social order the instruction goes farther. It is general; it is for the Lord’s own disciples; it denotes the continuance of the old order under new conditions and with new powers. The commission to bind and loose, connected on the other occasion with the future building of the Church of Christ, is repeated in this connection. The meaning of the commission we shall consider when dealing with the Ministry of the Church; it is sufficient to say here that to those who heard the words they would convey no meaning but that of legislative and judicial powers ordained in a constituted society; and these powers the Lord confirmed to his disciples in the Church. But his disciples had no such powers in the synagogue: the Church here spoken of is that society in which they were to exercise the ruling office.

It would be foolish to suppose that on these two occasions only was the word used by the Lord. It is familiar from the first in the apostolic teaching, and we

¹ Matt. xviii. 15-18.

find it used constantly in the sense already fixed. The Church of the Old Testament was God's chosen people, called out of Egypt and redeemed from bondage, endowed by the Divine providence with promised gifts and guarded as a peculiar treasure. The Church of the New Testament is described in the same terms with a difference. It is a chosen people, not of one nation only but gathered out of all nations, redeemed from sin, called to be saints, endowed with the riches of Divine grace, cherished by the Lord as a man cares for his own body. It is not wholly new; there is a remnant of the old according to the election of grace; the casting away of the rest is the reconciling of the world. Former branches of the olive tree were broken off that the new might be grafted in, but the tree remains the same. So the Church of the Old Testament is continued with a difference in the Church of the New Testament.¹

The Election of Grace holds an important position in Christian doctrine. It is closely connected with the idea of *calling*. In one of our Lord's parables the called and the elect are sharply sundered, and we are told that of many called few are chosen. By the calling is here meant God's invitation, through the preaching of the gospel, to the salvation which is by Christ; the elect are those who answer the call and are found worthy.² But elsewhere the words are not so distinguished. In St. Paul's language, *election* is in the secret purpose of God, *calling* is the outward expression of that purpose; and since we recognize the working of the purpose only

¹ Rom. xi. 5-18.

² Matt. xxii. 14. The words are sometimes interpolated in ch. xx. 16. There is no ground for the idea that ἐκκλησία is connected in sense with κλητὸς, meaning the company of the called. The etymological connection is accidental.

by its effect, those only are said to be called who obey the Divine voice.¹ The election is of grace, for it is made in the free working of God's love, not for any goodness or virtue in the chosen which should make their call a moral necessity. St. Paul illustrates this from the Old Testament by the choice of Jacob and the rejection of Esau, declared from before their birth. The reason for the choice remains unknown to us, secret in the Divine wisdom. It must therefore seem to us purely arbitrary; but we may not on that account think of it as an arbitrary act, in the sense in which unreasoning preference on the part of a man is arbitrary. Neither on the other hand can we safely attempt to penetrate speculatively into the secret things of God and to assign a reason for his choice. What we know is only the fact that God, who sent his Son to redeem the world, and who has prepared salvation for every man, does in effect choose and call certain men to the knowledge of salvation and the life of grace, while others are left, so far as we know, without that knowledge and the life which it conveys.

The insoluble question of the relation of God's sovereignty to man's free will is raised here as elsewhere. It is complicated by the element of foreknowledge. In a sense the election depends on God's foreknowledge; in a sense also it is election to the final attainment of glory and blessedness. "Whom he foreknew," says St. Paul, "he also foreordained to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren: and whom he foreordained, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified." An attempt to reduce this teaching within the compass of human logic has led to an exaggerated doctrine of

¹ See Grimm, *Lexic.*, s.v. *καλέω*, and cf. Rom. viii. 30.

election. The beginnings of it are in St. Augustine. It grew in the schools of the Middle Ages to a definite assertion that from eternity God ordained and elected some men to eternal life, others to damnation. Those he calls, and brings to glory by the effectual working of his grace ; these are either left to their natural corruption, or compelled, for lack of the grace of perseverance, to fall back into the second death. The doctrine of election is thus combined with a certain opinion about effectual grace. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it became one of the chief subjects of practical discussion among Christians. At the present day, the fierce controversy being burnt out, it is wisely relegated to its proper place, the schools of theology ; and more than this, it is generally allowed that, even if some such meaning lie behind the teaching of St. Paul, the first and obvious meaning of election is the actual call of certain men to the present life of grace. As Jacob was chosen to be the father of God's people while Esau was rejected, as a remnant of Israel was preserved at various times of general falling away and of consequent judgment, so a remnant was chosen to carry on the traditions of Israel into the Church of the New Testament, and others were called from among the Gentiles to share their privileges.

The Church of Christ is then a social organization, comprising all who are elect and called into the way of salvation. They are gathered, not into a mere aggregation of individuals, but into a social unity, a spiritual commonwealth. The gospel was first announced as the good tidings of the Kingdom of God. The Kingdom was at hand, said the Baptist. The Kingdom of God is come upon you, said the Lord himself. The Kingdom of God, the Kingdom of Heaven, were expressions already familiar to the Jews. The latter appears to have

been used of the Divine rule or theocracy in general ; the former signified more specially the promised reign of the Messiah. It was thought of as the Kingdom of David, revived and extended to a world-wide empire. The Lord Jesus Christ made use of this expectation, gradually and cautiously revealing to his disciples the unlooked-for nature of the Kingdom that was to be. It is natural to take this Kingdom as the exact equivalent of the Church. In the Gospels the word *Ecclesia* occurs but twice ; the Kingdom is spoken of continually. In the other writings of the New Testament the Kingdom is sparingly referred to ; the *Ecclesia* is everywhere. The words apparently correspond and are complementary. But a close examination shows that the Kingdom has a wider significance. We are taught to pray, *Thy Kingdom come*. To enter into the Kingdom of Heaven is to attain the final blessedness.¹ It stands at times for a purely ideal state of righteousness.² In many places the meaning is hard to fix precisely. In many however, and especially in several of our Lord's parables, the Kingdom clearly means the Christian society as it now is in the world, including good and evil men but working always to the final exclusion of the wicked. The Church then cannot be said to be exactly synonymous with the Kingdom. Here, as often, we are to regard things in two or more planes. In the farther plane is the reign of righteousness, the Kingdom of Christ from which all evil is destroyed. In the middle plane is an ideal of obedience to the laws of God which men are to set before themselves, and by striving to realize which they may hasten his Kingdom. In the nearer plane is the actual Church, the visible

¹ Matt. v. 20 ; vii. 21 ; viii. 11 ; xviii. 3 ; Mark ix. 47 ; Luke xiii. 28 ; Acts xiv. 22 ; 1 Cor. vi. 9 ; 2 Tim. iv. 18.

² Matt. vi. 33 ; Mark x. 14 ; Eph. v. 5.

organization of the Kingdom of Christ in the world, the community of those who are pledged to his service, however ill they do it, and made his disciples, however imperfectly they learn.

The Church thus organized is likened by St. Paul to a body. Christ is the Head, directing all the members, and, according to St. Paul's conception of anatomy, providing them with life and nourishment. It is therefore called the mystical Body of Christ. The figure answers in part to that of the vine or the olive tree, but St. Paul employs it chiefly for the purpose of insisting on the oneness of the Body, and the due subordination of the members in their several offices. Once more the Church is described as an ordered society.¹

It is a visible society, the members of which may be known and mutually recognized as brethren. The word *Ecclesia* itself implies so much; the use of it in the New Testament is unintelligible on any other understanding. Calvinists, in pursuance of their doctrine of absolute decrees of election and reprobation, are compelled to distinguish from the visible Church an invisible Church, consisting of all those and only those who are elect to eternal life. Others with less excuse have followed their example, taking the invisible Church to mean those who are known by God, the reader of hearts, to be persevering in the way of salvation. No such distinction is found in the teaching of Holy Scripture. An expression has become current of late years which covers part of the same ground. Certain men are said to belong to the *soul* of the Church, though not to the *body*. It is a fanciful description, adopted by some who, accepting a narrow definition of the Church, have to face the consequent

¹ Rom. xii. 4, 5; I Cor. xii. 12-27; Eph. iv. 4-16; Col. ii. 17-19.

exclusion of many whom they are fain to include. But the Church is an organized society, of which men either are members or are not; there is no third term. If the figure of the Body be pressed, we must say that as the living soul gathers and incorporates matter into the body, so the Holy Spirit—the One Spirit that goes with the One Body—incorporates individual men into the Body of Christ. In this sense we must read the well-known maxim: *Ubi Spiritus ibi Ecclesia*.¹

The Christian society includes all who have received, by whatever means, the grace of regeneration. That expulsion from the society awaits those who abuse the privileges of membership we are plainly taught. The branch of the vine that bears no fruit is cut away. But the time of such expulsion remains in doubt. Disciplinary excommunication by the rules of the Church on earth does not entirely sever the delinquent from the society of the faithful. Neither does apostasy have this effect, for the apostate may be restored by penitence. These diseased members, so to speak, are not cut off from the life of the body, however little it may circulate in them. They are not deprived of all Christian fellowship, although for reasons of discipline its outward manifestation be withheld from them. The mutual service which members of the Christian society owe to each other is not entirely denied them; in particular, they have a share in the prayers of the Church, and their restoration is hoped for and sought by the power of these prayers.

More doubtful is the condition of those who have gone to their death impenitent. That the possibility of

¹ The term *Invisible Church* was derived from the scholastic theologians, who meant by it however the souls of the departed in Purgatory or in Paradise, as being invisible to us on earth.

repentance ceases with death is taught as certain truth. Repentance means the resolute turning of the will away from the temptations of the world, the flesh, and the devil ; and the disembodied soul, whatever its faculties, being severed by force from the world and the flesh can no longer freely renounce them. But whether impenitence in death actually cuts off the soul from further connection with the Church, or leaves entire severance to follow upon the final judgment, is not clearly revealed. The practice of the Church excludes those who are reckoned to have died impenitent from any further share in the offices of the faithful. Of secret impenitence indeed the Church is no judge, and the most hopeful view is taken of the departed ; but death in open defiance or apostasy is treated as ground for exclusion. Those who die excommunicate, or who by reason of self-murder are judged to have shut upon themselves the door of penitence, are denied even the funeral rites of the body.

All others are regarded in death as still members of the Church. They are sustained by the prayers of the faithful in the fiery trial through which they have to pass ; and the continual supply of abounding grace comes to them, as to the living, through the perpetual intercession of the members of Christ one for the other. It is sometimes objected that no express mention is made in the New Testament of prayer for the departed, but there is no need for specifying them as objects of prayer. They are obviously included in the supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings to be made for all men, and in particular for all the saints.¹

¹ Eph. vi. 18 ; 1 Tim. ii. 1. I do not think St. Paul's prayer for Onesiphorus (2 Tim. i. 18) can be pressed, as there is no certain evidence that he was then departed. Neither can the *baptism for*

And equally do the departed souls themselves help in this work of intercession. In the words of a Russian theologian, "All the members of the Church, both living and departed, are being perfected incessantly by mutual prayer."¹

In the cult of the departed the Christian Church has taken over many things from natural religion, which have not been winnowed wholly free from superstition. With these we are not concerned, but only with the underlying truth on which they rest, the intercommunion of all saints in prayer and worship. The practice of the Church has developed on two separate lines. In the East, prayer is made in the Liturgy for all the departed alike, including even the Apostles and the Holy Mother of God herself; and in like manner the intercessions of all, but chiefly of the more glorious saints, are sought by the faithful. In the West, there is a distinction made between two classes of the departed. For the one class prayers are offered by the Church. In the other class are the perfect and glorified saints, the aid of whose intercession is invoked. The distinction is connected with the specific opinions about purgatory which have prevailed in Western Christendom. In England, by reaction from superstition, the cult of the departed has been altogether obscured, and belief in the whole Church, the communion of all saints living and departed, has been consequently weakened.

the dead, spoken of in I Cor. xv. 29, be safely adduced, in view of our entire ignorance of the practice actually referred to.

¹ Khomiakoff, in Birkbeck's *Russia and the English Church*, vol. i. p. 217.

SECT. II.—*The Characteristics of the Church*

We profess in the Creeds our belief in One Holy Catholic Apostolic Church. These four terms are known as the notes or characteristic marks of the Church. We may consider them in three aspects; they show us how the Church is to be regarded essentially, ideally, and practically.

The Church is *One*. There is numerically but one Church. It was announced by the Lord in the singular: "Upon this rock I will build my Church." It is spoken of as the Church of Christ, the Church of God, and therefore is one, as there is one God, one Christ. St. Paul describes it, in terms excluding all possibility of multiplication, as the Body of Christ, the fulness of him that filleth all in all. As there is one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, as there is one hope of our calling and one Spirit, so there is one Body. By the unity of the Church we mean much more than numerical oneness or singularity, but here is the starting-point. From this we may go on to understand how the Church can be spoken of in plurality and yet remain one.¹

The Church is to be not only one by nature, but also held together in moral unity. The moral unity of a society differs from the natural by the fact that it can be disturbed without the actual destruction of the society. A state which splits into several independent states is destroyed altogether: ceasing to be one, it ceases to exist: if the several states which have replaced it should afterwards come together in federal union, a new united state is created; the old is not

¹ Matt. xvi. 18; Eph. i. 23; iv. 4-6.

restored. On the other hand a family or a nation which is torn by dissension or civil war still remains one, though its moral unity is ruined. The moral unity of a society will consist in the due coordination of its several members for the mutual offices of social life. This may be attained in varying degrees ; nothing short of a total dissolution of society will destroy it altogether. The measure of its attainment will depend on two forces : the efficient maintenance of common order, and the good will of individuals. The need of this moral unity in the Church is indicated by our Lord's prayer, *That they all may be one*, and by the frequent apostolic injunction to be of one mind.¹ That which a thing inevitably is by nature, as the Church is numerically one, is neither prayed for nor enjoined ; that which is effected or hindered by the moral agency of men may properly be commanded, and the issue is controlled by prayer.

The Apostles found it a hard task to hold in one the Christians of Jewish birth and those who were converted from the Gentiles. Many of St. Paul's exhortations to unity are directed against this principle of division. It was opposed to the express declaration of the Lord, that his sheep of the fold of Israel and his other sheep which were not of this fold must come together into one flock under one Shepherd. The difficulty of the task is illustrated by the fact that St. Peter and St. Paul had to agree for a time to go apart, one to the circumcised, the other to the Gentiles, enjoining on their several followings only a mutual commerce of charity. We can follow in St. Paul's writings the traces of a great struggle that began with the decree of the Church at Jerusalem concerning the treatment of Gentile converts. He would no doubt have left us plainer indications, if he had not been

¹ John xvii. 21 ; 2 Cor. xiii. 11 ; Phil. ii. 2 ; 1 Pet. iii. 8, etc.

careful to write nothing that might embitter the conflict. The Epistle to the Ephesians seems to mark the final victory of the cause which he represented; he exults in the visible destruction of the wall of partition, the abolition of the enmity. Jew and Gentile were at last actually united in the One Flock. The glory and honour of nations the most diverse in the world were brought together into the City of God. In other times a national divergence or exclusiveness far less intense has been found strong enough to interfere with the perfect unity of the Church. The vehement antagonism of St. Paul to such disunion, his refusal to accept distinctions of this kind as a permanent basis even of organization within the Church, his insistence on the truth that in Christ neither Greek nor Jew is any longer to be recognized, circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bondman or freeman, shows that no account of the unity of the Church can be adequate which makes it a federal union of independent societies. He bases the moral or social union of the Church on the abiding fact of common heritage in the life of the one Head, Jesus Christ.¹

The moral and the natural unity of the Church are thus coordinated; the moral unity is seen to be an effort to realize in social activity that which is in the nature of things inevitable and indestructible. Men are one in Christ; they are to realize their unity in action.

The essential unity of the Church consists in the common participation of the one spiritual life. Its symbol is the one baptism by which men are incorporated into the one Body. The ideal unity of the Church is the perfect fellowship, the perfect charity, the perfect intercommunion of the members in all sacred things,

¹ John x. 16; Acts xv. ; Gal. ii. 7-14; Eph. ii. 14; Col. iii. 11.

which ought to exist, and after which we are bound to strive. The practical unity of the Church is the measure of such intercommunion which is actually attained. This calls for more consideration.

The Church was originally organized in a complete practical unity. A small society of men was gathered in one place. "They continued steadfastly in the Apostles' teaching and fellowship, in the breaking of bread and the prayers." They enjoyed, in some degree, a community of goods. There was at least a common stock, to which all contributed according to their means, and from which distribution was made to all who needed. The society seems to have spread in the villages about Jerusalem without any weakening of this unity, the brethren of all parts being visited by the Apostles and looking to Jerusalem as their one central meeting-place.¹ Persecution however broke up this intimate union, and certain features of it never recurred. Some of those who were scattered found new centres of activity in Antioch and elsewhere. Local assemblies were formed on the model of that which had been at Jerusalem. Following the pattern of the old covenant, these local assemblies of the one *Ecclesia* would naturally have been called *Synagogues*, but for some unrecorded reason this word did not find favour among Christians.² Each local gathering of members was called by the name of the whole society, *Ecclesia*.

¹ Acts ii. 46 ; iv. 32-35 ; v. 12, 16 ; vi. 1-7 ; viii. 1, 4, 14, 40 ; ix. 31-43.

² The only Christian use of it is in Jas. ii. 2. It may have been used in Jerusalem, where synagogues were numerous, but in other places, where the Synagogue was the recognized organization of the Jewish residents for all purposes, the use of the word for Christian assemblies might lead to awkward misunderstandings.

An attempt has been made to represent each local church as a fortuitous collection of individuals, forming a society of their own, independent of other similar societies. It would follow that so far as the whole Church is one it is a confederation, more or less formal, of these independent bodies. But this idea is foreign to the apostolic writings. In them we find side by side the one Church and the many churches. Each local church reproduces the characteristics of the whole; each individual Christian is a member at once of a local church and of the whole Church. But the one is not made up of the many. "To each local Ecclesia," says Dr. Hort, "St. Paul has ascribed a corresponding unity of its own; each is a body of Christ, and a sanctuary of God: but there is no grouping of them into partial wholes or into one great whole. The members which make up the One Ecclesia are not communities but individual men. The One Ecclesia includes all members of all partial Ecclesiae; but its relations to them all are direct, not mediate."¹

The one is anterior to the many; the universal to the local. The original Church at Jerusalem is not to be thought of as a local particular church, in imitation of which others were founded. It was the whole; and it became local and particular only upon the general dispersion after the death of Stephen, when other local churches came into existence. Nor were these local churches original foundations. That of Antioch is the most conspicuous example. Men came to Antioch who were already members of the Church, and to them were

¹ *The Christian Ecclesia*, p. 168. There are passages in the book which look the other way, but I think that in this passage is the dominant thought with which the others are to be reconciled; and Dr. Moberly's criticism, in his *Ministerial Priesthood*, pp. 22-29, seems to me faulty because not recognizing this fact.

aggregated the new converts in that city. That is to say, they were aggregated to the one Church, exactly as the first converts at Jerusalem were aggregated to the society of the Apostles in whom the Church was already constituted.¹ The organization of the local community followed. At Antioch, it is true, "a multitude of Christian disciples had come into existence in the most casual and unpremeditated way;"² but they did not form themselves independently into a church; they were already members of the Christian Church, and they were in consequence organized as the local church of Antioch. This organization was perhaps the work of Barnabas, who was clearly sent from Jerusalem with an apostolic mission; but, however effected, it was both natural and necessary; as natural as the organization of the Synagogue in the Jewish Dispersion. A Jew, because he was a member of the Jewish *Ecclesia*, was a member of the local synagogue, wherever he might find himself. A Christian, because he is a member of the Christian *Ecclesia*, is a member of the local church, wherever he may be. The phrase *Church of Rome*, or *Church of Africa*, or *Church of England*, is properly a mere geographical expression, signifying the part of the whole Church existing within the circumscription named.

The practical unity of the Church, therefore, which at the beginning was found in the intimate common life of the brethren at Jerusalem, is now to be found in the free intercommunion of the members dispersed in the various local churches. This community of charity begins when all pray for all, and all are ready to help all throughout the world. It is complete when all, from every local church, are welcomed to all the privileges of membership in any local church which they may visit. It is now very

¹ Acts ii. 41; xi. 19-24.

² *The Christian Ecclesia*, p. 59.

far from being complete. There are many degrees in which it may fall short of completion. It was marred when St. Peter and others refused to eat with Gentile converts at Antioch. Breaches of greater or less extent have frequently occurred; some are inveterate. Without affecting the essential and ideal unity of the Church, they do grievous injury to its practical or moral unity.

Each local church ought to reproduce the characteristics of the whole. It is in actual fact numerically one, being the whole company of Christian men living in a certain place. It should also be at unity in itself. St. Paul was grievously disturbed on hearing of divisions or schisms in the church of Corinth. These divisions were, in the proper meaning of the term, sects; that is to say, they were partisan companies of men professing to follow a certain leader. "Each one of you saith, I am of Paul; and I of Apollos; and I of Cephas."¹ There is no reason for supposing these sects to have actually fallen asunder from mutual communion, but there was a risk of this, and the perfect union of Christian charity was lacking. Pearson has observed that wherever in the New Testament any country or district is named in which the gospel had been preached, the churches of that region are spoken of in plurality, as the churches of Judaea, of Syria and Cilicia, of Galatia and Macedonia. On the other hand, where one city alone is mentioned, then the church of the place is spoken of in singularity—the church at Antioch, at Ephesus, the church of the Thessalonians, and so forth. He infers that even if in a great city there were several congregations, meeting apart for convenience,

¹ 1 Cor. i. 12. It is doubtful whether the ἐγὼ δὲ Χριστοῦ following is an indignant remonstrance by St. Paul, or represents a further sect, affecting superiority to all parties, but full of party spirit.

they were all held in one under a common government.¹ The conclusion is perhaps too absolute. The domestic churches spoken of by St. Paul, the church in the house of Aquila, in the house of Nymphas, in the house of Philemon,² whether we are to understand in each case only a Christian family, or a company of the faithful habitually meeting there, suggest a more elastic use of the word. What we know with certainty is that very soon after the apostolic age the Christians living in one town and its neighbourhood were held together in a unity depending on details of organization, which we shall consider in their place. There is no countenance in Scripture or in the practice of the Church for the conception of an unity consisting in the agglomeration or amicable intercourse of sects organized according to the preferences of individuals. Where the churches are spoken of in plurality regard is had only to local or geographical distinction; Christians living within the same circumscription, large or small, form one church, and are bound to live together in unity, avoiding the separation even of party spirit. In this way they work individually to promote the practical unity of the Church.

The Church is *Holy*. In the New Testament its members are commonly called saints. The fundamental meaning of holiness, in the language of Scripture, is separation from sin and from usages that are tainted with sin. Israel was a holy nation because separated from the rest of mankind and dedicated to the service of God. The things of the sanctuary, the offerings of God,

¹ *Exposition of the Creed*, p. 338, 8th ed. The passage in 1 Cor. xiv. 34, which he quotes to show that several congregations must have consisted in the Church of Corinth, will hardly bear the inference; ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις may mean "at your meetings."

² Rom. xvi. 5; 1 Cor. xvi. 19; Col. iv. 15; Philem. 2.

were holy because set apart from common use. There was a moral significance in this holiness; it was an approximation to the holiness of God himself. "Ye shall be holy unto me," says the Law, "for I the Lord am holy, and have separated you from the peoples, that ye should be mine." Israel was holy in essential fact; the children of Israel were therefore the more bound to strive after practical holiness in the likeness of God. Their failure did not for a time affect the essential holiness of the nation; but when the judgment of God fell upon them they were scattered among the heathen, losing their mark of separation. A precisely similar command forms the law of holiness for the Church of the New Testament: "Ye therefore shall be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect."¹

The essential holiness of the Church consists in the separation of Christians from the world. On entering the Christian society they make a formal renunciation of all evil, which is described by St. Paul as dying to sin. They are justified, as we have seen, or freed from the inherited and acquired guilt of sin. Nor is this a mere forensic or ceremonial cleansing. They are called to be saints, and obeying the call they receive a power of holiness given them by sanctifying grace. Being incorporated in the one Body wherein dwells the one Spirit of holiness, they have continual supplies of actual and habitual grace. They use or abuse these gifts according to their several practice; but, says Pearson, "the Church of God is universally holy in respect of all, by institutions and administrations of sanctity."²

The Church of the New Testament, like that of the Old, but in a higher sense, is "an elect race, a royal

¹ Lev. xx. 26; cf. xix. 2, and xxi. 8; Matt. v. 48; 1 Pet. i. 15.

² *Exposition of the Creed*, p. 345.

priesthood, a holy nation.”¹ This description must be taken as one. Holiness and priesthood go together. A priest is essentially a man taken from among men and consecrated to the service of God as representing his fellows. The priesthood of Christ is an attribute of his humanity, and as Head of the Church he communicates his human qualities to the Body. They are conveyed to the members severally, all being called to attain unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ. Therefore he has made us to be a kingdom, to be priests unto his God and Father. But we have this quality as members of the Body, not as individual men. The Church as a whole is the royal priesthood.²

The function of a priest is to offer gifts and sacrifices for sins.³ Here is a twofold ministry; the ministry of worship and the ministry of reconciliation closely interwoven. The various kinds of offering, distinguished in the Old Testament for the sake of clearness, are combined in the one offering of the New Testament, made by Christ himself, the one Priest, and by the Church in union with him. The essential holiness of the Church is the holiness of priesthood, manifested in the continual offering of the Christian Sacrifice and in the continual exercise of the ministry of reconciliation.

The ideal holiness of the Church is the holiness of Christ the Head regarded as the standard of attainment. It is the holiness also of those who have attained. In the imagery of the Apocalypse the Church is the Bride of the Lamb, arrayed in fine linen, bright and pure, which is the righteous acts of the saints. The Church is the Communion of Saints, whether in the sense that all are fellow-citizens with those who are perfect and partakers

¹ Exod. xix. 6 ; I Pet. ii. 9.

² Eph. iv. 13 ; Rev. i. 6 ; v. 10.

³ Heb. v. 1.

of their merits, or in the sense that all partake in the administration of holiness by which they are brought to perfection.¹

The practical holiness of the Church is found in warfare against evil. Of this warfare there are two well-marked stages. The Church is triumphant in Paradise, militant on earth. The imagery of war is constant in the New Testament. The contest of the Church is with mysterious powers of evil. "Our wrestling," says St. Paul, "is not against flesh and blood, but against the principalities, against the powers, against the world-rulers of this darkness, against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places."² It is not evil men, as men, who are the enemies of the Church. Indeed the Church fights on behalf of all men against the influences which ruin human society. Separate from these, and essentially hostile to them, the Church labours to set up the reign of righteousness, the kingdom of God. The separation is not between man and man. The Church militant is not a group of specially good men segregated from their fellows. That conception, or something approaching it, has at times occupied certain minds with disastrous results, to be read in the history of Novatianism, of Donatism, of the Cathari and of the Puritans. We are taught by the parables of the Tares and of the Draw-net that in the Church militant good men and bad are mingled. The holiness of the Church is a power working always for the conversion of the bad, and failing that, for their exclusion from the Church triumphant. It

¹ Rev. xix. 8; Eph. ii. 19. The question appears insoluble whether in the phrase of the creed *sanctorum communionem* the word *sanctorum* is masculine, signifying holy persons, or neuter, signifying holy things.

² Eph. vi. 12.

works also, but less directly, to raise the general standard of goodness for the world at large. Every local particular church has the note of practical holiness in varying degree as this work is done.

The Church is *Catholic*, or universal. The essential catholicity of the Christian Church is opposed to the national particularity of the Jewish Church. It is expressed by St. Paul where he says that in the Church there cannot be Greek or Jew, barbarian or Scythian, bond or free. All men alike are eligible and equal as members of the Christian society.

The ideal catholicity of the Church is the extension of the privileges of membership to all mankind. It is expressed in the command of the Lord: "Go ye, and make disciples of all the nations." It involves the abrogation of all prejudice of race or colour; the supersession of all barriers of language, symbolized by the mysterious unity of tongues at Pentecost; the maintenance and propagation of the one true religion by free interchange of all local traditions.¹

The practical catholicity of the Church is an approximation to the ideal. Like the practical unity of the Church, it is marred by everything that hinders the free intercommunion of Christians. It is marred also by any practice founded on a theory which narrows the Church. The Donatists of the fourth century held to a theory confining membership in the Church to those who conformed to a certain standard of excellence, and they refused all

¹ Matt. xxviii. 19. The last condition is what St. Irenaeus expresses in the well-known words (iii. 3), "Semper ab his, qui sunt undique, conservata est ea quae est ab apostolis traditio." In the circumstances of his time this interchange was found fairly complete in the local church of Rome, the common resort of Christians from all parts of the world.

communion with those who thought or acted otherwise. This was the negation of catholicity. A similar result may follow from any attempt to realize the unity of the Church by unwarranted means. A sect will naturally be united in exact proportion to its narrowness, and a definition of the Church in which expression is specially sought for the note of unity may tend to sectarianism. When certain theologians of the sixteenth century introduced into their definition of the Church the mention of the Roman Pontiff, defining it as "The congregation of the faithful visibly ordered under one Head Christ in Heaven and his Vicar on earth," unity was secured at the cost of catholicity. The society so defined is not practically catholic, since it excludes vast numbers of Christians.¹

A question remains. We have said that a local particular church ought to reflect the characteristics of the whole Church. But how can the particular share the attribute of universality? When a local church is described as catholic, the word is used with some variation of meaning. It betokens that which is a genuine part of the whole. The Egyptian bishops at the Council of Tyre, in the year 335, spoke of "the catholic church in Egypt," as distinct from the companies of heretics and schismatics which were troubling the Christian life of the country. In the same sense it has, since the fourth century, been applied to individuals. St. Augustine describes himself as becoming, on his conversion, a Catholic Christian, by contrast with his former condition as a Manichæan. A few years earlier, Theodosius had imposed by law the name of Catholic Christians on those who accepted the Nicene confession of faith.²

¹ See Note H.

² Athanas., *Op.*, tom. i. p. 797 : κατὰ τῆς καθολικῆς ἐκκλησίας

A catholic church is, in this sense, one that is orthodox and not heretical, one that is in communion with the Church at large and not schismatical. Nor is it difficult to see how the word comes to be so used. The Catholic Faith is that which is generally professed throughout the Church, as distinct from individual or sectarian opinions. A catholic practice is one that prevails generally throughout the Church, as distinct from temporary and local peculiarities. A particular church is catholic in proportion as it holds fast to the Catholic Faith and catholic practice, freely communicates with all other churches, and labours for the extension of Christ's kingdom throughout the world.¹

The Church is *Apostolic*. We are built, says St. Paul, upon the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets. The Apostles are not only the original Twelve, since the writer certainly would not exclude himself. The Prophets are not those of the Old Testament, but those of the New, the coadjutors of the Apostles, to whom, he says, the mystery of Christ has now been revealed. The Church is therefore Apostolic not only because originally established by the preaching of the Apostles, but also because held together by a continuing apostolic order. At the beginning the faithful continued steadfastly in the

τῆς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ. Aug., *Confess.*, vi. 1; Cod. Theodos., xvi. 1, 2 (the edict *Cunctos populos* of A.D. 380).

¹ Beveridge, *Thesaur. Theol.*, vol. ii. p. 330, ed. 1816: "Ut quaevis ecclesia recte constituatur, et ita ut verum sanumque Catholicae membrum permaneat, necesse est ut ad Catholicam sive universalem in omnibus, quoad fieri potest, se conformet, et disciplinam ritusque illius aequae ac doctrinam religiose complectatur." His illustrations are curious. In a secondary sense anything which is commonly done and allowed in any part of the Church is called a catholic practice as being neither heretical nor schismatical.

Apostles' teaching and fellowship, and this condition abides.¹

For the essential apostolicity of the Church it suffices that as the first converts were aggregated to the Apostles' fellowship, so all that follow are aggregated to the existing body. The ideal apostolicity of the Church involves the continuance of the apostolate in some form, and the adherence of all Christians thereto. The practical apostolicity of the Church is a matter of organization, to the consideration of which we proceed next in order. Reserving the nature of that organization, we may say here that a particular church is apostolic by virtue of adhesion to the order which continues the work of the apostolate. The faithful of any place or region form in point of fact a local church, even though not yet organized in the appointed manner. The church so formed is apostolic by intention, because composed of persons who are aggregated to the fellowship of the Apostles ; it obtains the fulness of the apostolic character when duly organized. A church on the other hand which abandons the appointed order practically forfeits the apostolic character. A church which is deprived of it by force of circumstances will retain the character, though imperfectly, by grace of origin.

SECT. III.—*The Organization of the Church*

Human societies are of two kinds, natural and artificial. Natural societies are those in which men are incorporated not by their own action specially directed to that end, but by the fact of birth, or by the working of circumstance. Such societies are the family, the city, the nation.

¹ Eph. ii. 20 ; iii. 5 ; Acts ii. 42.

Artificial societies are those which individuals enter or leave by their own voluntary motion. An artificial society is formed by a concourse of men who determine its constitution and organization in the act of formation; others who afterwards join them accept what is done; the members have as a rule, though not always, the same power to vary the organization which they originally exercised in creating it. A natural society on the other hand is of Divine origin. It cannot be traced back to the mutual agreement of its members. The theory of Social Contract, once in vogue, has no historical foundation. Every new family or state springs out of one already existing or is founded on existing laws. It is a part of the natural organization of human society imposed by the Creator; and therefore it can be said that, in all their various forms, the powers that be are ordained of God.

The Church is not an artificial society. It was not originally formed by a group of individuals coming together in voluntary association. It was in one sense a continuation of the Church of the Old Testament. More precisely the Christian Church began with the Lord Jesus Christ himself, the Son of Man, the representative of the whole race, to whom individual men were added as engrafted branches to a tree. According to another figure they became members of his Body, this mystical Body, the habitation of the one Spirit, being brought into active existence when the Holy Ghost came upon the hundred and twenty on the Day of Pentecost. To the society thus formed multitudes were afterwards aggregated by the act of God. Men do not enter it by their own act, but by grace of the new birth. But neither is the Church a natural society of the same order as the state or the family. It is not one among others,

an outgrowth of circumstance or a creation of human law. It is a supernatural society analogous to the natural societies of the world, including in idea the whole of mankind; in actual fact, those who are called and chosen.

A society cannot exist without officers and subordination. These elements are found in the Church from the beginning. The Apostles appear at once as rulers. They are nowhere in Scripture called expressly by a title implying as much, but their authority is evident in what they do. It is their doctrine and fellowship to which the converts adhere. Challenged by the Sanhedrin to say by what power or in what name they are acting, they do not disclaim authority, but declare themselves to be acting in the name of Jesus Christ. Forbidden to teach in this name—a recognized act of authority—they refuse to be silenced. They receive and administer the contributions of the faithful, and solemnly rebuke irregularity in the matter. When further officers are needed they leave the selection of persons to the multitude, but they themselves appoint the elected to their business. When the rest are scattered by persecution they remain at their post. When they hear that Philip has evangelized Samaria they send two of their number to set things in order. Through the laying on of their hands the Holy Ghost is given, and Simon Magus sees in this a definite power which they might transfer to others. When Saul, returning from Damascus, assays to join himself to the disciples, Barnabas brings him to the Apostles. Saul himself, become Paul the Apostle, rules the Church in the places where he has preached; he judges, even in his absence, the incestuous Corinthian, and writes to the assembly at Corinth to execute his sentence; he regulates many

things by letter, and declares his intention of setting the rest in order when he comes.¹

There was power to add to the number of the Apostles. St. Paul and St. Barnabas bore the title expressly. St. Paul, created an Apostle directly by the Lord, certified his appointment by appealing to the signs of an Apostle that were in his work; but in the emphasis with which he asserted that he received his apostleship neither from men nor through man he indicates the ordinary mode of transmission. The reality of the office does not depend on the title. Prophets are added to the Apostles on terms of equality as the foundation of the Church. Their functions under this name are obscurely indicated in the New Testament, and the name did not survive in the Church; but the *Didache* shows that in some regions, perhaps of backward development, there were prophets in the second century still exercising apostolic powers. Apostleship derived from men or through man can only be understood of authority conveyed from the original holders. The Lord's commission, "As the Father hath sent me, even so send I you," implies the power of sending as he sent. St. Paul was thus able to send Timothy to Ephesus, Titus to Crete, with apostolic powers, and provision was made for the continuance of order in the Church.²

There was power to appoint other officers of lower

¹ Acts ii. 42; iv. 7-10, 18-20, 35; v. 3-11; vi. 3; viii. 1, 19 (*ἐξουσία*); ix. 27; 1 Cor. v. 3-5; xi. 34.

² Acts xiv. 14; Rom. xv. 18, 19; 1 Cor. ix. 2; 2 Cor. xii. 12; Gal. i. 1; Eph. ii. 20, and iii. 5; John xx. 21; *Didache*, xi. 1-13. It is obvious that the solemnity of Acts xiii. 2, 3 was not an appointment to apostleship, but a blessing on special work to be done. I do not wish to beg the question whether the Montanist prophets were a genuine survival.

rank. We read first of the Seven, chosen by the multitude of the disciples, appointed by the Apostles to administer the alms of the church. They are generally recognized as identical in office with those afterwards called Deacons. Somewhat later we hear incidentally of those called Presbyters, or Elders, whose origin is not recorded. They appear as ruling the church at Jerusalem in conjunction with the Apostles, or perhaps in their absence. We hear of them next in the cities of south Galatia, where the Apostles Barnabas and Paul appointed elders in every church which they had founded. Some years later St. Paul convened the elders of the church of Ephesus, and charges them to feed the Church of God, the flock in which the Holy Ghost had made them bishops or overseers. By this second title St. Paul also addresses the rulers of the church at Philippi, in conjunction with deacons. Presbyters, bishops, and deacons are all mentioned in the Pastoral Epistles, and St. Paul gives directions for their appointment.¹

Here are three well-defined offices. First, there are the Apostles and Prophets; secondly, the Presbyters or Bishops; thirdly, the Deacons. Many functions or ministries are mentioned in the apostolic writings, about which interesting questions have been raised, but they are apparently descriptions only of the work done by members of the Church in their various capacities;²

¹ Acts vi. 3; xi. 30; xiv. 23; xv. 6; xx. 17, 28; Phil. i. 1; I Tim. iii. 1-13; v. 1, 17-19; Tit. i. 5-7. It is possible that the hundred and twenty of Pentecost were the original elders. See Gore, *The Church and the Ministry*, p. 239, 4th ed.

² Such are the enumerations in Rom. xii. 6; I Cor. xii. 4-11; Eph. iv. 11. The *πρῶτον, δεύτερον, τρίτον* of I Cor. xii. 28 is more suggestive of a hierarchy, but there also the dominant thought is that of different functions for different members in the most general sense, and probably the meaning goes no further.

these three alone stand out clearly as official grades. The titles explain themselves. They were all words in common use. The title of Presbyter was used in the Synagogue; but the Jewish elder was a purely judicial officer, and had no pastoral authority like that of the elders at Ephesus, nor any functions like those which St. James attributes to the Christian presbyters in the care of the sick. It is a title of respect which in one form or other all antiquity applied to those exercising authority. The words *bishop* and *deacon*, signifying oversight and service of almost any kind, have acquired their specific meaning by association. It is perhaps not altogether accidental that in the account of the election of St. Matthias the titles of deacon and bishop are adumbrated, as well as that of apostle. The other grades may be regarded as implicit in the apostolate, and derived from it by a partial conveyance of its functions.¹

The Apostles and Prophets exercised a general ministry throughout the Church, subject to such delimitation as was made for a time between St. Peter and St. Paul, and perhaps to the general principle that one should not cross the work of another or build on his foundation.² The Presbyters or Bishops had the pastoral charge of the local churches. The Deacons were their assistants, and may also have been companions of the Apostles. This we gather from the writings of the New Testament. The same system is found in the *Didache*, a document of not later date than the beginning of the second century, which represents the practice apparently of Hebrew Christians in eastern Syria or in Egypt. Contemporaneous with this are the letters of St. Ignatius to the churches of Rome and of Asia. In

¹ Jas. v. 14; Acts i. 17, 20, 26.

² Rom. xv. 20.

these a different arrangement of the ministry is implied. There is no mention of Apostles or Prophets, nor of any general oversight of many local churches such as they had. The titles of Bishop and Presbyter are distinguished, and in each local church there is one Bishop who presides, and several Presbyters who are his subordinates. This arrangement became universal, but gradually and not without modification. There are grounds for supposing the churches of southern Italy under the shadow of Rome, and those of Egypt under Alexandria, to have had less independence than others. Gaul had but one Bishop in the second century, and the extensive Roman province of Scythia was in the same case much later. St. Clement of Rome, an elder contemporary of Ignatius, could still speak of Bishops and Deacons after the manner of St. Paul,¹ but from the early years of the second century onward the Ignatian nomenclature is universal.

Here, as in the time of the Apostles, there is a three-fold ministry, but with a change of title. The purport of this change is matter of debate. Two different opinions have had so much support in the teaching of the Church that neither can be taken for a solid Christian tradition. According to one opinion the universal itinerant ministry, which the Apostles had exercised in person or by delegates, was gradually converted into a local ministry by the settlement of men, apostolic in rank and power, in the several churches. The first example is found in St. James of Jerusalem. Either from a general sense of what was fitting, or by a regular decision of the last surviving Apostles, it was resolved to fix one such supreme governor in each church, and to him exclusively was given the title of

¹ Clem., *Ad Cor.* 42.

Bishop, formerly common to the presbyters. The historic episcopate is therefore in the narrowest sense a continuation of the apostolate, and the presbyterate remains what it was from the beginning. According to the other opinion, which became current mainly through the influence of St. Jerome, the apostolate in the narrower sense was allowed to pass away; from among the presbyters or bishops, originally of equal power and dignity, one was chosen to preside in each church, to whom were eventually reserved certain functions of the ministry and the title of Bishop. In whatever way it came about, a well-supported tradition attributes the final settlement to the old age of St. John the Apostle at Ephesus.¹

What is common to apostolic and to later times, according to either opinion, is the existence of a hierarchy in the Christian Church with powers of extension. The establishment of this hierarchy is traced to the Lord Jesus Christ himself. Practically it will matter little whether we suppose him to have enjoined a particular constitution of the Ministry, or to have given his Church the power of organizing it according to need. On either showing the hierarchy is in present fact founded in a certain order. In the latter case however Christian doctrine would be concerned only with the principle that an organized society must have an official organization. The establishment of a certain form of hierarchy, though unchangeable except by the concurrent action of the whole body, would be a matter purely of ecclesiastical law. Christian tradition supports the former hypothesis, that Christ himself ordained the hierarchy by instruction given to the Apostles. It was part of the Divine order,

¹ The question is discussed by Gore, *The Church and the Ministry*, 4th ed. pp. 157-162 and 304, 305.

and St. Paul could tell the Presbyters of Ephesus that they were made Bishops by the Holy Ghost. They were not merely designated by a Divine inspiration for a special work, as were Barnabas and Saul at Antioch ; they were ordained, if by human agency, still by the power of the Holy Ghost.¹

The hierarchy thus ordained is a corporate unity. The Twelve Apostles had a single authority, exercised by each one of them not independently, but jointly with the rest. They jointly sent Peter and John to Samaria to confirm what was done by Philip. When St. Peter himself had for the first time admitted a Gentile to baptism, though he acted by revelation, he had to give an account of what he had done to the rest. In united session, along with the Presbyters, the Apostles regulated the proceedings of Paul and Barnabas in the same matter. According to St. Cyprian's view of the case, our Lord gave the apostolic commission in the first place to Peter alone, and afterwards conjoined the rest with him in the same office and power, so as to show the unity of their authority by its originating with one man. This may be fanciful, but it serves to illustrate the traditional conception of the hierarchy which St. Cyprian has put on record. Unity and concord in the Church depend, first on the due subordination of all Christians to the Bishops severally set over them, secondly on the united

¹ Acts xx. 28. The force of *ἔθετο* seems unmistakable. Compare 1 Cor. xii. 28, where it is used of *χάρισματα* generally. Possibly *διὰ προφητείας* in 1 Tim. iv. 14 conveys the same sense. The witness of St. Clement to the settlement of the hierarchy by instruction of Christ himself is express: *Καὶ οἱ ἀπόστολοι ἡμῶν ἐγνώσαν διὰ τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ὅτι ἕρις ἔσται ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος τῆς ἐπισκοπῆς. Διὰ ταύτην οὖν τὴν αἰτίαν, πρόγνωσιν εἰληφότες τελείαν κατέστησαν τοὺς προειρημένους, κ.τ.λ. (Ad Cor., 44).*

action of the Bishops among themselves. The episcopate, says St. Cyprian, is one and undivided; every single bishop holds the common authority in joint tenure; each one has the right to act on his own responsibility, rendering account to God, but he retains this right only on condition of abiding in concord with the rest and in the mystical unity of the Church. In practice the social needs of the Church have led, since St. Cyprian's day, to provincial combinations, and to some measure of subordination within the episcopate; but these things are purely matter of ecclesiastical law, and do not belong to the essential organization of the Church.¹

Appointment to the hierarchy appears from the writings of the New Testament to be in the hands of the Apostles and their coadjutors. The examples are few but uniform; for if St. Paul speaks of Timothy as advanced "by prophecy, with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery," he explains this elsewhere by the exhortation, "Stir up the gift of God which is in thee through the laying on of my hands."² Afterwards the power of appointment lay exclusively in the Bishop as now distinguished from the presbyters. The action of Colluthus, an Egyptian presbyter of the fourth century, who presumed to ordain a certain Ischyra to the presbyterate, was treated as an impossible innovation. The contention of Aetius, later in the same century, that presbyter and bishop were of equal dignity was rejected on this very ground; the uniform tradition of the Church was against him. St. Jerome, whose tendency was to exalt the presbyterate

¹ See Note I.

² Acts vi. 6; xiv. 23; 1 Tim. iv. 14; 2 Tim. i. 6; Tit. i. 5. Possibly Rom. i. 11, *ἵνα τι μεταδῶ χάρισμα ὑμῖν*, looks the same way.

and abase the episcopate, allowed that in respect of ordination the Bishop was superior.¹ If the episcopate be the direct continuation of the apostolate, this exclusive right of the Bishop is at once accounted for; there is no reason for supposing presbyters ever to have had the power of ordination. But if the origin of the episcopate be, as St. Jerome supposed, the selection of one man out of the presbytery for supreme authority, it will follow that all the original presbyters or bishops had the same power to ordain. The reservation of this power to the one Bishop would then seem to be a matter only of ecclesiastical discipline. The presbyters in that case retain implicitly the power to ordain, but are forbidden to exercise the power. Some colour is given to this contention by the custom which requires the presbyters present at an ordination to take part with the Bishop in the imposition of hands. There may seem to be here intended a real joint action, controlled only in practice by a rigorous adherence to the Ignatian maxim of doing nothing without the Bishop, so that ordination by presbyters alone in the absence of a Bishop, though unlawful, would not be strictly impossible.² Mediaeval theologians, following St. Jerome, and regarding the orders of the ministry chiefly as concerned with the Sacrament of the Altar, exaggerated the equality of bishop and presbyter, and prepared the way for those who in the sixteenth century claimed for presbyters not only

¹ For Colluthus, see Athanas., *Apol. ad Constant.*, 11, 12, and 74, tom. i. pp. 732, 794. For Acrius, Epiphanius, *Adv. Haer.*, lxxv. 4. Jerome, *Ep.* cxlvi. : "Quid facit, excepta ordinatione, episcopus quod presbyter non faciat?"

² Ign., *Ad Trall.*, 2 : ἕνευ τοῦ ἐπισκόπου μηδὲν πράσσειν ὑμᾶς. But cf. *Ad Magn.*, 7 : ἕνευ τοῦ ἐπισκόπου καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων μηδὲν πράσσετε.

the power but the right to ordain. The question is for theologians, and is rather of academic than of practical interest, since there can at best be no certainty that a presbyterian ordination is valid, and no one whose ordination is doubtful can be allowed to minister in the Church.¹

The Church being a holy priesthood, the ministers of the Church must of necessity exercise priestly functions. All Christians being made priests unto God, those are eminently so who preside in the Christian society. They are nowhere expressly called by this title in the writings of the New Testament, and only in the one case of the "prophets and teachers" at Antioch are their ministrations spoken of in ordinary terms of priesthood.² So long indeed as the Temple worship continued, this could not be done without danger of confusion. In the Epistle to the Hebrews it is said even of Christ himself, that "if he were on earth he would not be a priest at all, seeing there are those who offer the gifts according to the law." So in the second century the Apologists, addressing readers who knew only the Gentile sacrifices, could escape misunderstanding only by repudiating in the name of Christians the very idea of sacrifice. "God has no need of material offerings from men," wrote St. Justin Martyr, "He does not require blood, libations, or incense."

¹ See Note K.

² Rev. i. 6 ; Acts xiii. 2, *λειτουργούντων δὲ αὐτῶν τῷ κυρίῳ*. The words *λειτουργεῖν* and *λειτουργία* are commonly used in the LXX. for the offices of the priesthood. So also in Luke i. 23 ; Heb. ix. 21 ; x. 11, of the Old Testament worship. In Heb. viii. 2, *λειτουργὸς* is used of Christ as priest. In Rom. xv. 16, St. Paul speaks of his apostolic work in terms of priesthood—*λειτουργῶν, ἱεροουργοῦντα, προσφορὰ*—but metaphorically. Compare Phil. ii. 17 ; and observe that St. Paul also uses *λειτουργὸς* in a more general sense, Rom. xiii. 6.

Athenagoras concludes a similar repudiation with the words: "Yet are we bound to offer a bloodless sacrifice, and our reasonable service;" but he is speaking, ostensibly at least, of purely metaphorical offering. Against Trypho the Jew, on the other hand, St. Justin plainly asserts the sacrifice offered in the Eucharist as foretold by Malachi. In the *Didache* the Prophets are called High Priests, and the Eucharist, though treated with singular inadequacy, is spoken of as a sacrifice. St. Clement of Rome uses of the Christian ministry in one passage words which he elsewhere applies freely to the priesthood of the Old Testament. St. Ignatius declares in connection with the Eucharist that as there is one Bishop so there must be one altar. By the middle of the third century the bishop was freely called a Priest, as may be seen especially in the writings of St. Cyprian. The title was afterwards extended as freely to presbyters, and in most Western languages, as in English, a word derived from *presbyter* is the only term in use to express the meaning of *priest*.¹

The fundamental work of priesthood is to offer gifts and sacrifices for sin. To offer the gifts in holiness is, according to St. Clement, a characteristic office of bishop or presbyter. The essential act of Christian worship, the blessing of the bread and wine to become the Body and Blood of Christ, the Christian Sacrifice, has always been reserved to him. The work of priesthood is completed in what St. Paul terms the ministry of reconciliation.²

About the nature of this ministerial priesthood there are two opinions current. According to the one opinion the Lord conferred immediately upon the Apostles the power of offering when he bade them "Do this," at the

¹ Heb. viii. 4. See Note L.

² Heb. v. 1; 2 Cor. v. 18.

institution of the Eucharist, and in like manner conferred on them the ministry of reconciliation by the words, "Whosoever sins ye forgive, they are forgiven unto them." They handed on these powers to others, who thus have a priesthood distinct, though inseparable, from their function as pastors and rulers of the Church. According to the other opinion, these words of the Lord were spoken to the Apostles rather as representing the Church than as individuals; the powers of priesthood were conferred immediately on the whole society, and mediately on the ministers of the society. These are priests because they are pastors and rulers of the priestly Church; they are organs of the Body of Christ in its priestly character. The distinction is theological; it is of no practical importance, since in either case the powers of the ministry are derived by transmission from the Apostles.

We have considered only what belongs to Christian doctrine. The organization of the Church in detail, the institution of subordinate offices, the relations of the higher ministries, are matters of ecclesiastical rule. The powers of the sacred ministry, on the other hand, are a *charisma*, a gift of grace. The work of the ministry is described by St. Paul as the building up of the Body of Christ. The Apostles and those associated with them are ambassadors of Christ, workers with God, and stewards of his mysteries, labourers in the harvest of souls, fishers of men. Their task is to help in the formation of the Christian character, by communicating the knowledge and the grace of God. It may be summed up as the ministry of the Word and the Sacraments, which two aspects of it we now proceed to consider.¹

¹ Eph. iv. 12; cp. Rom. xv. 20; 1 Cor. iii. 9; 2 Cor. x. 8; xii. 19; Col. ii. 7. Also 1 Cor. iv. 1; 2 Cor. v. 20; vi. 1; Tit. i. 7; 1 Pet. iv. 10; Matt. ix. 38; Mark i. 17; Gal. iv. 19.

SECT. IV.—*The Ministry of the Word*

Christianity is the religion of the Incarnate Word of God, Jesus Christ, to whom is perfectly known the will of the Father, and by whom it is revealed to men. That which he taught, that which as received from him the Apostles spread through the world, is called emphatically the *Word*. What this means we see most clearly in the address of St. Peter before Cornelius, where he brings together in equal apposition the Word sent forth from God, the Matter so revealed, and the Person of Jesus Christ.¹ The expression was not new. From old time the Word of God meant a revelation of the Divine will or purpose. The Word of God came to the prophets of the Old Testament, came to John the Baptist, the precursor of the New, came and dwelt among us in the Person of the Incarnate Son. From the day of Pentecost the Apostles spoke the Word of God with boldness. This was their special work; they appointed the Seven because it was unmeet for them to forsake the Word and serve tables. They were eye-witnesses and ministers of the Word. They declared that which they had beholden and their hands had handled, concerning the Word of Life. Through them the Word of God grew mightily and prevailed.²

The Ministry of the Word is the task of making duly known to the world the revelation of Jesus Christ. This knowledge may reach the minds and hearts of men by

¹ Acts x. 36-38. Τὸν λόγον—τὸ γενόμενον ῥῆμα—Ἰησοῦν τὸν ἀπὸ Ναζαρέτ—are grammatically in apposition, the object of ὑμεῖς οἴδατε. The word ῥῆμα signifies the *matter* spoken of; here, the events of the Gospel. Cp. 1 Pet. i. 23-25.

² 1 Sam. iii. 1; xv. 10; John x. 35; Luke iii. 2; John i. 14; Acts iv. 31; vi. 2; Luke i. 2; 1 John i. 1; Acts xix. 20.

various channels, but there are special means appointed. The Word is preached, that is to say, solemnly proclaimed as by a herald; and for this solemn proclamation a commission is required. "How shall they preach, except they be sent?" asks St. Paul. This mission makes the Apostle; on its continuance depends the Ministry of the Word.¹

The mission is solemnly granted in the words of the Lord recorded by St. Matthew: "All authority hath been given unto me in heaven and on earth. Go ye therefore, and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them into the Name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost: teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I commanded you: and lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world."²

Four words are specially noticeable here. The commission is based on the *authority* or legitimate power which is granted to the Lord Jesus Christ in his human nature. It is a commission to make *disciples*, which is to bring men into a fixed relation of submission to a master. The purport of the mission is to make known what Christ *commanded*; a rule of life and conduct is proposed, as of equal importance with the facts of revelation. But this rule is proposed by way of *teaching*; no power is given to enforce it by pains and penalties.

We may here observe once more that nothing practical turns on the question whether in giving this mission the Lord addressed the Apostles as such, or the Church at large. In the latter case it is still the Ministers of the Word by whom the powers given to the Church are exercised.

About the proposition of faith much has been said in the Introduction which need not be repeated. What we

¹ Rom. x. 15.

² Matt. xxviii. 18-20.

have now to consider may come under the heading of the four words above noted.

All authority is given to the Son of Man. The Ministry of the Word does not exhaust this authority; it is one mode of its exercise. We are reminded of the authority given to the Son of Man on earth to forgive sins; but we may find another aspect of his authority which looks more directly to the Word. The Father "gave him authority to execute judgment, because he is the Son of Man." What is this judgment? "For judgment came I into this world," he said, "that they which see not may see; and that they which see may become blind." Yet, on the other hand, "God sent not the Son into the world to judge the world; but that the world should be saved through him." "If any man hear my sayings, and keep them not," he said, "I judge him not: for I came not to judge the world, but to save the world. He that rejecteth me, and receiveth not my sayings, hath one that judgeth him: the word that I spake, the same shall judge him in the last day." Reading together these passages from St. John's Gospel, with their superficial contradiction, we see what is the judgment spoken of. Judgment is not the purpose but the consequence of the coming of the Son into the world. He came to save the world from the judgment of death; and this salvation was by his Word. "He that heareth my Word," he said, "and believeth him that sent me, hath eternal life, and cometh not into judgment, but hath passed out of death into life." But there is a converse: "He that obeyeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him." The effect of the Word is therefore judgment; the marking of those who reject the truth. "He that believeth on him is not judged: he that believeth not hath been judged

already, because he hath not believed on the name of the only-begotten Son of God. And this is the judgment, that the light is come into the world, and men loved the darkness rather than the light ; for their works were evil." The authority to execute judgment is therefore identical with the power of communicating eternal life by the Word of truth. This power is spoken of once more in the prayer of the Lord Jesus at the Last Supper : "Thou gavest him authority over all flesh, that whatsoever thou hast given him, to them he should give eternal life. And this is life eternal, that they should know thee the only true God, and him whom thou didst send, even Jesus Christ." The judgment continues in the work of the Holy Ghost : "He, when he is come, will convict the world in respect of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment." The authority of the Son of Man is exercised by the apostolic ministry, in the power of the Holy Ghost, for the same purpose of salvation, with the same consequence of judgment. "We are a sweet savour of Christ unto God," says St. Paul, "in them that are being saved, and in them that are perishing ; to the one a savour from death unto death ; to the other a savour from life unto life." As an Apostle he had power to deal sharply, though the authority which the Lord gave him was for building up, and not for casting down.¹

Upon this authority is based the Ministry of the Word ; its purpose is to communicate life eternal by conveying to men the knowledge of God. Armed with this authority, the Ministers of the Word are commissioned to make disciples. Discipleship is a relation to a Master ; the disciple is one who learns from the authority of a teacher. The commission does not, however, extend to the

¹ John iii. 17-19, 36 ; v. 24, 27 ; ix. 39 ; xii. 47 ; xvi. 8 ; xvii. 2-3 ; 2 Cor. ii. 15, 16 ; xiii. 10.

making of many masters. The relation of master and disciple was familiar in Jewish experience. It was individual. The teacher was addressed by the disciple as Rabbi, *My Chief*; and each one taught with what authority he had acquired by reputation. But this was expressly forbidden by the Lord: "Be not ye called Rabbi: for one is your Teacher, and all ye are brethren. . . . Neither be ye called masters: for one is your Master, even the Christ." The Minister of the Word is to make disciples not to himself, but to Jesus Christ. It was an offence against this rule when certain at Corinth described themselves as disciples of Paul, of Apollos, of Cephas. "I thank God," cries St. Paul, "that I baptized none of you, save Crispus and Gaius; lest any man should say that ye were baptized into my name." He takes up the injunction of the Lord, "He that is greatest among you shall be your minister," by asking, "What then is Apollos? and what is Paul? Ministers through whom ye believed: and each as the Lord gave to him."¹

So far there is a marked contrast between the Minister of the Word and the Jewish teacher. But on the other hand the promise concerning binding and loosing, made by the Lord in the first place to St. Peter and afterwards to the Twelve, or perhaps to the Church at large, recalls an ordinary feature of the Jewish discipline. "No other terms," says Edersheim, "were in more constant use in Rabbinic Canon Law than those of 'binding' and 'loosing.' The words are the literal translation of the Hebrew equivalents *Asar*, which means 'to bind' in the sense of prohibiting, and *Hittir*, which means 'to loose' in the sense of permitting." Each great teacher claimed this power to bind or to loose, to declare an act lawful or unlawful. The Lord used this common form of speech

¹ Jas. iii. 1; Matt. xxiii. 8-11; 1 Cor. i. 12-15; iii. 5.

in his promise made to the Apostles. Nor is this all. His reference to Heaven and Earth also has a counterpart in Rabbinic teaching. He approved the teaching authority of the Sanhedrin for the time being. "The scribes and the Pharisees sit on Moses' seat: all things therefore whatsoever they bid you, these do and observe." A like power he conferred for the future on the ministry of his own Church. Now it was a favourite conceit of the time that there was a heavenly Sanhedrin, in which the decisions of the earthly Sanhedrin were reviewed. "In regard to some of their earthly decrees," says Edersheim again, "they were wont to say that the Sanhedrin above confirmed what the Sanhedrin beneath had done." The element of truth contained in this was confirmed by the Lord when, adopting the language of the time, he said, "What things soever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and what things soever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven."¹

If therefore individual Apostles and Ministers of the Word are not to be called *Rabbi*, or to be many masters, still they exercise collectively the power of teaching with authority. "He that heareth you, heareth me," said the Lord. As the Jews were bound to hear those who sat on Moses' seat, so Christians are to hear the Church. One consequence of refusing to hear is the same in both cases: he who will not hear the Church is to be held as the Gentile and the publican.²

It is held by some that the power of binding and loosing was conferred on St. Peter individually. This does not necessarily follow from the promise made to him individually, since this was the promise of a

¹ Matt. xvi. 19; xviii. 18; xxiii. 2, 3. Edersheim, *Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, vol. ii. p. 85.

² Luke x. 16; Matt. xviii. 17.

future gift. It is held again that all the original Apostles had this power individually, by virtue of a special gift of inspiration. But this does not well agree with the injunction against being called masters, nor yet with the practice of the Apostles. St. Paul insisted strongly on his individual mission, received directly from the Lord ; yet he carefully watched over the identity of his teaching with that of the other Apostles. He laid before them the gospel which he preached, lest by any means he should be running in vain. On this or on a similar occasion it was that all the Apostles and Presbyters at Jerusalem met, and by solemn agreement exercised the power of loosing. "It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us," they said, to declare the Law of Moses no longer binding on converts from the Gentiles. The teaching office resides in the whole Church, which acts by its proper organ or ministry, the Ministry of the Word. Those who exercise this ministry, taken as a whole, are for this reason known as the *Ecclesia docens*. It is not they alone who actually teach. At various times there have been teachers, recognized and honoured in the Church, who were not of the Ministry. But the Ministers of the Word are they who teach with authority, binding or loosing. Individual teachers, whether of the Ministry or no, may put forward opinions more or less generally received ; but they declare with authority only what the Church as a whole has taught.¹

The matter of this teaching is the Word of Christ—all that he has commanded. This matter is commonly distinguished as pertaining to faith and morals. It includes the facts of revelation, and the Christian rule of life. St. Paul gave a charge to the Thessalonians, how

¹ Gal. ii. 2 ; Acts xv. 28. At the present day some of the most distinguished theologians of the Eastern Church are laymen.

they ought to walk and to please God, which they received not as the word of man, but as it was in truth, the Word of God. The teaching office of the Church includes the promulgation of the Divine Law, and the exercise of authority in controversies of faith. The function of the Church is to decide questions of faith or morals when they arise, if this be necessary for the exclusion of false doctrine. The Ministry of the Word goes no further. Great as are the powers on which it is founded, they are to be exercised only by way of teaching. The Jewish Sanhedrin, exercising the powers of a theocracy, could enforce their decrees of binding and loosing, not only by the exclusion of the disobedient from the Synagogue, as the Gentile or the publican, but also in some cases by the punishment even of death. No such power is given to the ministers of the Christian Church, the Kingdom which is not of this world, and the servants of which must not fight. The binding and loosing of the Christian Church is declaratory only.¹

The Christian Society, it is true, has the power, natural to all societies, of making rules for its members, which by an almost inevitable necessity are digested into a body of Canon Law. These are to be carefully distinguished from the Divine rule of life which the Church declares—the familiar distinction of *ius ecclesiasticum* and *ius divinum*. It is perhaps unfortunate that both are included in the same digest. In like manner the Church, or even a self-contained part of it, may as a matter of social discipline forbid or enjoin the teaching of certain opinions; but this again must be carefully distinguished from the power of the whole Church to define what is matter of faith. Rules of this kind do not touch Christian doctrine, save only in regard to the general principle of obedience to

¹ 1 Thess. ii. 13; iv. 2; John xviii. 36.

authority.¹ Yet once more the Church has at various times received from the Secular Power authority of certain kinds, the faculty of holding courts and imposing penalties, the control of certain branches of law, as in matrimonial and testamentary causes. This borrowed authority is confused with the spiritual powers of the Church, and has a hardening effect upon the mode of their exercise. Conversely the Church has called upon the Secular Power to coerce with the sword of the magistrate heretics or defaulters from ecclesiastical discipline. The result has been disaster of a kind that recalls the warning of the Lord Jesus to St. Peter: "Put up again thy sword into his place; for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword."

In sum, the Ministry of the Word is the declaration of revealed truth and of the will of God, made known by Jesus Christ. It is incumbent on the whole Church to define the rule of faith and morals, where definition is needed. It is incumbent on every several church, as a pillar and ground of the truth, to maintain what is so defined. It is the duty of every several minister of the Word to declare the whole counsel of God, having regard to the capacity of those to whom he is sent—feeding the simple, as babes in Christ, with milk, those that are full-grown with solid food, speaking wisdom among the perfect. He must utter opinion as opinion, that which is of faith as of faith, handling aright the Word of truth. Ambassador of Christ, he is to preach not himself, but Christ Jesus as Lord.²

¹ For the further consideration of what is involved in "hearing the Church," see below, pp. 282-5.

² Acts xx. 27; 1 Cor. ii. 6; iii. 2; 2 Cor. iv. 5; v. 20; 1 Tim. iii. 15; 2 Tim. ii. 15; Heb. v. 13, 14.

SECT. V.—*The Ministry of the Sacraments*

“Let a man so account of us,” wrote St. Paul, “as of ministers of Christ, and stewards of the mysteries of God.” This relation is continued in the ministry of the Church. “The bishop must be blameless, as God’s steward.” A steward is the servant who has the care of his master’s house; he receives and dispenses; he rules the under-servants, and controls even the children of his lord. In the household of God there are stewards, and the goods which they guard and dispense are the mysteries of God.¹

We retain here the Greek word. *Mysterics*, in ordinary Greek parlance, were religious ceremonies, to which none were admitted but those who had been solemnly initiated. Such were the famous mysteries of the Cabiri in Samothrace, of Demeter at Eleusis. Rites of the same kind were commonly found in all Greek cities. They seem to have invariably included a solemn purification from sin, even if this were not, as some have thought, the primary object of the whole ceremony. It is doubtful whether any important secrets of religion or nature were revealed to the initiated, but this was certainly pretended, and the proceedings at least were secret; to know them was a high privilege, and to speak of them to those without was a great impiety. Such is the true meaning of Mysteries; but the word passed into a more general sense. The obscure doctrines of certain natural philosophers were, perhaps in jest, called by Plato mysteries. The word was used even of an ordinary secret between man and man.²

¹ 1 Cor. iv. 1; Tit. i. 7; Luke xii. 42; Gal. iv. 2.

² Plato, *Theaet.*, 156 A. The line of Menander, *μυστήριόν σου μὴ κατέπεις τῷ φίλῳ*, does not however establish a general use.

In the Septuagint the word is used with both meanings. It stands for the secret counsel of a king; in the Book of Wisdom, the Gentile religion is summed up as consisting of mysteries and initiations, while on the other hand the religion of Israel is spoken of, in the phrase afterwards used by St. Paul, as the Mysteries of God; in the Book of Daniel the dreams of Nebuchadnezzar are called mysteries.¹

It is never safe to ignore the witness of the Septuagint to the meaning of the words used in the New Testament, but in this case little is to be drawn from this source. Mysteries were inconsistent with the Jewish economy, in which the worship of God was public to the whole nation. Philo rails at the Gentile mysteries, pointing to the openness of nature as the model to be followed. He contrasts with them the Jewish sacrifices founded on the exactly opposite principle. To the Mysteries none were admitted but the initiated; from the worship of Israel none were excluded but the unclean.² The use of the word by St. Paul is therefore the more remarkable, and it is the more decisively connected with the ideas current in the Greek-speaking societies among which he moved.

There is a record in the Gospel of one occasion when the word was used by the Lord himself. To the Twelve it was given, he said, to know the mysteries of the Kingdom of Heaven, but to others the truth was obscurely told in parables. There is nothing here to suggest any meaning beyond that of a secret revealed to some, but as yet withheld from others. By St. Paul the falling away of Israel and the admission of the Gentiles to the Church is called a mystery. He seems here to mean a

¹ Tob. xii. 7; Judith ii. 2; Wisd. ii. 22; xiv. 15, 23; Dan. ii. 18; iv. 6.

² Philo, *περὶ θυόντων*, *Op.*, pp. 856, 857.

secret purpose of God, which was gradually being revealed as it came into effect. Apparently in the same sense the finishing of the mystery of God is spoken of in the Apocalypse. So, too, the revelation of an event wholly future, as of the resurrection, is a mystery.¹

There remain passages in which St. Paul uses the word according to its primary sense. In one of his earliest epistles he wrote of the "mystery of lawlessness." The allusion is of noted obscurity; but this much is clear, that he is speaking of a religious system which stands in rivalry with the truth of God. Elsewhere he uses the word only of the Christian religion. To the Corinthians he describes himself as a steward of the mysteries of God. In the same Epistle he uses language that could convey only one meaning to the reader: "We speak wisdom among the perfect . . . we speak God's wisdom in a mystery." This could not fail to suggest the familiar idea of initiation into the secret rites of the Mysteries. There was therefore something strictly analogous in the Christian religion.²

In the later epistles to the Ephesians and the Colossians the word is frequent, and here again the idea of stewardship is prominent. "I was made a minister of the Church," says the Apostle, "according to the stewardship of God which was given me to you-ward, to fulfil the

¹ Matt. xiii. 11, and the corresponding passages, Mark iv. 11; Luke viii. 10. Rom. xi. 25, 26; Eph. iii. 3-6; Rev. x. 7; I Cor. xv. 51.

² 2 Thess. ii. 7 (cf. Rev. xvii. 5); I Cor. ii. 6, 7: *ἐν τοῖς τελείοις*, *i.e.* those who are *τετελεσμένοι*, or initiated into the *τέλη* or *τελεταί*, the rites of the Mysteries. The "wisdom of the rulers of this world" is probably an allusion to the pagan Mysteries (cf. Eph. vi. 12), with which the Christian Mysteries are thus paralleled and contrasted, as the Christian sacrifice with pagan sacrifices in I Cor. x. 21.

word of God, the mystery which hath been hid from all ages and generations ; but now hath it been manifested to his saints, to whom God was pleased to make known what is the riches of the glory of this mystery among the Gentiles, which is Christ in you, the hope of glory." His work was "to make all men see what is the stewardship of the mystery which from all ages hath been hid in God, who created all things." He prays for boldness in making known the mystery of the Gospel. In writing to Timothy he speaks of the mystery of the faith, and the mystery of godliness, which exactly contrasts with the mystery of lawlessness described in earlier years. This mystery of godliness is the sum of the Christian religion : "He who was manifested in the flesh, justified in the Spirit, seen of angels, preached among the nations, believed on in the world, received up in glory." He calls it a "great mystery," suggesting the distinction of the great and the little mysteries of Greek institution. In the same way he describes marriage as a "great mystery."¹

St. Paul therefore employs language plainly indicating that in the Christian religion there is something analogous to the religion of the Greek mysteries. There are ceremonies and rites to be approached only by a ceremonial initiation. This being established, we can hardly understand in any other sense the Mysteries of the Kingdom of Heaven, which are spoken of in the Gospel, and these would unquestionably be included in the things concerning the Kingdom about which the Lord instructed the Apostles after his resurrection. These are the

¹ Eph. i. 9 ; iii. 9 ; v. 32 ; vi. 19 ; Col. i. 25-27 ; ii. 2 ; iv. 3 ; 1 Tim. iii. 9, 16. At Eleusis the initiated passed through τὰ μικρὰ τέλη to τὰ μεγάλα. See the Schol. on Plato, *Gorgias*, 497 C. Compare also the allusive use of μεμύημαι in Phil. iv. 12.

Mysteries of God, committed to the stewardship of the Christian Ministry. They are much more than rites and ceremonies. They have the reality after which the pagan mystagogues were dimly feeling, the purification of the soul, the gift of communion with God. The Christian Mysteries mean the dwelling of Christ in his people, the hope of glory. They are the ritual and ceremonial expression of the fulfilment of God's secret purpose from the foundation of the world, the redemption and the sanctification of all men by the Incarnate Word. They are divinely appointed signs of this Redemption that is being wrought, of grace that is being given; and since with God, who calls the things that are not as though they were, to signify that a thing is being done is all one with the doing, they are therefore signs which effect that which they signify.¹

In the older Latin version of the Scriptures the Greek word *mysterium* was rendered, in the whole range of its meaning, by *sacramentum*. In the later revision, perfected by the labours of St. Jerome, the word *mysterium* is more commonly retained.² The former use, however, corresponds to the practice of Latin writers during several centuries. With Tertullian *sacramentum nostrum* means the Christian religion as a whole. The esoteric tradition which some heretics opposed to the public

¹ The habitual use of the word *μυστήριον* and its cognates by the Greek Fathers leaves no room for doubt as to its meaning for Christians. See the examples in Bingham, I. iv., and add to these the *Mystagogic Catechism* of St. Cyril of Jerusalem, which is instruction for those who are advancing from baptism to τὰ θεϊότερα μυστήρια.

² The texts in which the Vulgate has *sacramentum* are Dan. ii. 18; iv. 6; Tob. xii. 7; Wisd. ii. 22; Eph. i. 9; iii. 3, 9; v. 32; 1 Tim. iii. 16; Rev. i. 20. The selection seems to be quite arbitrary, and does not indicate any appropriation of the word to a specific sense.

teaching of the Church he scornfully calls a "hidden *sacrament*." The clergy of Rome wrote to St. Cyprian that "the whole *sacrament* of faith is set forth in the confession of the Name of Christ." By St. Cyprian himself the word is constantly used in this way; the most familiar example being his phrase *sacramentum unitatis* for the mystery or revealed truth of the unity of the Church. In St. Leo the Great we find the *sacrament of the Incarnation*, and much later in Isidore of Seville the *sacrament of the Trinity*. Lactantius uses the word of the truths obscurely revealed in the Sibylline verses.¹

Side by side with these expressions we find the word in constant use for the sacred rites of the Church. In either use it is to be regarded purely as the equivalent of *mysterium*, and its meaning is determined by that of the Greek word, as used in the New Testament. We are not concerned with the sense in which it was employed by Latin writers who were not Christian. For them a *sacramentum* was either a pledge deposited for surety in a court of justice, or an oath, and especially the soldier's oath of obedience. The former use of the word has coloured some definitions of the Christian Sacraments; the latter, in connection with St. Paul's imagery of the Christian warfare, has afforded opportunities for a play upon words. Neither helps us to understand what meaning the Church of the first age found in the word *mysterium*. St. Augustine would seem, however, to be indicating a current use of the Latin word where he says that signs or symbolical actions, "when they appertain to Divine things, are called *sacramenta*." Latin literature yields no example of such use, but it may have been established in

¹ Tertull., *Apol.*, c. 15; *De Praescr.*, c. 20, 26. Cypr., *Ep.*, xxx. § 3; *De Unit. Eccl.*, c. 7. Leo M., *Serm.*, xxiv. 4. Isid. *Hisp.*, *Contra Ind.*, i. 4. Lactantius, vii. 24.

the popular language. In that case the appropriation of the word to the Christian Mysteries would seem to show that what was chiefly regarded in them was that element of *signification*, which underlies the Greek term; and so we are helped to understand the meaning of St. Paul.¹

The sacred ceremonies and rites used in the Christian Church are obviously not all of equal importance. St. Augustine observed the fewness of those which are of palmary significance, "Baptism in the Name of the Trinity, the Communion of the Body and Blood of Christ, and whatever else is appointed in Holy Scripture." To these few the name of Sacrament was gradually restricted. The dividing line was supplied by the emphasis laid upon the doctrine of grace; and those sacraments were distinguished which were expressly connected with the gift of sanctification. Among these Baptism and the Lord's Supper are eminent. The institution of these two alone, with their proper form, is recorded by the holy evangelists, and they have therefore been called by way of distinction the Sacraments of the Gospel. It was long before there was any clear demarcation of other Sacraments. Early in the twelfth century Hugh of St. Victor, in his great work *De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei*, still adhered to the wider sense of the word. Some few years later Peter Lombard specified seven—the rites of Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, Penance, the Unction of the Sick, Ordination, and Marriage—as being in a peculiar sense the Sacraments of the New Testament. The dominating influence of his work as a text-book in the mediaeval schools secured the general acceptance of this classification, which found no less favour in the Eastern Church than in the West, and the meaning of the word *Sacrament*

¹ See Note M.

in common use has been narrowed from its former extension so as to include no other rites but these.¹

This distinction of the seven Sacraments, commonly so called, is purely theological. Certain rites are observed to be ordinary means appointed by God for the conveyance to the soul of sanctifying grace. To these the general term *mystery* or *sacrament* is reserved in a special sense. The distinction is convenient so long as we are careful to remember the more general sense of the word. The seven are specially marked, by the evidence of Holy Scripture and Christian tradition, as means of grace.

The elementary doctrine of the Sacraments, thus narrowly understood, is very simple. Treated theologically it is the subject of endless complications. These we put aside for the most part, noting only some questions which are practically unavoidable.

The first is the question of *matter* and *form*. A Sacrament, being a sign, must be an object of sense. In what does the sensible sign consist? St. Augustine says, in well-known words which will hardly bear translation, "accedit verbum ad elementum, et fit sacramentum." He is speaking of baptism. The water of baptism, in itself, is mere water and nothing more. But when used in conjunction with the "word of faith," the declaration of what is done in the Name of the Holy Trinity, it has power to cleanse the soul. The element and the word together make the Sacrament.² In a later

¹ Aug., *Ep.* 54, *ad Januar.*, § 1: "Sacramentis numero paucissimis, observatione facillimis, significatione praestantissimis, societatem novi populi colligavit, sicut est baptismus Trinitatis nomine consecratus, communicatio Corporis et Sanguinis ipsius, et si quid aliud in Scripturis canonicis commendatur." Petr. Lomb., *Sent.*, iv. § 1.

² Aug., *Tract.* 80, *in Ioan.*, § 3. Commenting on John xv. 3,

age this sentence was read as describing the nature of a Sacrament in general. An *element* of some kind, and a *word*, that is to say, a fixed formula, were taken to be essential. When the peripatetic philosophy invaded the schools, and everything existing in nature was analysed into matter and form, the constitution of a Sacrament seemed to be assured; the element was the matter, the word was the form. Great ingenuity was spent in applying this principle to the other Sacraments, with doubtful success. As eventually modified, however, the distinction has become useful, and is now thoroughly established in theological language. By the *matter* of a Sacrament we understand either a tangible thing or an action, as water, oil, or the imposition of hands. Taken in itself this thing, or this action, may have various significations; its signification in the Sacrament is determined by accompanying words, which are called the *form*. The two together make up the sensible and intelligible sign which is the Sacrament.

For such a sign to be an effectual conveyance of grace it must be appointed by the Author of grace; in the words of the English Catechism, it must be "ordained by Christ himself." This ordinance may be either specific, as in Baptism and to a less degree in the Lord's Supper, or generic, as perhaps in the case of Ordination, the rite or outward sign of which, so far as we know, was not particularly specified. *The determination of

he says, "Quare non ait, *mundi estis propter baptismum, quo loti estis*, sed ait, *propter verbum, quod locutus sum vobis*, nisi quia et in aqua verbum mundat? Detrahe verbum, et quid est aqua nisi aqua? Accedit verbum ad elementum, et fit sacramentum, etiam ipsum tanquam visibile verbum. . . . Hoc est verbum fidei quod praedicamus, quo sine dubio, ut mundare possit, consecratur et baptismus."

the matter and form will in the latter case rest with the Church at large, or, it may be, even with the individual dispenser of the Sacrament.¹

The second question that must be considered is that of the *minister*. In a Sacrament something is done by God's appointment. There must be a doer, also appointed by God, a steward or dispenser of the grace given. The question of appointment is best determined by the practice of the Church. Those who are recognized by actual custom as dispensers of a Sacrament have a right which cannot be challenged. The power of any others to act in the same capacity will at best be doubtful.

Our third question concerns the *intention* of the minister, about which there has been much darkening of counsel. The minister is a man; his action is a true human action. It must therefore be directed by some purpose, upon which its nature will in a measure depend. To wash a child for the purpose of cleansing its skin is not the same action as to wash it in Holy Baptism, and cannot be the action required to constitute the Sacrament. From two opposite points of view it has been maintained that if the proper form and matter of a Sacrament be used, even in jest, the Sacrament is complete. Luther held this because of his opinion that a Sacrament works purely by exciting motions of faith in the recipient, which might be the result even of a profane jest. Others have been led to the same conclusion from an exaggeration of the truth that a Sacrament depends on what is done by God's appointment, not on the doer

¹ Innocent IV., in his commentary on the Decretals, lib. i. tit. 16, maintained that, subject to the determination of the Church, "sufficeret ordinatori dicere *sis sacerdos*, vel alia aequipollentia verba."

or the recipient. But this makes the action of the minister no true human action, and reduces the Sacrament to something less than a magical charm. The often-quoted story of an actor converted in the moment of a mock-baptism on the stage, and led thence to martyrdom, proves nothing, even if true; for this would be an extraordinary, not an ordinary, operation of the Holy Spirit. The truth is commonly expressed by saying that he who administers a Sacrament must intend to do what the Church does. He must act intentionally as minister. Can he then by a careless, ignorant, or deliberate misdirection of his will destroy the value of the Sacrament which he administers? It has been held that he can do so; but intolerable consequences follow. We are shut up, it has been said, in a dungeon of uncertainty; no man can be assured of the reality of any Sacrament that he receives, and the very purpose of an outward and visible sign is frustrated. The suggestion is met by considering that the minister, by the very fact that he is a minister, a servant of another, acts not in his own name but in the name of his master. If with the obvious intention of acting ministerially he do what is appointed, there need be no further question. The result issues *ex opere operato*, from what is done by God's appointment; not *ex opere operantis*, from anything which the minister does of himself. It does not depend upon his belief or opinion, his purpose or will, but solely upon his ministerial action.¹

A fourth and last question concerns the *effect* of a Sacrament. The Sacraments are called effectual signs of grace, because they produce, by the working of the Holy Spirit, what they signify. We have already considered the doctrine of grace, the meaning of the gift, its effect

¹ See Note N.

upon the soul, and the hindering of that effect through lack of response in the subject. This must all be understood as we speak of the Sacraments, the special grace given through each of them being noted.

We may now briefly consider under these four heads what is the doctrine of the Sacraments taken severally.

In *Baptism* the matter is water, in which the subject is bathed or washed by affusion; the form is a declaration that the subject is baptized in the Name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. This use of the Name is expressly commanded by the Lord; the words indicating the action may be indifferently "I baptize thee," as in the Western Church, or "Such an one is baptized," as everywhere in the East. The effect of Baptism is the remission of sin by a mystical death, and the gift of new life by regeneration. All, says St. Paul, who are baptized into Christ Jesus are baptized into his death; entrance into the Kingdom of God is by the new birth of water and the Spirit.¹

The ordinary minister of Baptism was from the first one of the local bishops or presbyters, to whom this ministry was given by the Apostles. From the time of St. Ignatius it was in the hands of the Bishop, as now understood, or of a presbyter or deacon at his appointment.² In case, however, of extraordinary need, any person may administer Baptism; and if it be irregularly done without such need by any unauthorized person, the fact holds good if the proper matter and form are used. It was strongly

¹ Rom. vi. 3; John iii. 5.

² 1 Cor. i. 17. Ign., *Ad Smyrn.*, 8: οὐκ ἐξόν ἐστιν χωρὶς τοῦ ἐπισκόπου οὕτε βαπτίζειν οὕτε ἀγάπην ποιεῖν. Tertull., *De Baptismo*, c. 17: "Dandi [baptismum] quidem habet ius summus sacerdos, qui est episcopus, dehinc presbyteri et diaconi, non tamen sine episcopi auctoritate."

maintained by St. Cyprian, with the African bishops and the greater part of the East, that the minister of Baptism must be in communion with the Church. They rejected Baptism performed by a heretic as invalid. The tradition, however, has prevailed that any person, of any opinion or condition whatsoever, can minister true Baptism, the appointed action being duly observed according to the institution of Christ.

Confirmation is the ritual complement of Baptism.¹ Its effect, which is commonly described as the gift of the Holy Ghost, does not differ essentially from that of Baptism, being the extension and completion of the gift of new life then bestowed. About the matter of Confirmation there are two opinions. It is either Imposition of hands, or the sacred Chrism, an unguent compounded of oil and balsam. We read of the Apostles laying their hands on the baptized for the gift of the Holy Ghost. St. Cyprian calls baptism and the imposition of hands the two sacraments by which men are sanctified and made the sons of God.² On the other hand it can hardly be doubted that unction was in common use for the initiation of Christians in the time of the Apostles. They allude to it in exactly the same way as to the washing of Baptism. "He that anointed us is God," says St. Paul. "The anointing which ye received of him," says St. John, "abideth in you." This may possibly

¹ Hence the name. In the Roman *Ordines* of the eighth century *confirmare aliquem* is to minister the chalice, completing the rite of Communion.

² Acts viii. 17 ; xix. 6. Cypr., *Ep.* 72 : "Parum sit eis manus imponere ad accipiendum Spiritum sanctum, nisi accipiant et ecclesiae baptismum. Tunc enim demum plene sanctificari et esse filii Dei possunt, si sacramento utroque nascentur" (Hartel, p. 775). Nemosianus spoke in the same terms at the council of Carthage on rebaptism (*ibid.*, p. 439).

refer to a preliminary anointing such as was afterwards used in making catechumens, which is not reckoned a sacrament in the narrower sense.¹ But Tertullian mentions both the unction and the imposition of hands following immediately on Baptism, and by later writers the two ceremonies are frequently thus coupled. Of the eighty-seven bishops who gave their judgments in St. Cyprian's council at Carthage on the question of heretical baptism, no one mentions unction, while many refer to the imposition of hands; but in the letter issued by some of them after the council they speak of the chrism after Baptism as necessary, that a man may have in him the grace of Christ. In later years the opinion that chrism is the matter of the Sacrament so far prevailed that the imposition of hands ceased entirely in the East, and partly in the West. Eugenius IV. at the council of Florence instructed the Armenians that Confirmation by chrism had been substituted for the apostolic imposition of hands, but his statement has no value as a tradition. The conclusion seems imperative that either matter is sufficient. Confirmation is ministered by a Bishop, either mediately, as in the East, through the chrism which he has consecrated, or immediately by his own hand, as with rare exceptions in the West.²

The Sacrament of *Penance* is a formal exercise of the

¹ 2 Cor. i. 21; 1 Johu ii. 20, 27. Compare 1 Cor. vi. 11; Eph. v. 26; Heb. x. 22.

² Tertull., *De Baptismo*, c. 7, 8. Cypr., *Ep.* 70 (Hartel, p. 768): "Ungi quoque necesse est eum qui baptizatus est, ut accepto chrismate id est unctione esse unctus Dei et habere in se gratiam Christi possit." Eugen. IV., *Decr. ad Armenos*: "Loco autem illius manus impositionis, datur in ecclesia confirmatio." This, like the rest of his teaching about the Sacraments, is drawn from the *Opusculum quartum* of St. Thomas Aquinas.

power given by the Lord to the Church in the words, "Whose soever sins ye forgive, they are forgiven unto them." It is doubtful how far in the first age this was distinguished in practice from the penitential discipline by which the Christian Society excludes notorious evil-doers from its privileges, and restores them to the peace of the Church on repentance. As in Baptism there is the double effect of cleansing the soul from sin and of incorporating the baptized in the society of the Church, so a ritual act of penance may at once relieve the soul of guilt and restore the penitent to his place among the faithful. But sins which do not involve notorious exclusion from Christian communion may still be treated by the Sacrament of Penance. Penitential discipline may be varied by the Church. It has been varied from the extreme of severity to the extreme of laxity ; but this does not alter the effect of sin upon the spiritual condition of the soul, or the burden upon the conscience of the sinner. We have considered this in dealing with the doctrine of Eternal Life. It may suffice to say here that what was done in Baptism is restored in Penance, in both cases alike, as St. Ambrose says, by the ministry of man, with the same sacramental efficacy. The Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins, and he has continued his mission by leaving power to his Church to absolve all sinners who truly repent. The promise of assured pardon is to those who confess their sins, and in the language of the New Testament confession never means anything else but open acknowledgment before men. The word of absolution can be pronounced upon such confession, whether it be made publicly in the presence of the Church, or more privately before a single minister of the Church. The practice of the whole Church for many centuries approves

the latter course, the information given by such confession being the most inviolable secret.¹

The distinction of matter and form is not easily adapted to this Sacrament. In earlier days the imposition of hands had a place in Penance which might seem to point to it as the matter; but this ceremony is not retained, and it was possibly connected only with the public reconciliation of the penitent. It is sometimes held that the sins confessed, or the contrition expressed by the penitent, should be regarded as the matter; but this only serves to show how slight is the importance of the scholastic theory of matter and form. The Sacrament is complete when the contrite confession of the sinner is made, with purpose of amendment or satisfaction, and the word of absolution is pronounced.

The minister of the Sacrament is a priest, whether bishop or presbyter, who is subject in ordinary cases to certain restrictions due to the connection of this Sacrament with the social discipline of the Church. Under certain conditions St. Cyprian allowed a deacon to receive a confession and to absolve a penitent in imminent danger of death, but this was by virtue of the extraordinary prerogative allowed to the martyrs in that age. St. Thomas Aquinas and other mediaeval authors held that in peril of death a man ought to confess even to a layman, if a priest were not procurable, but they did not suppose the Sacrament to be complete in such a case.²

¹ Matt. ix. 6; John xx. 21-23; I John i. 9. Ambrose, *De Paenit.*, i. 8: "In baptismo utique remissio peccatorum omnium est. Quid interest utrum per paenitentiam an per lavacrum hoc ius sibi datum sacerdotes vindicent? Unum in utroque mysterium est."

² Cypr., *Ep.*, xviii.: "Occurrendum puto fratribus nostris, ut qui libellos a martyribus acceperunt et praerogativa eorum apud Deum

In the Sacrament of the *Lord's Supper* the Body and Blood of Christ are continually offered as the Sacrifice of the New Testament, and are given to the faithful as their spiritual food and a means of union with the Lord. "He that eateth my Flesh," he said, "and drinketh my Blood, abideth in me, and I in him." The matter of this Sacrament is bread and wine, as used by the Lord in the institution at his last Passover. The form is a prayer of blessing, including the words of Christ, *This is my Body, This is my Blood*. The minister is a priest, whether bishop or presbyter, who repeats the action of the Lord, according to the command, *Do this in remembrance of me*. The Lord declared that what he gave to his disciples was his Body, his Blood; and upon this simple statement of fact depends the true doctrine of the Sacrament. He had formerly said, "Except ye eat the Flesh of the Son of Man and drink his Blood, ye have not life in yourselves." Doubters had asked, "How can this man give us his flesh to eat?" There was no answer until at the Paschal supper the Lord said, "Take, eat: this is my Body."¹ Bread and wine were thus appointed to be the signs or figures of the Body and the Blood. But we must observe that our Lord did not call *bread* his Body or *wine* his Blood. He said, "This—which I give you to eat—is my Body." "This Cup—this which I give you to drink—is my Blood." The bread and wine were by his word of power become his Body and Blood. "The seeming bread," says St. Cyril of Jerusalem, "is not bread, though sensible to the adiuvari possunt . . . si presbyter repertus non fuerit et urgere exitus coeperit, apud diaconum quoque exomologesin facere delicti sui possint, ut manu eis in paenitentiam imposita veniant ad Dominum cum pace quam dari martyres litteris ad nos factis desideraverunt." *Sum. Theol.*, Suppl. 8. 2.

¹ John vi. 51-56; Matt. xxvi. 26-28; Mark xiv. 22-24; Luke xxii. 19, 20; I Cor. xi. 23-25.

taste, but the Body of Christ; and the seeming wine is not wine, though the taste would have it so, but the Blood of Christ." The signs, indeed, remain in their proper reality; the object of sense, the *species corporalis*, as St. Augustine calls it, is unaltered; the sacramental change concerns that which is invisible, the object of the understanding and of faith.¹ The Sacrament may still be called improperly *bread*, as having all the sensible nature of bread, and also as being indeed the Bread of Life. "It is no longer ordinary bread," says St. Irenaeus, implying that in some sense it is bread. "Seeing there is One Bread," says St. Paul, "we who are many are one body, for we all partake of the One Bread." In a mystery so great we can but accept the Word of Revelation. Complicated theological questions are raised about it; but the truth is simple. We are not to empty it of meaning by elaborate refinements, nor to explain away a clear statement of fact as figurative and hyperbolic. We have but to believe, to adore, and to receive.²

The Sacrament of *Ordination* is the rite by which men are admitted to the sacred Ministry of the Church. Opinion varies about the manner in which the powers of the Ministry were conferred on the Apostles—whether they were given directly by the Lord himself, or promised by him and definitely conveyed by the Pentecostal outpouring of the Holy Ghost. The Seven were appointed by the Apostles with imposition of hands and prayer. There is no express mention in the books of the New Testament of the mode in which presbyters were ordained; but St. Paul speaks twice to Timothy of the

¹ See Note O.

² Iren., iv. 8, οὐκέτι κοινὸς ἕστος ἐστίν. I Cor. x. 17. I adopt the only rendering of this difficult text which seems to give an intelligible sense, that of the Revisers' Margin.

charisma or gift of God that was in him by imposition of hands, and this gift is clearly connected with the apostolic ministry which he exercised. This scanty evidence accords with the known practice of the Jewish Church to appoint rulers and teachers by imposition of hands, the origin of which was referred to the consecration of Joshua by Moses. It is confirmed by the continuous practice of the Christian Church.¹ Ordination is therefore a solemn rite with an appropriate ceremony. It is not on that account alone a Sacrament in the narrower sense. The *charisma* so bestowed is, indeed, a spiritual endowment. The Ephesine presbyters were created, as St. Paul told them, by the Holy Ghost. But this *charisma* can be distinguished from sanctifying grace. True, but in the Christian Church there is no room for a merely external or ritual consecration of men for a sacred office. Ordination, says Jeremy Taylor, is the sanctification of the person in the two senses, that he is separated for certain mysterious actions of religion, and also endowed with gifts that make for holiness. "They who are honoured with so great a grace as to be called to officiate in holy and useful ministries, have need also of other graces to make them persons holy in habit and disposition as well as holy in calling. . . . And therefore Ordination is a collation of holy graces of sanctification." It thus comes under the narrower definition of a Sacrament. The ordinary matter of this Sacrament is imposition of hands, but there are some grounds for supposing that any other fitting ceremony

¹ Acts vi. 6 ; 1 Tim. iv. 14 ; 2 Tim. i. 6 ; Numb. xxvii. 18, 23 ; Deut. xxxiv. 9. It is not clear that in 1 Tim. v. 22 there is a reference to ordination ; the words would seem more applicable to imposition of hands in penance. In Acts xiv. 23 the word *χειροτονήσαντες* does not necessarily imply imposition of hands.

might be substituted by the authority of the Church. The form is the prayer of blessing by which the grace of the Ministry is called down upon the subject. The Minister is a Bishop, as shown above in the section on the Organization of the Church.¹

Marriage is the only one of the seven which is expressly called a Sacrament in Holy Scripture, and that in a sense which is far from clear. It is the rite by which a Christian man and woman are made *one flesh*. Here, as in the case of Penance, the distinction of matter and form applies very imperfectly if at all. It is universally agreed that the Sacrament is complete when the man and the woman have openly before witnesses by word of mouth taken each other for husband and wife. They are themselves, therefore, the Ministers of the Sacrament. The priest intervenes only to witness the agreement and to bless the union. The contract may in one sense be fairly regarded as the matter of the Sacrament, for this contract belongs to the natural state of man. It is therefore subject to natural and to positive human law, and cannot be validly made except as allowed by such law. Not all parties can marry; but when a Christian man and a Christian woman lawfully enter into this contract, it is at once raised from its natural origin to a supernatural power. The grace conveyed by marriage, if used aright, is the abatement of concupiscence, indicated by St. Paul when he says, "It is better to marry than to burn."²

¹ Acts xx. 28. For Taylor, see Note P. In the *Revue Anglo-romaine*, vol. i. p. 193, I have given reasons for thinking that the Bishops of Rome and Alexandria were at one time consecrated by imposition not of hands but of the Gospels. Cp. Moberly, *Ministerial Priesthood*, p. 306. Nor is the opinion of mediaeval theologians about ordination *per traditionem instrumentorum* to be lightly disregarded.

² Eph. v. 32; 1 Cor. vii. 9.

The Sacrament of *Unction* is the rite enjoined by St. James: "Is any among you sick? Let him call for the presbyters of the Church; and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord; and the prayer of faith shall save him that is sick, and the Lord shall raise him up; and if he have committed sins, it shall be forgiven him." This direction is too clear to leave any room for controversy, except in regard to the saving and raising up which is promised. It would be natural to refer this to bodily healing, especially in view of the statement of St. Mark that the Apostles, on their first mission, anointed with oil many that were sick and healed them. But against this we have to set the fact that such powers of miraculous healing were not given generally to the Church or its ministers. St. Paul says expressly that all had not the gifts of healing. But St. James directs this anointing to be done ordinarily by the ministers of the Church in their ministerial capacity. The promise, therefore, concerns ordinary and universal gifts, and such are only the gifts of supernatural grace. A prayer for bodily healing would doubtless be conjoined with the unction, as the practice of the Church has always required; but the sacramental effect, which is promised, is the spiritual strengthening of the sufferer against the perils which accompany the approach of death, and that putting away of sin which is inseparable from the work of sanctifying grace. The Minister of the Sacrament is a priest, whether bishop or presbyter. The liturgical blessing of the oil by the Bishop, required by the Latin Church, is a very ancient ecclesiastical custom, but is not essential, and is unknown in the Eastern Church.¹

There remain two points to consider in the doctrine of the Sacraments.

¹ Jas. v. 14, 15; Mark vi. 13; 1 Cor. xii. 9, 30. See Note Q.

Four out of the seven serve to bring the recipient into a certain state of life. Baptism and Confirmation initiate him into the Christian covenant; Ordination advances him to a grade of the sacred ministry; Marriage is entrance upon a joint life and conversation. Their effect is therefore abiding. Baptism, Confirmation, and Ordination are said by theologians to impress a *character* or mark, which is indelible. What is done in Baptism and Confirmation cannot be undone, and therefore the act cannot be repeated. The baptized is irrevocably joined to the Church, from which he can never be wholly separated. He may be deprived of certain privileges attaching to membership in the Church, but he may recover these by penance. If at the time of reception his disposition is such as to frustrate the sanctifying effect of the grace given, the effect is nevertheless not dispersed, but stored up for future working. The same is true of Ordination. A bishop, a presbyter, or a deacon may by the discipline of the Church be denied the exercise of his office, but his ordination cannot be annulled. The most solemn deposition or degradation takes away only his lawful right of ministering. In a less degree Marriage has a like effect, dissolved only by death. The operation of the contract may be suspended, either by the fault of one party, or by mutual consent, according to St. Paul's ruling, for reasons of devotion; but while both live, neither can marry afresh.¹ No marriage can be annulled, unless there

¹ 1 Cor. vii. 5, 11, 39. The exceptional case treated in ver. 15 is that of a marriage contracted by unbelievers, one of whom is afterwards converted. St. Paul's rule is that if the party who remains unbaptized then dissolves the marriage the dissolution is effective, but he will not allow the baptized party so to act (vers. 12-14). His ruling shows that Christian marriage acquires

appear some flaw in the original contract, which shows that no valid union has existed.

Our last point for consideration is the necessity of the Sacraments. Of Baptism the Lord Jesus Christ has said unmistakably, "Except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven." Baptism is therefore generally necessary to salvation. Of the gift bestowed in the Lord's Supper he said with the same clearness, "Except ye eat the Flesh of the Son of Man and drink his Blood, ye have not life in yourselves." Here the same necessity is indicated; but the sacramental mode of eating is not expressly mentioned, and the words may have a wider significance. A necessity less absolute than in the case of Baptism is acknowledged by the practice of the Church; otherwise the ancient custom of giving the Holy Communion to infants, still retained in the East, would not have been abandoned by the greater part of Christendom. A still lower degree of necessity attaches to the other Sacraments. Marriage is necessary, as St. Paul intimates, for some persons. Ordination is necessary for the well-being and the due administration of the Church. Penance is necessary for the restoration of the lapsed, at least in extreme cases. Confirmation is required by the discipline of the Church for the ordinary approach to the higher mysteries. To Unction there attaches no necessity at all; but the neglect of this Sacrament in the English Church is unaccountable.¹

In all cases alike the necessity is relative. The two great Sacraments are generally necessary to salvation, it has been said, "when they may be had." The Church its indissoluble character from the baptism of the two parties. So Innocent III. in *Decr.* iv. tit. 19, c. 7.

¹ John iii. 5; vi. 53; 1 Cor. vii. 37.

has always recognized what is called the *baptism of desire*, where a believer by no fault of his own has been denied access to the font. When Innocent III. was consulted about a priest who after his death was discovered to have passed his whole life unwittingly without Baptism, he replied unhesitatingly that such a man had the grace and fruit of the Sacrament. The answer applies to all cases where a man is in good faith persuaded that he has received a valid Sacrament. The Sacraments are necessary only in relation to the voluntary action of man; he may not hope for the effect if he wilfully or carelessly remove the cause. Desiring the grace of God, he is bound to use the means appointed. God is not bound. As the wind bloweth where it listeth, so is the operation of the Spirit free in the bestowal of grace.¹

¹ Nicholson, *Exposition of the Catechism*, p. 151, ed. 1842. Innoc. III., in *Decr.* iii. tit. 43, c. 2: "Presbyterum, quem sine unda baptismatis extremum diem clausisse litoris tuis significasti, quia in sanctae matris Ecclesiae fide et Christi nominis confessione perseveravit, ab originali peccato solutum, et caelestis patriae gaudium esse adeptum, ex auctoritate sanctorum Patrum Augustini atqui Ambrosii asserimus incunctanter."

CHAPTER V

CONCERNING PRACTICAL RELIGION

SECT. I.—*Conscience*

RELIGION is the voluntary submission of human actions to the control of a higher Power. In the language of the New Testament the Christian Religion is usually described as the service of God. The strongest possible word is used. Christians are bond-servants, slaves; that is to say, their wills, their souls and bodies, are not their own; they are bought with a price. But they enter into this servitude and continue in it by an act of their own will. The Christian ideal is to be free, not using freedom for a cloak of wickedness, but as a bond-servant of God.¹

The first thing needed for service of this kind is to know the will of the Master. The knowledge of God, whether attained by nature or by revelation, is the groundwork of religion. But for this purpose a purely objective knowledge is not sufficient. To be religious

¹ 1 Cor. vi. 20; 1 Pet. ii. 16. The word *religion* is badly used in the English Bible. In Acts xxvi. 5, it stands for *θηρησκεία*, the formal observance of rule; in Gal. i. 13, 14, *Ἰουδαϊσμός* is merely the Jewish polity (cf. 2 Macc. ii. 21); in Jas. i. 26, *θρησκός* probably means an observer of ceremonies, and such is his *θηρησκεία*, while in the next verse *θηρησκεία* seems to be used with a touch of irony. The word *religion* occurs nowhere else.

a man must have this knowledge subjectively in relation to himself. He must begin with the question that rose to the lips of St. Paul at the moment of his conversion: "What shall I do, Lord?" Knowledge of this kind is called by a special name, *Conscience*. The idea was common to Greek and Latin thought, and found similar expression in both languages. The Greek word barely made its way into the Septuagint rendering of the Old Testament; it does not occur in the Gospels, but is frequent in the Epistles of the New Testament.¹

The Apostles build then upon a current idea, the exact nature of which we must ascertain. It starts from the notion of acquaintance with the actions of another. To be conscious of him is to share his knowledge of what he is doing, to be privy to his designs, the word being used more especially of a guilty knowledge which makes a man accessory to crime. From this we pass to a like knowledge of one's own guilt; and here the specific sense of the word begins. To be conscious, in this sense, is to know oneself to be guilty, or inversely to know oneself to be innocent. *Mens sibi conscia recti* is so written by Vergil, while the Horatian phrase *nil conscire sibi* shows how the word, used absolutely, points rather to consciousness of wrong. So St. Paul writes, "I am conscious of nothing." He speaks of men who are "branded in their own conscience as with a hot iron," the knowledge of their guilt being ineffaceably impressed on them. He speaks of the testimony of his conscience to his own purity of motive. There is a "conscience

¹ The verb *συνειδέναι*, Lat. *conscire*, or more commonly *consciū esse*, gives the substantive *τὸ συνειδὸς* or *συνείδησις*, Lat. *conscientia*, common from the time of Cicero. The LXX. has the word only in Eccles. x. 20, *καὶ γε ἐν συνειδήσει σου βασιλέα μὴ καταράση*. The reading in John viii. 9 is apparently not genuine.

of sins," which is destroyed by the grace of pardon. The Blood of Christ cleanses the conscience from dead works. There is thus an evil conscience which needs cleansing, and a good or pure conscience, which is the knowledge that sin either has not been done, or has been altogether put away by the sanctifying grace of God.¹

Passing from this use, the word comes to mean the faculty of the mind by which a man reviews his own actions, adjudging them right or wrong. There is a curious tendency to separate this faculty from the other reasoning powers, and to personify it as a being apart from the man himself, praising him or condemning him for what he has done, and consequently controlling him by the anticipation of judgment. This would seem to be what Socrates meant by his familiar demon. The real fact is shrewdly expressed in the well-known line of Menander, which declares that to every man his own conscience stands for God.² The only approach to this in the New Testament is found in St. Paul's words, "my conscience bearing witness with me;" but in the strictly accurate sense of a reasoning faculty the word frequently occurs. Mind and conscience are coupled by St. Paul, as defiled by sin; that is to say, the reasoning faculty which seizes the distinction of right and wrong as objective fact, and the faculty which views the distinction subjectively in relation to self, are alike injured. The pure

¹ 1 Cor. iv. 4; 1 Tim. iv. 2; 2 Cor. i. 12; Heb. ix. 9, 14; x. 2, 22; xiii. 18; Acts xxiii. 1; xxiv. 16; 1 Tim. i. 5, 19; 2 Tim. i. 3.

² Βροτοῖς ἅπασιν ἡ συνείδησις Θεός. The more natural word in this sense is τὸ συνειδός, which is not used in the New Testament. It may be doubted whether *conscientia* is used in this sense by classical writers, but the phrase *salva conscientia* approximates to it.

conscience in which we are to hold the mystery of the faith is a faculty clarified by grace. The meaning of the word is made especially clear in St. Paul's instruction to the Corinthians about the idol-offerings. We have an objective knowledge, he says, that an idol is a mere nothing, the sacrifices before the idol have no significance, the flesh of the victim has no sacramental effect and is merely so much good food. There can therefore be no harm in eating it. "Howbeit in all men there is not that knowledge: but some, being used until now to the idol, eat as of a thing sacrificed to an idol; and their conscience, being weak, is defiled." This weak conscience is a faculty incapable of distinguishing between what is right and what is wrong in the action; unable to dissociate the act of eating from an act of communion with the idol. For this reason Christians were bound to be careful. "For if a man see thee which hast knowledge sitting at meat in an idol's temple, will not his conscience, if he is weak, be emboldened to eat things sacrificed to idols?" That is to say, he will be led to do that which he considers in some measure an act of idolatrous worship. Returning to the subject, and giving the Corinthian Christians practical advice, St. Paul says, "Whatsoever is sold in the shambles, eat, asking no question for conscience sake." It may or may not be the flesh of a sacrifice; they are not to trouble themselves about it, or make it a matter of conscience. "If one of them that believe not biddeth you to a feast, and ye are disposed to go; whatsoever is set before you, eat, asking no question for conscience sake." It is the same advice again. "But if any man say unto you, This hath been offered in sacrifice, eat not, for his sake that showed it, and for conscience sake: conscience, I say, not thine own, but the other's." Now the direction is changed. To the man who says this—

probably a Christian of confused mind—it is matter of conscience ; he regards the flesh subjectively as a means of idolatrous communion ; and the man who knows better is required by the law of charity not to cause him scandal. “ But why,” St. Paul conceives an objector asking, “ is my liberty judged by another conscience ? ” He replies curtly, “ Whether ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God. Give no occasion of stumbling.”¹

To the respect which is due to the weak conscience we shall presently return. Here we must notice that, without passing altogether away from subjectivity, the conscience adjudges a thing right or wrong in the abstract ; right or wrong for another as well as for self. This implies a reference to an external standard. The judgment is not, “ This is wrong because I think it wrong ; ” otherwise I should not be able in my conscience to judge another. The conscience, that is to say, is not a criterion to itself ; it refers to a standard. What is this ? The natural conscience will refer to many standards—public opinion, general utility, or others. Common morality becomes possible only when a common standard is recognized. The Stoic notion of a

¹ Rom. ix. 1 ; Tit. i. 15 ; 1 Tim. iii. 9 ; 1 Cor. viii. 1-10 ; x. 25-32. The last passage admits two varied interpretations. “ For conscience sake ” in vers. 25 and 27 may possibly mean, “ Lest your own conscience be defiled by the knowledge of the fact,” in which case it is advice to those of weak conscience ; but this is improbable in view of what follows. In ver. 29 the question has been taken to mean, “ Why should I use my liberty so as to scandalize another, doing that for which his conscience will condemn me ? ” But this is harsh and obscure, and leaves the further question unexplained, “ Why am I evil spoken of for that for which I give thanks ? ” The interruption of a supposed objector is characteristic of St. Paul’s style.

moral impulse in man, to obey which is virtue, strikes at the root of social existence ; for it makes every man a law to himself. This would be an insufficient foundation for morality even if man were unfallen, abiding still in the excellence of his created nature. That God the Creator made man with an inclination to good is as certain as that he gave him also the power of choosing evil ; and this inclination is not wholly destroyed in fallen man. But the fact that choice is possible and necessary shows that a man is not merely to follow inclination even when it is good. He is to judge. There is no moral sense directly perceiving right as right and wrong as wrong. There is an active faculty of reasoning which discerns between right and wrong, measuring every act by reference to a standard. When this standard is the will of a higher being, the conscience becomes religious. The higher being, real or imaginary, may still be far from supreme ; may be whimsical, arbitrary, fantastic. We then have a degraded form of religion. But if it be to the one supreme God that reference is made, to the Creator by whom all things consist, whose Will is indistinguishable from the perfect good, we then have the one true religion.

A conscience rightly informed is called by St. Peter a conscience of God.¹ It is the conscience of a man who not only acknowledges God objectively as Creator and Judge, but also accepts the Will of God subjectively as the standard by which he discerns good and evil. This, when duly instructed in the doctrine of Jesus Christ, is the Christian conscience. Instructed only by the law of Nature, it is still a conscience of God. The

¹ 1 Pet. ii. 19 ; cp. 1 Cor. viii. 7, τῆ συνειδήσει τοῦ εἰδώλου, which means, if that be the right reading, a conscience governed by the idolatrous idea.

Gentiles, says St. Paul, without any revealed law, "show the work of the Law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness therewith, and their reasonings one with another accusing or else excusing them." By this standard of God's Law a man's conscience judges not only his own actions, but those of others; marks them as right or wrong either absolutely or in relation to circumstances. Such judgment is not to be despised, as if each man had nothing to regard but the conclusions of his own conscience. To the conscience of Christians in general St. Paul, though holding it a very small thing to be judged of men, desired to commend himself.¹ There is indeed no such thing, strictly speaking, as a common conscience, a conscience of the community. The objective standard of right is proposed to the Church, received by the Church, guarded by the public teaching and judgment of the Church: but the subjective judgment is individual; each man for himself measures every action by the standard proposed. To leave this undone; or to accept a judgment ready-made, is to abdicate the function of conscience altogether. At the same time the judgment of many is founded on a broader experience than the judgment of one. We speak of common sense, meaning by this not a corporate judgment of humanity, but the general consent of experienced men. A common conscience of this kind there is; and the Christian who dissents from the common Christian conscience needs justification no less than a man who runs counter to the common sense of mankind.

The weak conscience, we have seen, is a conscience imperfectly informed, and therefore unable to come to a decision. The weakness may be due either to lack of

¹ Rom. ii. 15; 1 Cor. iv. 3; 2 Cor. iv. 2.

knowledge or to lack of judgment. The latter weakness can be remedied by saving grace with diligent exercise of the undeveloped faculty; the lack of knowledge can be supplied only by instruction. But while the conscience remains weak, how does the man stand? They that are strong are forbidden to encourage him by their example to do a thing about which he is doubtful. For him it is wrong. St. Paul has a hard saying here. Dealing with a question near akin to that of the idol-offerings, he says, "He that doubteth is condemned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith; and whatsoever is not of faith is sin." We must not take these last words out of their context, as if they were a proposition universally applicable; but St. Paul does lay down, as a rule of conduct applying to the case before him, the general principle that a man who does a thing about which he doubts whether it be not wrong is acting sinfully.¹

The case, however, must be looked at narrowly. It is a case of a single alternative, to eat or to abstain. The one alternative, to abstain, is certainly not wrong; the other, to eat, is doubtful. A man compelled to choose between the two is bound to take the course which is certainly not wrong. To act without faith, that is to say, without the certitude of being right in the sight of God, when he has the option of doing so, is sin. But this ruling does not directly cover the case of a man who has before him two or more courses, about every one of which he is doubtful whether it be not wrong. How shall he act? If he be shut up to an absolute alternative, as to speak or not to speak, and either course may with equal possibility be wrong, it is clear that in doing what is doubtful he acts under compulsion; and an act done truly under compulsion has no

¹ Rom. xiv. 23.

moral quality at all, good or bad; the doer can be neither condemned nor praised. But such a case must be of the rarest. As a rule one course will be less probably wrong than the other, and probability, as Butler has said, is the guide of life. The man is bound to avoid the course which is more probably wrong.

What is this probability? It is a judgment of the man's conscience, not final and conclusive, but tentative, either because made distrustfully or because based on imperfect evidence. But why is a man bound to act on a judgment so imperfect? The answer is found in the subjectivity of the service which God requires, and of sin which is the denial of that service. "To him," says St. James, "that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin." He has nothing to go by except his own conscience of God, whether weak or strong, ill informed or well instructed. Even if his judgment be altogether wrong, he is bound to act upon it. "I know" says St. Paul, "and am persuaded in the Lord Jesus, that nothing is unclean of itself." There is the objective truth. "But to him who accounteth anything to be unclean, to him it is unclean." There is the subjective judgment, contrary to the objective truth, but nevertheless a judgment on which the man must act.¹

This truth, simple in itself, is confused by the common mistake of personifying the conscience, or treating it as an objective something external to the man, a guide and mentor. If it were such, it were no more excusable to act on a weak conscience than to obey any other faulty adviser. A man beguiled by his conscience would have no more to say than Eve when beguiled by the serpent. On the other hand, if a man were bound to follow a guide external to himself, there would be an end of personal

¹ Jas. iv. 17; Rom. xiv. 14.

responsibility. And worse ; this guide would be set up in a sort of rivalry with the Law of God. Warned by the Law, warned also in a different sense by his conscience, a man would be called upon to obey the latter. Such intolerable consequences follow from St. Paul's teaching if the conscience be personified. But the conscience does not give commands ; it receives them. It is not my conscience that bids me do this or that. God bids me by nature or by revelation ; my conscience accepts the bidding, as my faith or understanding reads it. As I read, so I am bound to act.

A man is not thereupon discharged from all responsibility. He is responsible for the exercise of every faculty that he has, whether faith or understanding or conscience. If he misread the standard, or if he falter in applying it to his own actions, he must answer for this. But there is a difference in the degree of responsibility. If a man run counter to the objective rule of right, he will suffer. If he run counter to his own subjective knowledge of it, however imperfect, he is a worse offender. The distinction is drawn by the Lord himself: "That servant which knew his lord's will, and made not ready, nor did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes ; but he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes."¹

The Conscience, then, is the faculty by which a man applies the Will of God, so far as he knows it, to the control of his own actions. He is bound to use this faculty as he best can. This done, he is bound to act on the result. Religion is that subjective obedience, the joyful recognition of oneself as a bond-servant of God.

¹ Luke xii. 47, 48.

SECT. II.—*Duty*

What the conscience lays hold of is duty. Duty is first conceived as a debt owed to another. A man owes to his parents some return for the life they have given, and for the care they have bestowed upon him from infancy. He owes to society some return for the protection always extended to him, for the bare possibility as well as for the attainment of true human life. Natural and civic duties rest on this foundation. But ultimately he owes life and being to God the Creator; his only possible repayment of this debt is to be what God wills him to be and to do what God wills him to do. This lays upon him an obligation which is religious duty.

Every such duty becomes imperative when it is sufficiently proposed to the conscience. The conscience does not create the obligation; the man does not take it upon himself; it is laid upon him by the facts of his being. When the duty is presented to the conscience it becomes a moral law, obedience to which is indeed voluntary, in the sense that disobedience remains possible, but is none the less a debt. We glorify God by doing his will, because we are thus fulfilling his creative work; but we do not add anything of our own. "When ye shall have done all the things that are commanded you," said the Lord, "say, We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which it was our duty to do."¹

Religious duty is the obligation laid upon man to do what God wills him to do, to be what God wills him to be. Duty, in the ordinary sense of the word, is concerned with doing; the duty of being involves deeper considerations.

¹ Luke xvii. 10.

“Ye received of us,” writes St. Paul to the Thessalonians, “how ye ought to walk and to please God.” He had given them a rule of conduct, and this in the form of a charge laid upon them in the name of the Lord Jesus. The specific charge was very simple; it was to abstain from fornication. This was not to be the whole of their morality; it was a formal addition to that standard of right which they had already acknowledged. They were not to give way to the passion of lust “as the Gentiles which know not God.” There was in these people a solid foundation of morals; there was no need to write to them of brotherly love. Regarding this they were themselves taught of God, by the natural law, as St. Paul says elsewhere, written upon their hearts. Christian morality was to be raised on this foundation by the proposal to the conscience of additional duties, which had not hitherto been recognized. For a beginning there was proposed a restraint of that indulgence of carnal desire in which the general conscience of paganism saw no harm.¹

The revelation of the moral law proceeded uniformly after the manner thus indicated by St. Paul. There is a traditional morality, the roots of which are lost in the past, which may be derived from some primordial revelation, or may be the result only of human experience, the transmission of accumulated judgments upon the natural indications of God’s will. It varies within wide limits, being sometimes grotesquely perverted, sometimes attaining to singular nobility. There is no evidence of continued progress in the way either of improvement or of degeneration. The accepted standard fluctuates, perversion in one respect going hand in hand with improvement in other respects. But a standard of some kind,

¹ 1 Thess. iv. 1-9.

however degraded, every community of men does accept. There is always something which ought or ought not to be done; some rule which is imposed not by inclination or by a calculation of advantage, but by a categorical imperative. It is decreed, without appeal, that such a thing ought not to be done. By what authority it is so ruled may not be at all clear; fantastic notions on the subject may prevail; but the fact is incontestable. Such is natural morality, which, however degraded, Christian doctrine refers ultimately to God, as the Author of nature.

Upon this natural morality supervened the revelation of God's will given by the Law and the Prophets. It was gradual and very slow. The Word of the Lord was precept upon precept, line upon line. Many things were permitted, some things were even commanded, because of the hardness of men's hearts. But even those rules of the Mosaic Law which seem to us most harsh were a softening of the accepted standard. The law of retaliation—an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth—was a mitigation of the ferocity of revenge, limiting punishment by the measure of the wrong committed. Acts again are related with complacency in the books of the Old Testament, or even praised by the witness of prophecy, which according to our standard are cruel and abominable. They are allowed because not contravening the will of God so far as it was then revealed; they are praised because done with a single eye to the service of God as it was then conceived. When Jehu treacherously slays the sons of Ahab and the Baal-worshippers in Samaria, his zeal for the Lord is commended; the act is praiseworthy as an attempt to root out evil by methods in which the conscience of the actor saw no wrong. When Saul spares Agag and the spoil of the Amalekites, he is condemned, not for his clemency, but for indifference to the service

of God and to the standard which in his conscience he accepted. We shall be disappointed if we look to the pages of the Old Testament for evidence of any great advance upon traditional morality. In some respects we shall find the standard there set lower than that which contemporary nations among the Gentiles approved. The one great moral truth taught by the Law and the Prophets was the reference of all actions to the judgment of the one supreme God. His will is the only measure of right; all men alike are bound, by virtue of their creation, to submit themselves to his pleasure, to learn his will so far as it may be ascertained, and according as they know it so to act.

This broad conception of the service of God was overlaid in later Judaism by a minutely particular code of duties, the work of scribes and lawyers. The careful ordering of life by rules drawn inferentially from the Law might seem to be a safeguard for the idea of duty. In effect there was a very different result, to which two causes contributed. The minute and burdensome rules that were laid on men required a close scrutiny to secure their observance; to obey them all was the utmost that a man could do; he was compelled to interpret them narrowly, and the result was the development of that sort of scrupulous conscience which finds, without intentional seeking, every possible evasion of a command. The idea of duty is ruined when it becomes a matter of course to shirk. It was ruined yet more in Judaism by the conception of merit. As the requirements of the traditional law grew more complex, it became practically impossible for an ordinary man to fulfil them. A halting performance was therefore regarded as sufficient, no man being bound to the impossible. There was then brought in the conception of gaining merit, which is characteristic

of the ethical systems of the East. The performance of a hard task in the way of religious observance meant so much put down to the credit of the doer, which the justice of God would repay him at some future settlement. Religion is thus made a matter not of obligation but of calculation; a man successful in this traffic, far from regarding himself as debtor to God, owing himself and all that he can do, is led to consider God as debtor to himself, owing him a covenanted recompense for the service he has done. Up to a certain point he owes God service; beyond that point he begins to accumulate a balance of merit in his favour. The conception of duty is gone.

The teaching of the Lord Jesus Christ was directed against these perversions of the truth. He did not directly assail the accepted code of minute regulations. That would have been to destroy the foundation of morality. He indirectly assailed the spirit of it by sometimes disregarding rules of small importance, such as those of the prescribed washings. Rules which violated the real purpose of the Divine Law, like those of sabbath-keeping, he openly set at naught. Refinements of casuistry which enabled the falsely scrupulous to evade the plain meaning of the Law, as in the famous case of *Corban*, he indignantly condemned: "Full well do ye reject the commandment of God that ye may keep your tradition." The doctrine of merit, the doing of service with an eye to reward, the calculation of much and little, he swept away by teaching the infinity of obligation. When all has been done we are still unprofitable servants; we can do no more than our bare duty. The servant's hire is not indeed withheld; no good work, however hidden, shall lose its reward: "thy Father which seeth in secret shall recompense thee." But this reward is declared by

the parable of the labourers to be of the free bounty of God, who gives liberally to all that serve him freely, not measuring the recompense to the work, but to the ready mind. Men are to lay up for themselves treasures in heaven, but the reason is that where the treasure is stored there will the heart be also. Self-seeking means the loss of all. He that would save his soul for his own sake will lose it; he that shall find is the man who would lose even his own soul for the Lord's sake.¹

The Christian religion is founded on this lofty conception of service and duty. It condemns on the other hand that kind of asceticism which so absorbs all energies into the service of God as to leave no freedom for the service of man. It is the religion not of individual souls, but of a society intended to embrace all mankind. Christian duty is therefore intimately concerned with social relations. There are individual duties; but they are concerned rather with being than with doing. The man is bound to be in himself what God would have him be; and yet even here he does not escape from society, for social relations determine his being what he is or his becoming what he becomes. His doing is still more predominantly social. Nothing which he does concerns himself alone. There are two main commandments, which set forth a man's duty towards God and his duty towards his neighbour. But these are not two separable duties, so that a man should be able to do the one and leave the other undone. The Will of God declared by these commandments is a perfect unity; one, as the Divine Nature is one; and therefore, as St. James says, he who stumbles in one point is guilty of an offence against the Law taken as a whole. It is not only that he

¹ Matt. vi. 18-20; xii. 1-8; xvi. 25; xx. 1-16; Mark vii. 1-9; Luke xi. 38; xvii. 10, 33.

who loves God is commanded to love his brother also ; he who pretends to be loving God while hating his brother is a liar. So St. John puts it sternly and abruptly. Such religion is not merely defective ; it has no positive reality at all ; “for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, cannot love God whom he hath not seen.”¹

Such a duty therefore as that of worshipping God is not merely individual, and is not fulfilled by any individual action. Christian worship is common worship, the act of the whole society. The two or three who are gathered together in the Name of Christ worship not by themselves apart, but in the unity of the Name. An individual Christian can worship God acceptably in isolation, but his worship is acceptable by virtue of his habitual union with his fellows in the Body of Christ. Those who deliberately forsake the assembling of themselves together forfeit the right of worship, the access to God which is through the veil of the Flesh of Christ. Nor is this common assembly for worship merely a matter of convenience. It is the outward sign of a spiritual unity and concord which is necessary to perfect Christian worship. St. Paul mingles together exhortations about public worship and mutual benevolence so as to make them seem one united action. We are severally members one of another, with differing gifts of grace :—ministering, teaching, exhorting ; love, joy, fervour, hospitality, almsgiving ; all are conjoined. The almsgiving from church to church which he commanded “not only filleth up the measure of the wants of the saints, but aboundeth also through many thanksgivings unto God.” The intense liturgical teaching of the Epistle to the Hebrews includes the same rule : “Through him let

¹ Jas. ii. 10 ; 1 John iv. 20, 21.

us offer up a sacrifice of praise to God continually, that is, the fruit of lips which make confession to his name ; but to do good and to communicate forget not : for with such sacrifices God is well pleased." We cannot serve God aright without simultaneously serving man.¹

On the other hand the duty of a Christian to his fellow-men is a part of what he owes to God. St. James declares the incongruity of the same mouth blessing God and cursing men, which are made after the likeness of God. The teaching is not new ; it is ancient as the Noachian precepts, where manslaughter—more especially, no doubt, sacrificial slaughter—is forbidden expressly on the ground that man is made in the image of God. But this obscure and limited commandment draws a new meaning from the solidarity of mankind in the Incarnate Son. Every man, as redeemed, has a new relation to God, and a new sanctity. An injury done to him is a wrong done to the Son of Man. The ground on which St. Paul insists on the consideration due to the weak in conscience is the fact that he is a brother for whom Christ died. The ground for doing alms in secret is that, all being done rather for God than for man, a reward may be expected from God alone. "Whatsoever ye do," writes St. Paul, "work heartily, as unto the Lord, and not unto men ; knowing that from the Lord ye shall receive the recompense of the inheritance : ye serve the Lord Christ."²

The social character of Christian duty lends importance to the far-reaching precept : "Obey them that have the rule over you." The Apostles were peremptory in

¹ Matt. xviii. 20 ; Rom. xii. 5-13 ; 2 Cor. ix. 12 ; Heb. x. 20, 25 ; xiii. 15, 16.

² Jas. iii. 9 ; Gen. ix. 6 ; Matt. vi. 1 ; Rom. xiv. 15 ; 1 Cor. viii. 11 ; Col. iii. 23, 24.

demanding this obedience. "If any man obeyeth not our word by this epistle," wrote St. Paul to the Thessalonians, "note that man, that ye have no company with him, to the end that he may be ashamed." There is an authority in the Church that must be obeyed. It is the authority of the Lord himself, according to his word, "He that heareth you heareth me, and he that rejecteth you rejecteth me." There is indeed no other source for any real authority. The magistrate is equally to be obeyed as God's minister; to be obeyed not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake. The decrees and ordinances of a recognized authority in Church or in State have a Divine sanction; obedience is a matter of Christian duty.¹

But here is a question. St. Paul contrasted the freedom of the Gospel with the old Law that was contained in *dogmata* or ordinances. "If ye died with Christ from the rudiments of the world, why, as though living in the world, do ye subject yourselves to ordinances, Handle not, nor taste, nor touch, after the precepts and doctrines of men?" The rules of the Old Testament are in similar language put on one side in the Epistle to the Hebrews as merely decrees of the flesh concerning meats and drinks and washings. But if obedience be a Christian duty, why are these rules so disparaged and set in contrast with the Christian dispensation? The question becomes the more urgent when we find St. Paul himself delivering the *dogmata* of the Apostles and Elders to be kept by the churches of Galatia, and remember that these *dogmata* enjoined abstinence from blood and from things strangled. Where is the difference

¹ Heb. xiii. 17; 2 Thess. iii. 14; Luke x. 16; Rom. xiii. 1-6; 1 Pet. ii. 13, where *κρίσις* apparently means an *institution* by reference to the primary sense of *κρίσις*.

between such ordinances and those of the Old Testament? ¹

The difference lies in the purpose. There is a well-known distinction between things wrong in themselves and things wrong because forbidden. In both cases alike the wrong consists in opposition to the Will of God ; but in the latter case the opposition is to an expression of God's Will conditioned by human circumstances. An act is forbidden, either by God himself or by those having authority from him, with reference to a mediate end, distinct from that union with God which is the ultimate end of man. To confuse the ends will be to miss the purpose of the prohibition, and so to confound the Divine order. This was done when the teachers of Judaism treated the distinction of clean and unclean as a distinction in the nature of things, or when they counted a man righteous for his observance of the legal precepts taken in themselves. Such obscuring of the Divine purpose was so essentially immoral that St. Paul found it necessary even to condemn the doing of things commanded by the Law, because of the danger of misconception. To be circumcised and to keep the sabbath were things indifferent in themselves, commanded by the Law of the Old Testament, and certainly not contrary to the Gospel ; yet when the Galatians took them for things good and necessary in themselves, he peremptorily forbade them. They were good only so far as done by way of obedience or in reference to a mediate end. ²

An ordinance of man, whether ecclesiastical or civil, is

¹ Col. ii. 20-22. The force of the middle *δογματίζεσθε* should be observed. He who imposes *δόγματα* upon himself is acting not in obedience to authority, but from a conviction of their natural inherent obligation. Heb. ix. 10, *δικαιώματα σαρκός* ; Acts xv. 29 ; xvi. 4.

² Gal. iv. 9-11 ; v. 2-4.

to be obeyed for the sake of obedience. There is however a limit to this obedience. "Whether it be right in the sight of God," said the Apostles before the Sanhedrin, "to hearken unto you rather than unto God, judge ye."¹ The answer is self-evident. Have we then here a conflict of duties? To suppose this possible is to overthrow the conception of duty; for all duty must be ultimately resolved into the obligation to do the Will of God; and a conflict of duties would therefore mean that in God there is yea and nay. The apparent contradiction is solved by observing that no ordinance of man is to be obeyed for any virtue inherent in itself. It is of value only as an expression, more or less imperfect, of the Will of God. In ordinary cases it is an expression sufficient to command obedience. But where there is an expression clearer and more imperative, that is to be followed. Between this and that expression the conscience must judge, and the individual man must be responsible for the judgment. From this there is no escape. But though the apprehension of the fact depends on the individual, the fact in itself does not. There is at every moment for every man one duty only. However general a law may be, the incidence of law as constituting duty is individual. Duty is for me what God wills me now to do. In this Will there can be no contradiction.

Holding in synthesis the general law and the individual incidence of duty, the objective reality of obligation and the mass of conflicting indications from which it has to be discerned, we shall be able to understand the distinction drawn between a Precept of the Gospel and a Counsel of Perfection. Great harm is done to religion if the distinction is supposed to lie between precepts that are binding and counsels which a man may with equal

¹ Acts iv. 19.

right follow or neglect. To treat the Counsels in this way is faulty not only because it implies that a man is not bound to follow after perfection, but also because it removes them from the category of duty altogether, and thus empties of meaning some of the most impressive sayings of the Lord Jesus. When he bade the rich man, "Go, sell that thou hast, and give to the poor : and come, follow me," he was not pointing out a more expeditious way to perfection, which might be taken or left at pleasure ; he was imposing a duty. When he said to his disciples, " Resist not him that is evil : but whosoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also ; and if any man would go to law with thee, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke also ; and whosoever shall compel thee to go one mile, go with him twain ; give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away ;" he was not pointing to a way of renunciation that was open to them but by which they were not bound to walk ; he was formally amending the laws of his kingdom, appointing a direct substitute for the older law of retaliation.¹

What then ? The distinction is perhaps valid if we understand by a Precept that which is always and equally applicable under all conditions, by a Counsel that which is addressed to particular persons or, if general, is subject to condition. The two supreme commandments, to love God and to love one's neighbour, summarize all Precepts, which do but expand these in detail or prohibit actions which are necessarily and inherently opposed to them. A Counsel is a direction how to fulfil these commandments in the varying circumstances of life. It is that which is promised by the prophet : "Thine ears shall hear a word behind thee, saying, This is the way, walk

¹ Matt. xix. 21 ; v. 39-42.

ye in it, when ye turn to the right hand, and when ye turn to the left." But the man who receives such direction is no less bound to follow it than to obey the commandment. Counsel engenders duty no less than Precept.¹

The Lord's counsel to the rich young man was clear and imperative. Circumstances may bring exactly the same counsel to bear upon the conscience of others, as of St. Francis. There is a counsel to abstain from marriage, and this so general that St. Paul could say, "I would that all men were even as I myself." But the Lord said expressly, "All men cannot receive this saying, but they to whom it is given." Where it is given it is clearly of obligation. "He that is able to receive it, let him receive it." To receive it or to receive it not is alike of God. "Each man," says St. Paul, "hath his own gift from God, one after this manner, and another after that." Each man does his duty by walking as he is directed.²

The purpose of God's commandment is clear and unmistakable. The direction how to fulfil it is complicated by the circumstances of our life. It is but rarely that a perfectly clear indication is given to any one. The counsels addressed to Christians in general are to be kept always in view; the final direction is derived from their just combination with every other indication of God's Will. But every precept also, when applied in particular, requires this adjustment. The soldier in battle, the judge who condemns a murderer, or the officer who executes him, is not exempt from the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill;" but his action is determined by this commandment taken in combination with the intricate circumstances of social life, every one of which is an indication, according to its measure, of the

¹ Isa. xxx. 21. See Note R.

² Matt. xix. 11, 12; 1 Cor. vii. 7.

Will of God. Every precept and every counsel would be simply obligatory if the state of things were normal, as God would have it. The Sermon on the Mount is not, as some foolish readers think, incompatible with social life; it is indeed the scheme of a perfectly normal society. But the state of things being abnormal through the effects of sin, complications are introduced. If all were normal, the counsel, *Give to him that asketh thee*, would be universally binding, since no one would ask who ought not to receive. The importunity of rogues introduces a complication, which is not to be disregarded; otherwise the observance of the counsel would be only a partial obedience to the direction received, and that is no obedience at all. The man who rightly refuses to give alms does not ignore this counsel as inapplicable to his case; he regards it in due combination with all circumstances, and so finds his duty. Writing to Marcellinus, who in his character of Roman magistrate was deeply conscious of difficulties in the Sermon on the Mount, St. Augustine showed that all these precepts and counsels are to be observed chiefly *in preparatione animi*, in the inward disposition of the heart, while in external action many things must be done, especially by the executants of human justice, which contradict their letter but fulfil their purpose.¹

The purpose of all is the perfection of man according to the Will of God. By whatever step the attainment of that purpose can be approached, I myself or through me any other being brought nearer to perfection, to take that step is my pressing duty. Being is therefore the end of doing; the unity of the Divine Will requires the ultimate resolution of the duty of doing into the duty of being.

¹ Aug., *Ep.*, 138, c. 2.

SECT. III.—*Perfection*

“Ye therefore shall be perfect,” said the Lord to his disciples, “as your heavenly Father is perfect.” The standard of human perfection is stated by St. Paul; it is the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ. He is the express image of the Father; he is therefore the pattern of perfect manhood, the realization of the purpose in which God created man after his own likeness. Our calling is to be conformed to his image.¹

We must look closely to the word by which this truth of human perfectibility is expressed.² It signifies that which is come to its own proper completion. In the simplest use it means a full-grown man, one whose bodily development is complete, and who has the use of all his natural faculties. By an obvious transition it is used to express the full possession of supernatural grace, this also being required for the completeness of man according to the purpose of God. In no other sense but this can we take the promise of the Lord and the aspiration of St. Paul. The perfect man according to the measure of Christ is the man who has grown to the utmost in the grace and knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ, the man in whom Christ is formed, and who is conformed to his image. But this entire conformation to the Divine idea becomes possible only to those who see God as he is. “We know,” says St. John, “that if he shall be manifested we shall be like him; for we shall see him even as he is.” For this cause it is not yet made manifest what we shall be. “Now we see in a mirror, darkly,” says St. Paul, “but then face to face: now I know in part; but then

¹ Matt. v. 48; Eph. iv. 13; Rom. viii. 29.

² The word *τέλειος* and its congeners. See Note S.

shall I know even as also I have been known." Perfection is thus a promise of the future; in hope of this promise a Christian man labours to purify himself; but the work is not yet complete, nor can be in our present state. "We know in part," says St. Paul, "but when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away." Perfection is not for this life, but for the life which is to come.¹

There is however a lower grade of advancement which is also called perfection. "We speak wisdom," says St. Paul, "among the perfect"—men, that is to say, who are called perfect though still living the life of the flesh. He assures the Colossians that prayers are being made for them to the end they may stand perfect. In writing to the Philippians, he puts the two kinds of perfection vividly in contrast. "Not that I have already obtained, or am already made perfect," he says; "I count not myself yet to have apprehended: but one thing I do, forgetting the things which are behind, and stretching forward to the things which are before, I press on toward the goal." He then immediately adds the exhortation, "Let us therefore, as many as be perfect, be thus minded."²

In the language of ascetic theology these grades are distinguished as *perfectio patriae* and *perfectio viae*. The one is the perfection of the end, the other is the perfection of the means. The one is the perfection which belongs to him only who has attained to the heavenly country, and sees God face to face, knowing as he is known; the other is the perfection of the pilgrim in the way, who is completely furnished with all that is needful for his journey, and whose mind is wholly bent on its fulfilment.

¹ 2 Pet. iii. 18; Gal. iv. 19; 1 John iii. 2, 3; 1 Cor. xiii. 9-12.

² 1 Cor. ii. 6; Col. iv. 12; Phil. iii. 12-15.

The entire adaptation of the means to the end makes the state of pilgrimage continuous with the state of attainment. But if this were all, it would still be hard to see how any approach to the end can be called perfection. To be going in the way, with whatever steadiness and whatever assurance of the result, is not the same as to arrive; an approach to perfection is indeed the very negative of perfection. Nor can we solve the difficulty by taking the man perfect in the way to be one who has attained to the full measure of grace which is attainable in his present condition. Such might be called a relative perfection; but such is not the meaning of St. Paul when he urges those who are perfect to be ever pressing onward. There is indeed no halting-place of perfection according to a standard of this life. There is but one standard, the measure of the fulness of Christ, and the Christian life is continual growth and approximation thereto.

A man is perfect when he becomes what God wills him to be. To seek perfection is therefore to endeavour the fulfilment of the duty of being. But the obligation of duty is limited by a man's powers; no one is bound to the impossible. Shall we then say that every man is perfect when at each stage of his progress he has made all the advance that was possible according to the grace given? This is true in a sense. He is become at the moment what God wills him to be at the moment. But growth is not a succession of determinate moments. It does not proceed up to a certain point, then cease and begin afresh. Nor is there a succession of standards proposed, to which a man may attain one by one, and having attained find ever a fresh one before him. The one supreme end is set before him from the beginning, to be perfect even as the Father is perfect;

from the first, as at every stage, he is to press toward the one goal of his calling. If then he can be called perfect while still in the way, it is because in some sense he has already attained the goal. In one sense he is still pressing onward, in another sense he has arrived; in one sense he is still striving for the prize, in another sense he has received it; in one sense he is still growing up to the measure of Christ, in another sense he is perfect. It is as when St. Paul tells us that our citizenship is even now in heaven; or as when we are assured that even now we are come to the heavenly Jerusalem, and to the spirits of just men made perfect.¹ The fulfilment of the duty of being is not only an aspiration for the future; it is a present obligation.

A man is counted perfect in the way out of regard either to his condition or to his life. He is perfect in so far as he is a full member of the Church of Christ, the Communion of Saints, the society of just men made perfect, the general assembly of the Firstborn who are enrolled in heaven. There is nothing of less or more in this membership. The saints who have attained are not in any fuller sense admitted to the covenant of grace than are those who rank lowest. The Church is continuous in earth and heaven, and those on earth are equally with those in heaven citizens of the heavenly commonwealth. It is clear that St. Paul is using the word in this mystic sense of those fully initiated into the Christian religion, when he writes of speaking wisdom among the perfect, and when he exhorts all that are perfect to press onward to the goal. In the same sense perhaps, but with an ironical glance at the ethical meaning, he asks the Galatians whether, having begun in the Spirit, they are now being perfected in the flesh. This

¹ Phil. iii. 20; Heb. xii. 23.

also is the perfection to which in the Epistle to the Hebrews Christian neophytes are urged to go forward.¹ The ethical meaning is indeed never to be ignored. There is in the Christian religion no such thing as a merely ceremonial perfection. Initiation to the mysteries of the faith is introduction to the stores of grace by which the life that now is may be sanctified. But in the sacramental aspect the initiation is complete; the baptized who has gone forward to the higher mysteries of the faith enjoys the full privileges of the household of God, and is so far a perfect Christian.

This truth of the mystical perfection of all Christians was obscured by the mediaeval doctrine of the State of Perfection. By this was meant the condition or standing within the Church of those who were specially and solemnly bound to the observance of the Counsels. In dealing with this matter St. Thomas Aquinas was reduced to sore straits. He could not but see that Christian perfection essentially consists in the observance of the precepts of charity; the counsels are intended, he says, to remove certain hindrances to active charity, and so are only means to the fulfilment of the precepts. Now the State of Perfection is for him the condition of a man who is not indeed actually perfect, but is solemnly bound to those things which belong to perfection. But all Christians are by the solemnity of baptism bound to observe the precepts of charity, in which observance perfection essentially consists. It should follow that all are in the State of Perfection. But the better sense of St. Thomas was overpowered by the supposed authority of the pseudo-Dionysius, to whose writings, from the conceit of his being the immediate disciple of St. Paul, a value was attributed hardly inferior to that of the Apostolic Epistles.

¹ Gal. iii. 3; Heb. vi. 1.

According to his teaching monks and bishops—the latter at the cost of some ingenuity—were distinguished from the clergy and from all other Christians as being exclusively in the State of Perfection. For St. Thomas, as much later for the stalwart common sense of the Chancellor Gerson, this was a purely technical distinction. Not all who are in the State of Perfection, he says, are even in the state of grace, much less perfect, and some on the other hand have perfection of life who are not in the State of Perfection. Many of the married, says Gerson, are and have been perfect in the Christian life; but they have not the State of Perfection, he adds with simplicity, because the married state is not called the State of Perfection.¹ It was therefore little more than a matter of words, but as usual words had power over thought, and this meaningless teaching about Perfection has had strange consequences, by no means confined to those who bow to the scholastic theology. It has directly produced the idea that a lower level of morality is proper to some Christians, a higher to others. Indirectly, by revulsion from the nominal perfection of the cloister, it has produced the widely spread notion that perfection is not in any sense for this life, and that in aspiring to it men are guilty of something like presumption. Both ideas work together in lowering the accepted standard of duty and the service of God. They engender what is vaguely but sufficiently described as worldliness in religion.

If we say that all Christians are normally in a state of

¹ *Summa Theol.*, 2-2. 184. 3, 4, and 5; Gerson, *De Consil. Evang.*, tom. iii. col. 346, ed. 1606: "Multi sunt perfecti et fuerunt in vita spirituali, qui non sunt in statu perfectionis. Patet de multis coniugatis qui sunt et fuerunt perfecti in vita Christiani, nec tamen habent statum perfectionis, quoniam status coniugalis non dicitur status perfectionis." He deplores also the truth of the converse.

perfection, we do not suppose them to be attaining the standard which is set before them, nor on the other hand are we speaking of a merely nominal perfection. We do not propose a measure of Christian excellence proper to the life which is lived in the world, adjusted to the present capacities and limitations of humanity; still less a measure set by the ordinary attainments even of the best among Christians. The one standard set is the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ. The whole progress of the Christian life is nothing else but an approximation to this measure. We do not suppose the limit reached until fulness of knowledge is acquired in the world to come; indeed we cannot think of ultimate perfection without the redemption of the body in the resurrection. But in this world also there is a perfection that is real; the perfection of state or condition to which men are raised by the power of grace; a perfection also of life and character.

The perfect man is he who fulfils the end of his being, keeping God's commandments. Can this be done? What is it to walk in all the commandments of the Lord with a perfect heart? It is to have the affection and the will so set upon doing the will of God that no room is left for any contrary purpose. Ultimate salvation is secured by enduring or persevering to the end, refusing to be drawn aside from the way. "Let patience have its perfect work," says St. James—patience, that is to say, in the active sense of continuous effort—"that ye may be perfect and entire, lacking in nothing." He who thus sets his face as a flint, looking to the end, may still be far from ultimate perfection, or even from the full knowledge of his aim, but he is perfect in the way.¹

¹ Matt. x. 22; Jas. i. 4. The only places of the New Testament in which *ὑπομονή* is used in the passive sense of endurance are 2 Cor. i. 6; Rev. i. 9; and perhaps 2 Thess. iii. 5.

Nor is he perfect only by intention. The end of the commandment, says St. Paul, is charity, which is the fulfilment of the Law. But charity is not a virtue for the acquisition of which we have to wait; it is not like that knowledge upon knowledge which can be attained only with the vision of God. It abides even now, with faith and hope. These are exclusively proper to the life that now is; but unlike them and all other gifts, charity never faileth. The love that is now possible for us does not differ in kind from the love that shall be, as the knowledge that we now have in part differs from the knowledge upon knowledge of the life to come, or as hope differs from possession. Love is continuous now and for ever, growing only to a greater intensity when He shall be seen and known, whom not having seen we love; on whom, though now we see him not, yet believing, we rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory, receiving even now the end of our faith, the salvation of our souls. He who loves God is therefore already attaining perfection. While still in the way to that ultimate perfection which is the object of his striving, he already possesses that in which it will consist. He has yet something to cast away, burdens and hindrances of the pilgrimage; but he has also that which he will keep, the essential immortal blessedness of the life to come. This is the perfection of the Christian character in the way. Charity is the bond of perfectness; it links our imperfect efforts to the heavenly consummation.¹

This perfection is not a remote goal of long-continued

¹ 1 Tim. i. 5. Something is lost by a rendering which seems to refer *παραγγελα* exclusively to the specific charge which Timothy was to deliver at Ephesus. Rom. xiii. 10; 1 Cor. xiii. 8-13. Observe again the distinction of *γνώσις* and *ἐπίγνωσις*, *ut supra*, p. 102. 1 Pet. i. 8; Col. iii. 14.

effort. It is the present possession of those who in the strength of Christian fellowship and mutual prayer stand perfect and complete in all the will of God. There is a fulness of the Christian life attainable in the way, which may be spoken of in words like these: "I bow my knees unto the Father, from whom every family in heaven and on earth is named, that he would grant you, according to the riches of his glory, that ye may be strengthened with power through his Spirit in the inward man; that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith; to the end that ye, being rooted and grounded in love, may be strong to apprehend with all the saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge, that ye may be filled unto all the fulness of God."¹

To know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge, is not to be a passive recipient of mystic illumination. It is to be active in the whole life of the society of which Christ is the Head, which he loves, and for which he gave himself. "Whoso keepeth his word," says St. John, "in him verily is the love of God perfected." To keep his word is to hold fast to his commandment; and his commandment is that we love the brethren. "If we love one another, God abideth in us, and his love is perfected in us."² The social character of Christian perfection is thus revealed, showing the combination of its two aspects, the mystical and the practical. It is the perfection of the man who, being fully initiated into the privileges of the Christian Church, steadily endeavours to fulfil the obligations of his calling. Fortified by all the means of grace which are proper to his condition, he wilfully neglects no single duty. He takes the Christian

¹ Col. iv. 12; Eph. iii. 14-19.

² 1 John ii. 5; iv. 12.

Religion as a whole, without partiality, without hypocrisy. He is imperfect as yet in the measure of his attainment, always advancing and reaching out to that which is before. He is perfect in the determination of his affection to do the good and acceptable and perfect will of God.

APPENDIX

*Some notes are here collected which were too long
for the foot of the page*

A (p. 36).

THE following excerpts are taken from the *Sylloge Confessionum*, ed. Oxon. 1804:—

(a) *Helvetica*, p. 66, “Ministrorum origo, institutio et functio vetustissima et ipsius Dei, non nova aut hominum est ordinatio.”

(b) *Augustana*, p. 189, “Sic autem sentiunt potestatem clavium, seu potestatem episcoporum, iuxta Evangelium, potestatem esse seu mandatum Dei, praedicandi Evangelii, remittendi et retinendi peccata, et administrandi Sacramenta.”

(c) *Saxonica*, p. 240, “Filius Dei est summa sacerdos, unctus ab aeterno Patre, qui ut non funditus intereat Ecclesia, ministros Evangelii ei attribuit, partim a se immediate vocatos, ut Prophetas et Apostolos, partim vocatione humana electos.”

(d) *Belgica*, p. 311, “Credimus Ministros, Seniores, et Diaconos debere ad functiones illas suas vocari et promoveri legitima Ecclesiae electione, adhibita ad eam seria Dei invocatione, atque eo ordine et modo qui nobis Dei verbo praescribitur.”

B (p. 58).

The words of St. Augustine were eagerly debated in the fifteenth century, when the question of the absolute authority of a General Council representing the Catholic Church was to the fore. Thomas Netter (Waldensis), the Carmelite opponent of Wickliffe, was the author of the comparison mentioned in the text (*Doctrin. Fid.*, ii., art. 2, c. 21). William of Ockham had previously argued that by the Catholic Church St. Augustine meant all the faithful from the

first, including of course the Evangelists; and the authority of the whole, he ingeniously contended, is greater than that of the part. (See his *Dial.* in Goldast, *Monarch. S. R. Imp.*, tom. ii. p. 402).

Calvin hung between these two explanations, but he preferred that of Waldensis, giving it however his own peculiar colour. He says (*Inst.*, I. vii. 3) that St. Augustine used these words, "significans se, quum alienus esset a fide, non aliter potuisse adduci ut Evangelium amplecteretur pro certa Dei veritate, quam ecclesiae auctoritate victum." A little below he adds, "Fatemur eos qui nondum Spiritu Dei sunt illuminati Ecclesiae reverentia ad docilitatem induci, ut Christi fidem ex Evangelio discere sustineant." That is to say, the testimony of the Church influences unbelievers only; when once they become believers they have an apprehension of the truth at first hand.

This is certainly not St. Augustine's meaning. He is arguing that it is useless for the Manichæan teacher to appeal to the Gospel in support of his doctrine: the doctrine was condemned by the Church, and "Evangelio non crederem," etc. Clearly then he means that the text of the Gospel may not be set in opposition to the *current* teaching of the Church. In the previous chapter he had made it plain what he meant by the authority of the Catholic Church. The explanation of Ockham is included: "ab ipsa sede Petri Apostoli . . . usque ad praesentem episcopatum successio sacerdotum." But also the present teaching of Christendom is included: "consensio populorum atque gentium;" and the prevailing standard of orthodoxy: "Tenet postremo ipsum Catholicae nomen, cum omnes haeretici se catholicos dici velint, quaerenti tamen peregrino alicui, ubi ad Catholicam conveniatur, nullus haeticorum vel basilicam suam vel domum audeat ostendere."

C (pp. 114 and 184).

In 1 Cor. ii. 14 and xv. 46 much confusion has been caused by rendering ψυχικός *natural*. The rendering *sensual* in Jas. iii. 15 and Jude 19 is less objectionable, but still unsatisfactory. Σῶμα ψυχικόν would naturally mean *animal body*, as rendered in the Latin Vulgate, *corpus animale*; but unfortunately we use the word *animal* in a sense which would be still more misleading. It is true that when ψυχή is set in contrast with πνεῦμα, it properly signifies the animal soul, the mere animating principle of the body, as in 1 Thess. v. 23, πνεῦμα being the soul regarded in its higher or

rational character. But in these passages St. Paul is making a different distinction; *ψυχή* is here the human soul, and *πνεῦμα* the Divine influence. He does not classify the first man with the brutes, but distinguishes the natural faculties of the human soul from the supernatural endowments which flow from the Incarnation. The English rendering *natural* for *ψυχικός* is therefore justifiable, though it is rather a gloss than a translation, and it certainly lends itself to much misconception.

The comment of B. de Picquigny on ii. 16 is excellent sense: "Ut animalis homo spiritualem iudicare posset, deberet Dei mentem et secreta melius nosse quam norit homo spiritualis: at non cognoscit ea; vel enim illa naturaliter et vi luminis naturalis nosset, quod est impossibile; vel supernaturaliter, Deo scilicet revelante; sed supponitur contrarium, cum supponatur animalis, seu solius animae naturali lumine ductus." And above: "*Spiritualis* tripliciter sumitur. 1°. Qui cibo non eget: ut Christus nunc. 2°. Qui spiritus dic-tamen sequitur. 3°. Qui sublimiora fidei mysteria intelligit."

D (p. 127).

The passage cited from St. Athanasius, *Contra Gentes*, p. 8, is as follows:—Οὐκ ἀρκεθείσα δὲ τῇ τῆς κακίας ἐπινοίᾳ ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχῇ, κατ' ὀλιγον καὶ εἰς τὰ χείρονα ἑαυτὴν ἐξάγειν ἤρξατο· μαθοῦσα γὰρ διαφορὰς ἡδονῶν καὶ ζωσαμένη τὴν τῶν θείων λήθην, ἡδομένη δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ σώματος πάθη, καὶ πρὸς μόνα τὰ παρόντα, καὶ τὰς τούτων δόξας ἀποβλέπουσα, ἐνόμισε μηδὲν ἔτι πλέον εἶναι τῶν βλεπομένων, ἀλλὰ μόνα τὰ πρόσκαιρα καὶ τὰ σωματικὰ εἶναι τὰ καλὰ· ἀποστραφεῖσα δὲ καὶ ἐπιλαθομένη ἑαυτὴν εἶναι κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ Θεοῦ, οὐκ ἔτι μὲν διὰ τῆς ἐν αὐτῇ δυνάμεως τὸν Θεὸν λόγον καθ' ὃν καὶ γέγονεν ὄρα· ἔξω δὲ ἑαυτῆς γενομένη τὰ οὐκ ὄντα λογίζεται καὶ ἀνατυπῶται. Ἐπικρύψασα γὰρ ταῖς ἐπιπλοκαῖς τῶν σωματικῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τὸ ὡς ἐν αὐτῇ ἀτόπτρον, δι' οὗ μόνου ὄρᾶν ἠδύνατο τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ Πατρὸς, οὐκέτι μὲν ὄρα· ἃ δεῖ ψυχὴν νοεῖν· παντὶ δὲ περιφέρεται, καὶ μόνα ἐκεῖνα ὄρα· τὰ τῇ αἰσθήσει προσπίπτοντα.

I offer the following translation:—

The human soul, not content with devising wickedness, began little by little to put forth on yet worse ventures. For learning varieties of pleasure, and girding itself with forgetfulness of divine things, finding pleasure also in the very passions of the body, and looking only to things present and the opinions current about them, it came to the conclusion that nothing at all existed beyond what is

seen, the Good being found only in things temporal and corporeal. So turning aside and forgetting its own being in the image of the good God, the soul no longer sees by its inherent power the Divine Word after which it was made ; but passes out of itself to conceive and imagine things that are not. For having hidden beneath the folds of bodily desires the mirror, so to speak, that is within it, by which alone the Image of the Father could be seen, the soul no longer sees what it should rightly understand, but turning every way sees those things only which are the objects of sense.

E (pp. 173 and 177).

The extravagant teaching of Calvinists and Jansenists on the subject of grace was not a new product of the seventeenth century. It was inherited from the Thomist theologians of the mediaeval schools, who in their turn were but continuing the tradition of the less guarded utterances of St. Augustine. Towards the end of the sixteenth century the Jesuits became the champions of a more temperate theology, but in stress of controversy they almost inevitably ran to the other extreme, as also did the Remonstrants in Holland. The disputes of Calvinists and Arminians among the Reformed were almost exactly parallel with the controversy which raged at the same time in the Roman Communion. The Synod of Dordrecht was engaged with the same questions as the Congregation *de auxiliis gratiae*, which after some years of fruitless discussion was dissolved in 1607 by the Pope Paul V., who tried to silence the controversy. This did not however prevent the authorities of the Roman Church from condemning, for the most part with conspicuous wisdom, the exaggerated statements on either side which characterized the debate arising out of the *Augustinus* of Cornelius Jansen. These were chiefly concerned with the power of regenerate man to keep God's commandments, about which Pascal discoursed with more wit than fairness in the *Provincial Letters*, and the still deeper questions of sufficient and effectual grace. The Jansenists, holding that effectual grace is irresistible, that no man can be saved without it, and that God bestows it by his sovereign power on whom he will, were driven by the logic of their position to assert that the gift of *sufficient* grace alone does but increase a man's damnation. One of them launched out into the extravagance of saying that we might reasonably pray in the

Litany, *A gratia sufficienti, Libera nos Domine*. The proposition was among those condemned by Alexander VIII. in 1690.

F (p. 181).

Heb. vi. 4-6. The explanation given in the text is that of St. Ambrose, *De Paenit.*, ii. 2, who is in agreement with the great majority of the ancient Fathers. St. Athanasius (*Op.*, tom. i. p. 974) lays the chief stress on ἀνακαινίζειν. He says, 'Ἐβραίοις γὰρ ἔγραφε· καὶ ἵνα μὴ νομίσωσι κατὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ συνθήειαν προφάσει μετανόιας εἶναι πολλὰ καθ' ἡμέραν βαπτίσματα, διὰ τοῦτο μετανοεῖν μὲν παραινεῖ, μίαν δὲ εἶναι τὴν ἀνακαινίσιν διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος καὶ μὴ δευτέραν ἀποφάινεται. In 2 Cor. iv. 16 the kindred word ἀνακαινοῦνται is used of daily growth. In Rom. xii. 2 and Titus iii. 5 the sense is the same as here. The word παραδειγματίζοντας in this connection is illustrated by Numb. xxv. 4 (LXX.), παραδειγματίσον αὐτοὺς κυρίῳ, and by the use of ἐδειγματίσεν in Col. ii. 15. This last passage probably suggested the Vulgate rendering here, *ostentui habentes*, and still more the reading of St. Ambrose, *ostentatione triumphantes*. I content myself with rendering it *openly*. "De baptismo dictum credamus," says St. Ambrose, "in quo crucifigimus Filium Dei in nobis; ut per illum nobis mundus crucifigatur, qui quadam triumphamus specie, dum similitudinem mortis eius assumimus, qui principatus et potestates in sua cruce ostentavit ac triumphavit."

There seem to be only three possible interpretations of the passage: (1) the Novatian, denying the possibility of penance; (2) that given above; and (3) the explanation preferred by many moderns, which makes it mean that recovery from complete apostasy is so difficult as to be morally, though not absolutely, impossible. St. Ambrose glances rather contemptuously at the last interpretation. It seems to be excluded by the fact that the writer is not speaking of extreme wickedness, but rather of failure to make progress.

G (p. 188).

In 1 Cor. iii. 8-15, the special reference is to the apostolic work of building up the Church, but the teaching is general. The words may refer to the effect of the fiery trial of temptation in his life,

as St. Augustine takes them, but, as he allows, not to this alone (*Enchir.*, c. 68-9; *De Civ. Dei*, xxi. 26). In the latter place he argues that the purging fire cannot be identical with the *eternal fire* of Matt. xxv. 41, but adds that he cannot deny the existence of a similar fire by which souls are tried between death and resurrection, because there may be such. Of the cleansing pain after death in general he says (*ibid.*, c. 13), "Temporarias poenas alii in hac vita tantum, alii post mortem, alii et nunc et tunc, verumtamen ante iudicium illud severissimum novissimumque patiuntur. Non autem omnes veniunt in sempiternas poenas, quae post illud iudicium his (sc. the lost) sunt futurae, qui post mortem sustinent temporales. Nam quibusdam, quod in isto non remittitur, remitti in futuro saeculo, id est, ne futuri saeculi aeterno supplicio puniantur, iam supra diximus." He seems to have stumbled—pace tanti viri dixerim—over the conception of *elemental* fire taken in this connection. It would be as reasonable to take the "wood, hay, and stubble" in the same literal sense.

The words of the Council of Bethlehem are: *Τούτων καὶ αὐτῶν τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπέρχεσθαι εἰς ἄδου, καὶ ὑπομένειν τὴν ἔνεκα ὧν εἰργάσαντο ἁμαρτημάτων ποινήν· εἶναι δ' ἐν αἰσθήσει τῆς ἐκεῖθεν ἀπαλλαγῆς* (Hardouin, tom. xi. p. 255).

H (p. 216):

The definition given in the text is that of Domingo Bañes. It is found in his Commentary on the *Summa Theol.*, tom. iii. p. 45, ed. 1615: "Congregatio hominum fidelium baptizatorum visibilis sub uno capite Christo in caelis, et Vicario eius in terris." This position is different from that of the Gallican theologians, who held that all Christians are bound indeed by the Divine law to be in communion with the Roman Pontiff, but do not, in default of such communion, cease *ipso facto* to be visibly members of the Church, and do not, if unjustly excommunicated by him, lose any of the privileges even of membership.

Launoï has collected (Lib. viii. Epist. xiii.) definitions of the Church from all sources down to the sixteenth century, showing that until then no one had introduced the Roman Pontiff into the definition of the essence of the Church. He accuses Peter Canisius of first "deforming" the Church in the third edition of his Catechism, *anno* 1587, turning the Church, as he says, into a monarchy.

So far however the reference was only to the *government* of the Church, not to its *being*. Bañes was the first to bring the Pope into the *essence* of the Church. Launoi commends Bellarmine, without much reason, as less extreme.

I (p. 227).

Cypr., *De Unit. Eccl.*, 4, 5: "Super unum aedificat ecclesiam, et quamvis apostolis omnibus post resurrectionem suam parem potestatem tribuat . . . tamen ut unitatem manifestaret, unitatis eiusdem originem ab uno incipientem sua auctoritate disposuit. Hoc erant utique et ceteri apostoli quod fuit Petrus, pari consortio praediti et honoris et potestatis, sed exordium ab unitate proficiscitur, ut ecclesia Christi una monstretur. . . . Quam unitatem tenere firmiter et vindicare debemus, maxime episcopi qui in ecclesia praesidemus, ut episcopatum quoque ipsum unum atque indivisum probemus. . . . Episcopatus unus est, cuius a singulis in solidum pars tenetur."

Ep., lxvi. 8: "Scire debes episcopum in ecclesia esse, et ecclesiam in episcopo, et si qui cum episcopo non sit, in ecclesia non esse, . . . quando ecclesia, quae catholica una est, scissa non sit neque divisa, sed sit utique connexa et cohaerentium sibi invicem sacerdotum glutino copulata."

Ep., lv. 21: "Manente concordiae vinculo et perseverante catholicae ecclesiae individuo sacramento, actum suum disponit et dirigit unusquisque episcopus rationem propositi sui Domino redditurus."

K (p. 229).

It is known that in the seventeenth century most English divines were disposed to regard presbyterian ordination as valid, and in some circumstances even lawful. They would not, however, suffer men so ordained to minister in the English Church. See Mr. Denny's *English Church and the Ministry of the Reformed Churches*, No. lvii. of the Church Historical Society's Tracts. Bramhall, ordaining a certain Edward Parkinson who had received presbyterian ordination, gave him letters testimonial of the fact containing these words: "Non annihilantes priores ordines (si quos habuit) nec invaliditatem eorundem determinantes, multo

minus omnes ordines sacros Ecclesiarum forinsecarum condemnantes, quos proprio Iudici relinquimus, sed solummodo supplentes quicquid prius defuit per canones Ecclesiae Anglicanae requisitum, et providentes paci Ecclesiae, ut schismatis tollatur occasio, et conscientiiis fidelium satisfiat, nec ulli dubitent de eius ordinatione, aut actus suos presbyteriales tanquam invalidos aversentur” (Bramhall, *Works*, vol. i. p. xxxvii.).

L (p. 230).

Justin M., *Apol.*, ii. p. 58 (ed. Colon): οὐ δέεσθαι τῆς παρὰ ἀνθρώπων ὑλικῆς προσφορᾶς προειλήφαμεν τὸν Θεόν. p. 60: ἄθεοι μὲν οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἐσμὲν, τὸν δημιουργὸν τοῦ δε τοῦ παντὸς σεβόμενοι, ἀνευδὲ ἡ αἱμάτων καὶ σπονδῶν καὶ θυμιαμάτων, ὡς ἐδιδάχθημεν, λέγοντες, κ.τ.λ.

Dial. cum Tryph., p. 260: περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν παντὶ τύπῳ ὑφ’ ἡμῶν τῶν ἔθνων προσφερομένων αὐτῷ θυσιῶν, τουτέστι τοῦ ἄρτου τῆς εὐχαριστίας καὶ τοῦ ποτηρίου ὁμοίως τῆς εὐχαριστίας προλέγει.

Athenag., *Legatio*, p. 13 (*ibid.*): θυσία αὐτῷ μεγίστη ἂν γιγνώσκωμεν τίς ἐξέτεινε καὶ συνεσφαίρωσε τοὺς οὐρανοὺς, κ.τ.λ. . . . τί δέ μοι ὀλοκαυτώσεων, ὧν μὴ δεῖται ὁ Θεός; καίτοι προσφέρειν δέον ἀνάιμακτον θυσίαν, καὶ τὴν λογικὴν προσάγειν λατρείαν.

Didache, xiii. 3: δώσεις τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τοῖς προφήταις· αὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰσιν οἱ ἀρχιερεῖς ὑμῶν; xiv. 1-3: κατὰ κυριακὴν δὲ Κυρίου συναχθέντες κλάσατε ἄρτον καὶ εὐχαριστήσατε προεξομολογησάμενοι τὰ παραπτώματα ὑμῶν, ὅπως καθαρὰ ἡ θυσία ὑμῶν ᾗ . . . αὕτη γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ ῥηθεῖσα ὑπὸ Κυρίου· ἐν παντὶ τύπῳ καὶ χρόνῳ προσφέρειν μοι θυσίαν καθαρὰν.

Clem. Rom., *Ad Cor.*, 44: λειτουργίαν—λειτουργήσαντας—ὄσιος προσενεγκόντας τὰ δῶρα.

Ignat., *Ad Philad.*, 4: μία γὰρ σὰρξ τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, καὶ ἐν ποτήριον εἰς ἔνωσιν τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ· ἐν θυσιαστήριον, ὡς εἰς ἐπίσκοπος, ἅμα τῷ πρεσβυτερίῳ, καὶ διακόνοις τοῖς συνδούλοις μου, ἵνα ὃ ἐὰν πράσσητε κατὰ Θεὸν πράσσητε.

M (p. 247).

Aug., *Ep.* 138, *ad Marcell.*, § 7: “Cum ad res divinas pertinent sacramenta appellantur.” Cp. his *Serm.* 272, “Ista dicuntur sacramenta, quia in eis aliud videtur, aliud intellegitur,”

where also the absolute identity of *mysterium* and *sacramentum* is illustrated. "Mysterium vestrum," he says, "in mensa dominica positum est," sc. the Mystery or Sacrament of what you yourselves are, the Body of Christ. In *De Civ. Dei*, x. 5, he defines *sacramentum* simply as *sacrum signum*. Towards the end of the seventh century Isidore of Seville more formally defined it thus: "Sacramentum est in aliqua celebratione, cum res gesta ita fit, ut aliquid significari intellegatur quod sancte accipiendum est" (*Etym.*, vi. 19).

Tertullian glances at the military oath when he says (*Ad Martyres*, 3), "Vocati sumus ad militiam Dei vivi, iam tunc cum in sacramenti verba respondimus." Caecilius of Bithia, in the Carthaginian Council convened by St. Cyprian, used the phrase "sacramentum interrogat" in much the same sense of the question put to the candidates at baptism (Cypr., ed. Hartel, p. 437). The statement of Pliny (*Ep.* 97) about the Christians of his province, "Affirmabant . . . se *sacramento* non in scelus aliquod obstringere," etc., shows that the word was already established in Christian use, and that he himself was puzzled by it, thinking only of its legal or military sense.

N (p. 251).

Since the extreme requirement of a right intention has found favour only in the Roman schools, it may be expected to disappear in face of the express declaration of Leo XIII. in his Bull *Apostolicae Curae*: "De mente vel intentione, utpote quae per se quiddam est interius, Ecclesia non iudicat: at quatenus extra proditur, iudicare de ea debet. Iam vero quum quis ad sacramentum conficiendum et conferendum materiam formamque debitam serio ac rite adhibuit, eo ipso censetur id nimirum facere intendisse quod facit Ecclesia." It may be interesting to contrast with this the opinion expressed three years previously by Gasparri in his tractate *De Sacra Ordinatione*, n. 968: "Ordinatio foret nulla prorsus, si minister intendit quidem facere quod facit Ecclesia Christi, sed simul actu positivo et explicito voluntatis non vult conficere sacramentum, aut ritum sacrum, aut facere quod facit Ecclesia Romana, aut conferre potestatem ordinis, aut imprimere charactere," etc.

Whatever else may be the result of this Bull, directed against the validity of Anglican ordinations, those whose action led to its

publication may be thankful if they have indirectly helped forward a return to reasonable opinions on the question of intention. The position now taken is practically that of St. Thomas Aquinas: "Minister sacramenti agit in persona totius Ecclesiae, cuius est minister; in verbis autem, quae profert, exprimitur intentio Ecclesiae, quae sufficit ad perfectionem sacramenti, nisi contrarium exterius exprimitur ex parte ministri, vel recipientis sacramentum." (*S. T.*, 3. 64. 8).

O (p. 258).

Cyr. Hieros., *Cat. Mystag.*, iv. 9: ὁ φαινόμενος ἄρτος οὐκ ἄρτος ἐστίν, εἰ καὶ τῇ γεύσει αἰσθητὸς, ἀλλὰ σῶμα Χριστοῦ· καὶ ὁ φαινόμενος οἶνος οὐκ οἶνός ἐστιν, εἰ καὶ ἡ γεῦσις τοῦτο βούλεται, ἀλλὰ αἷμα Χριστοῦ.

August., *Serm.*, cclxxii.: "Ista, fratres, ideo dicuntur Sacramenta, quia in eis aliud videtur, aliud intellegitur; quod videtur speciem habet corporalem, quod intellegitur fructum habet spiritalem." See the argument of Card. Franzelin, *de obiectiva realitate specierum sacramentalium* (*De ss. Euch.*, thes. xvi.), in which he shows that what is changed is τὸ νοούμενον.

The statement that our Lord did not call *bread* his Body and *wine* his Blood does not follow grammatically from the use of the neuter τοῦτο in the first sentence of the Institution, as some have thought. That argument is indeed futile. It follows from the logical structure of the sentence, in which τοῦτο is merely apodeictic, indicating an unnamed subject, while in the second sentence the contents of the cup are equally unnamed, except predicatively as the Blood of Christ. Gardiner was so far right in his controversy with Cranmer, though he spoilt his argument by adhering to the scholastic attempt at fixing the moment of the sacramental change. It is not a case of disparate terms joined by the copula. The parallels often cited—*e.g.* "That rock was Christ," or "The seed is the word"—are therefore beside the mark. Tertullian was inaccurate when he wrote the words "panem Corpus suum appellans" (*Adv. Iud.*, 10). Observe ποτήριον used in the sense of πόμα in Matt. xx. 22; John xviii. 11; 1 Cor. x. 21; xi. 27.

P (p. 260).

Taylor, *Clerus Domini*, sect. vii. 15, 16. Observe that Taylor does not himself call ordination a *Sacrament*. Like other English divines of the seventeenth century, he tied the word to a narrow sense, which could not be justified from history. The appeal to antiquity should have led them rather to widen its meaning. All, I believe, without exception, taught that in ordination there was conferred, not only an official capacity, but also a "grace of ability," which endowed the recipient personally with powers proper to his function, so rendering him in Taylor's phrase "gracious and loved by God." It is needless to multiply quotations, but this from Barrow has a special value: "To every vocation God's aid is congruously afforded, but to this (the principal of all others, the most important, most nearly related to God, and most peculiarly tending to his service) it is in a special manner most assuredly and plentifully imparted" (*Works*, vol. i. p. 528, ed. 1847). This aid or auxiliary grace "most assuredly imparted" is exactly what is meant by the sacramental grace of ordination, according to the definition of Gasparri (*De Sacr. Ordin.*, n. 1130), "*Gratia sacramentalis*, qua ordinatus valet functiones recepti ordinis sancte peragere." The conclusion of Bramhall, who allows that ordination is "in a larger sense" a sacrament, is singularly convincing: "It is folly to wrangle about the word, when we agree upon the thing" (*Works*, vol. i. p. 272 and vol. v. p. 189).

Q (p. 261).

The liturgical blessing of the oil for the sick appears in the *Canons of Hippolytus* (Achelis, iii. § 28, in *Texte und Untersuchungen*), which represent either the Roman or the Alexandrian use of the third century; and in the prayers of Serapion of Thmuis in Egypt, c. A.D. 360, where the anointing oil is coupled with water to be drunk by the sick, ὅπως πᾶς πυρετὸς καὶ πᾶν δαιμόνιον καὶ πᾶσα νόσος διὰ τῆς πόσεως καὶ τῆς ἀλείψεως ἀπαλλαγῇ (pp. 7 and 13, in *Texte und Untersuchungen*). In the fifth century at Rome, oil blessed by the Bishop might be applied by the sick person himself or any bystander. See Innoc. I., *Ep.*, i. 8. The Greek and Russian Churches appoint seven priests to minister the unction, who bless the

oil at the time of administration, but one may act alone in case of need.

The title *Unctio extrema*, used by Peter Lombard, means only the *last* of the anointings used in the Church. It is a mere blunder to infer from the name that the anointing is intended only for those *in extremis*. The *Rituale Romanum* orders it more especially for those *periculose aegrotantibus*, without confining it to them; but forbids its repetition in the same sickness, unless it be long continued, or unless after partial recovery the peril of death recurs. The Office includes the prayer: "Plenamque interius et exterius sanitatem misericorditer redde: ut ope misericordiae tuae restitutus, ad pristina repararetur officia." Of the effect, St. Thomas Aq., in *Opusc.* iv., says simply, "effectus huius sacramenti est sanatio mentis et corporis."

R (p. 287).

St. Thom. Aq. (*S. T.*, 1-2. 108. 4) adopts the distinction in this form: "Haec esse differentia inter consilium et praeceptum, quod praeceptum importat necessitatem, consilium autem in optione ponitur eius cui datur." But he is here thinking of the three general heads of counsels "simpliciter proposita," viz. *poverty*, *chastity*, and *obedience*, theologically understood. He recognizes, *passim*, that a particular counsel may be obligatory on a particular person. The question is whether, if it be not obligatory, it applies to the person at all. He says (*ibid.*), "Cum homo dat aliquam eleemosynam pauperi, quando dare non tenetur, consilium sequitur quantum ad factum illud." It seems safer to say that in every given case a man either ought or ought not to give alms, the determination often being very difficult. If he does it when he ought not, he is not following the counsel, but missing his way.

S (p. 289).

The Greek *τέλος*, unlike the Latin *finis*, or the English *end*, seems in classical writers never to be connected with the idea of *cessation*; it always signifies *completion*. In LXX. the word has acquired the other meaning, and so in N.T., e.g. Luke i. 33; Heb. vii. 3. The meaning of *τέλειος* however is fixed exclusively by the original sense of *τέλος*; it signifies that which has

attained the end or completion of its being and so continues. In the Latin and English versions of the N.T. *perfectus* and *perfect* are used also to represent such words as ἀκριβῆς and κατηρητισμένος, the latter of which varies from τέλειος only as not introducing the idea of the *end* or purpose of being. The passages in which the reader of the English Bible must be on his guard are Luke i. 3; vi. 40; Acts iii. 16; xviii. 26; xxii. 3; xxiii. 15, 20; xxiv. 22; 1 Cor. i. 10; 2 Cor. xiii. 9, 11; Eph. iv. 12 (cp. 13); 1 Thess. iii. 10; v. 2; 2 Tim. iii. 17; Heb. xiii. 21; 1 Pet. v. 10; Rev. iii. 2. In none of these do the words τέλειος or τελειότης occur.

INDEX

NUMBERS refer to pages, LETTERS to the Notes in the Appendix

- AERIUS, 227
- Albigenses, the, 75
- Ambrose, St., on Penance, 255, 256, F
- Analogies, terms of Christian doctrine founded on, 30
- Angels, 103
- Animal life, nature of, 115
- Anthropomorphism, 91
- Apollinarianism, 145
- Apostasy, 201
- Apostles, commission of the, 11, 35, 221, 258
- , credentials of the, 51-54
- , founders of the Christian tradition, 11, 217
- , guardians of the Christian tradition, 12
- , rulers of the Church, 220
- , witnesses of the Resurrection, 52
- Apostolate, unity of the, 226
- Aquinas, St. Thomas, on the *beginning*, 93
- , on the birth of Christ, 151
- , on confession to a layman, 256
- , on the counsels of perfection, 293, 294, R
- , on Intention, N
- , on the meaning of *Spirit*, 77
- Aquinas, St. Thomas, on original sin, 123
- , quoted, 71, 95, 127, 133, 177, 184, Q
- Arianism, 85, 95, 146
- Aristotle, 33, 39, 182
- Arminianism, E
- Ascension, the, 160
- Aseitas*, 71
- Athanasius, St., on the corruption of nature, 124, D
- , on the limited knowledge of Christ, 154
- , on the purpose of the Incarnation, 143
- , on the sufficiency of Scripture, 22
- , quoted, 78, 120, 127, 152, 216, 228, F
- Athenagoras, on sacrifice, 230, L
- Atonement, natural ideas of, 32
- Augsburg, Confession of, 36
- Augustine, St., on the authority of the Church as a motive to belief, 58, 59, B
- , on the constitution of a Sacrament, 248, M, O
- , on creation, 98
- , on the image of God in man, 110
- , on the number of the Sacraments, 247

- Augustine, St., on prevenient and subsequent grace, 177
 —, on purgatorial pain, G
 —, on the Sermon on the Mount, 288
 —, quoted, 103, 112, 170, 216, 246, 258
 Authority of the Church, 19, 58
 — of the Master, 8, 27
 — of the Son of Man, 233, 234
 — of theologians, 66
 Auxiliary grace, 171
- BAÑES, definition of the Church, 216, H
 Barrow, on the grace of ordination, P
 Beatific vision, the, 188
 Beatitude, 90, 110, 187
 Beginning, the, 92
 Belief, the duty of, 44
 Beveridge, on the catholicity of local churches, 217
 Body, the, its creation, 114
 —, its mortality, 117
 —, its relation to the soul, 101
 —, its resurrection, 102
 Boethius, on the meaning of *Person*, 79
 Bramhall, on the authority of Councils, 64, 69
 —, on infallibility, 56
 —, on Presbyterian ordination, K
 —, on the Proposition of Faith, 50
 —, on the Rule of Faith, 22
 —, on the Sacrament of Ordination, P
 Browning, Robert, on Original Sin, 125
- CALVIN on Holy Scripture, 56, B
 Calvinism, 166, 173, 200, E
- Canisius, Petrus, definition of the Church, H
 Canon Law, 239
 Canon of Scripture, 23
 Casuistry, 67
 Catechism, the Racovian, 147
 —, the Russian, 189
 —, the Scottish, 110
 Certainty of Faith, 8, 28
Charismata, 172, 231, 259, P
 Church, the, and the Secular Power, 240
 —, authority of, in controversies, 19, 239
 —, definitions of, 216, H
 —, general function of, 39
 —, guardian of tradition, 13
 —, infallibility of, 55
 —, interpreter of Holy Scripture, 22, 60
 —, membership in, 41, 292
 —, precepts of, 67, 283
 —, proponent of faith, 55-59
 —, teaching of, 61, 65, 239
 —, witness to the teaching of Christ, 13
 Clement, St., 37, 189, 224, 226, 230, L
 Colluthus, 227
 Commandments, possibility of keeping the, 127, 295
 —, limitation of the, 287
Communicatio idiomatum, 149, 153
 Concupiscence, 14, 126
 Confession, 255, 256
 Confessions, Reformed, on the Sacred Ministry, 36, A
Consubstantial, the word, 78
Corban, 279
 Corruption of nature, 121, 124
 Council of Ariminium, 64
 — of Bethlehem, 189, G
 — of Carthage, 253, 254, M
 — of Chalcedon, 148
 — of Ephesus, 147

- Council of Florence, 83, 254
 — of Nicaea, 63, 78
 Councils, authority of, 64
 Cranmer, O
 Credentials of Christ, 45, 48, 57
 — of the Apostles, 51-54
 Creeds, the, their relation to
 Holy Scripture, 26
 Cyprian, St., on deadly sin, 180
 —, on the episcopate, 226,
 227, I
 —, quoted, 22, 246, 253, 254,
 256, M
 Cyril of Jerusalem, St., 245,
 257, O
- DAMASCENE, ST. JOHN, 16, 70
 Darwell Stone, *Outlines of
 Christian Dogma*, 83
 Death, eternal, 187
 —, the nature of, 120
 —, the second, 179
 Definitions of faith, 19
 Deism, 97, 170
 Demons, 76, 103, 108
 Departed, prayer for the, 202
Didache, the, 221, 223, 230, L
 Disciple, the faith of the, 2, 27
 —, the relation of Master and,
 1, 2, 9, 235
 Discipline of the Church, con-
 troversies about the, 41, 42
 Doceticism, 145
Dogmata, 283, 284
 Donatists, the, 40, 214, 215
 Dordrecht, Synod of, E
 Dualism, 74
- Ecclesia*, 193, 200, 207
 — *docens*, 238
 Edersheim, on binding and
 loosing, 236, 237
 Effectual grace, 177, E
 Election, 196-198
 Ἐνεργεῖα, 182
- Episcopate, origin of the historic,
 224, 225
 —, unity of the, 227, I
 Eternity, 72, 87
 Eucharist, institution of the,
 161
 Eugenius IV., 254
 Evidence, 6
 Evidences, Christian, 8
 Evil, origin of, 106
 —, toleration of, 130
 Evolution in creation, 98, 115
 Excommunication, 201
 Expiation, 164
- FAITH, definitions of, 19
 —, of Christendom, 6
 —, of the Disciple, 1-6, 27
 —, rule of, 22, 28
 —, supernatural, 3
 Fatherhood, in what sense
 spoken of God, 30, 76, 86
 Field, on the authority of
 Councils, 65
 —, quoted, 112
 Franzelin, Card., O
 Freedom of the creature, 31,
 94, 105, 106
- GALLICANISM, H
 Gardiner, O
 Gasparri, on intention, N
 —, on the grace of ordina-
 tion, P
 Generation in the Divine Nature,
 82
 Geographical ordering of the
 Church, 209
 Gerson, on the state of per-
 fection, 294
 Γνωσις, 102, 296
 Goode, 23
 Gore, *The Church and the
 Ministry*, 37, 222, 225
 Green, Prof. T. H., quoted, 98

- HIPPOLYTUS, Canons of, Q
 Holiness, nature of, 211
 — of God, the, 108
 Hooker, on Certainty, 8, 28
 —, on the authority of the Church, 25
 —, on the way of salvation, 134
 —, quoted, 36, 59, 86
 Hort, *The Christian Ecclesia*, 35, 38, 193, 194, 208, 209
 Hugh of St. Victor, 247
 Hume, theory of causation, 4
Hypostasis, 78
 Hypostatic Union, the, 147
- IDOL-OFFERINGS, 268, 272
 Ignatius, St., quoted, 103, 149, 223, 228, 230, 252, L
 Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, 52
 Immutability, 87
 Infant Communion, 260
 Inferences, peril of, 29
 Infinity, 73, 87, 93
 Innocence, 117
 Innocent I., Q
 — III., 263, 264
 — IV., 250
 Irenaeus, St., 121, 215, 258
 Ischyras, 227
 Isidore of Seville, 256, M
- JANSENISM, 166, 173, E
 Jerome, St., 225, 227, 228, 245
 Jerusalem, the new, 192
 Judaism, 278
 Judgment, the, 185, 188
 — by the Son of Man, 234, 235
 Justice of God, the, 108
 Justification, 173, 178, 180
 Justin Martyr, St., on sacrifice, 229, 230, L
- KHOMIAKOFF, on the nature of Scripture, 25
- Khomiakoff, on the state of the departed, 203
 Kingdom of God, the, 198, 199
 Κόσμος, 135
 Knowledge, 89
 — of Christ, the human, 153
 — of God, the, 184, 265
 Kurtz, on sacrifice, 139
- LACTANTIUS, 246
 Latham, *The Risen Master*, 54
 Launoi, on definition of the Church, H
 Law, authority of, 285
 —, Canon, 239
 —, corruption of human, 129
 —, nature of the Divine, 119, 130
 Λειτουργίος, 229
 Leo the Great, St., 246
 — XIII., on intention, N
 Liddon, 153
 Likeness to God, 117
- MALDONATUS, 18
 Manichaeism, 75
 Master and Disciple, relation of, 1, 2, 9
 —, authority of the, 8, 27
 —, —, incommunicable, 10
 Materialism, 75
 Melchizedek, 158
 Mercy of God, the, 109
 Merit, 278
 Μετανοεῖν, 176
 Ministry, the sacred, 34-39, 223, 227
 Miracle, the witness of, 3
 Moberly, *Ministerial Priesthood*, 37, 208, 260
 Monism, 75
 Monophysitism, 148
 Monothelites, the, 148
 Moore, Aubrey, quoted, 74
 Moral theology, 67

- Morality, natural, 276
 — of the Old Testament, 277
 Mortification, 180
 Μυστήριον, 241-245

 NAME of God, the, 71, 80
 Natural Law, 4, 276
 — Religion, 1, 5, 14, 31,
 49, 71, 92, 270
 Nestorianism, 146
 New Testament, character of
 the Scriptures of the, 21, 38
 —, importance of the Scrip-
 tures of the, 22
 —, selection of the Scriptures
 of the, 23
 Nicaea, Council of, 63, 78
 Nicholson, *Exposition of the
 Catechism*, 264
 Novatianism, 179, 214, F

 OBEDIENCE, 282-285
 Obligation, 48, 275, 291
 Ockham, B
 Old Testament, authorship of
 books of the, 17
 —, morality of the, 277
 —, ordinances of the, 284
 —, the, supplemented and
 corrected in the New, 15
 Omnipotence, 99
 Omnipresence, 94, 99
 Omniscience, 99
 Ὁμοούσιος, 78
 Ὀργανον, 95
 Original sin, 123, 124
 Οὐσία, 78

 PANTHEISM, 73, 75, 94
 Pascal, E
 Pearson, *On the Creed*, 210-212
 Pelagianism, 124, 170, 171, 173
 Person, the word, 78, 79
 Personality, 102
 Peter Lombard, 247
 Philo, 77, 95, 96, 99, 114, 242

 Picquigny, B. de, C
 Πλήρωμα, 73
 Pliny, the word *sacrament*, M
 Πολίτευμα, 192
 Polytheism, 75, 76, 88, 91
 Presbyterian ordination, 229, K
 Priesthood, ministerial, 229-231
 — of Christ, 158
 — of the Church, 213
 Probability, 68, 273
 Procession, 81, 82, 86
 — the double, 83, 84
 Prophecy, 136
 Prophets, New Testament, 217,
 221
 Propitiation, 164
 Proposition of the Church, the,
 ordinary and solemn, 62, 63
 Providence, 97, 99, 105
 Ψυχικός, C
 Purgatory, 189, 203
 Puritans, 214
 Pusey, quoted, 23

 QUESTIONS, open, 65, 68

Rabbi, the title, 236, 237
 Reasonableness of religion, 58,
 R
 Redemption, natural ideas
 about, 32, 165
 —, universal, 166
 Regeneration, 178, 184
 Responsibility, human, 45, 47,
 129, 274
 Resurrection of the body, the,
 102, 185, 186, 295
 —, witness of the, 46, 54
 Revelation, completeness of, 15
 —, exclusiveness of, 17
 —, interpretation of, 18
 —, nature of, 13
 — of the Moral Law, 276
 Righteousness of God, the, 90
 —, supernatural, 117, 123

Roman Pontiff and the definition
of the Church, the, 216, H
Rule of Faith, the, 22, 69

SACRIFICE of Christ, 159, 161
— of Isaac, 131
— in the Old Testament, 138,
158
—, the Christian, 163, 213,
230
Sabellianism, 79, 80, 84
Sanctification, 176
Satan, 107
Satisfaction, 164
Scotist theory of original sin,
123
Scripture, Holy, sufficiency of,
22, 56, 60
Semipelagianism, 170
Sense, all natural knowledge
founded on, 104, 115
Serapion, prayers of, R
Sin, actual, 132
— as lawlessness, 119
—, original, 123
—, the capacity of, 107
Socinianism, 85
Soul, the nature of the, 101, 114
Spirit, the meaning of, 74, 77,
C
—, the disembodied, 101,
187
Substance, the word, 78
Substitution, 165
Sufficiency of proposition, 45,
49, 55, 59, 275
— of Scripture, 22, 56, 60
Sufficient grace, 177, E
Supernatural good, 133
— truths, 28
Synagogue, 193, 207

TAYLOR, Jeremy, on the grace
of Ordination, 259, P

Τέλειος, 243, 289, S
Tertullian, on the minister of
Baptism, 252
—, on the Rule of Faith, 22
—, quoted, 19, 245, 254, M, O
Theodore of Mopsuestia, 146
Theodosius, 216
Theology, the place of, 65-68
Theotokos, the title of, 147
Thomassin, on the Christian
Sacrifice, 162
Thorndike, quoted, 7, 33
Θρησκεία, 265
Tree of Knowledge, the, 113,
118
— of Life, the, 113, 116, 133
Tritheism, 80, 84
Truth of God, the, 108

UNBELIEF, the sin of, 45, 49
Uniformity of nature, 97, 98
Unitarianism, 84, 147
Unity of God, 71-73, 87
— of the Divine Law, 280
Universal redemption, 166
Υπομονή, 295

VICAR of Christ, the, 41
Vicarious offering, 165
Virgin-birth, the, 151
Virtues, natural, 126, 128

WALDEN SIS, B
War, acts of, 132, 287
Will, 89
—, the existence of created,
104, 106
— of Christ, the twofold, 155
Wisdom of God, the, 99
Word, the, 77, 232
—, creation by the, 95, 99
World, the ruin of the, 129
—, salvation of the, 135
Worship, Christian, 281

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

Demy 8vo. 1s. net.

RESERVATION : A Letter to His Grace
the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury.

“A closely-reasoned *résumé* of the whole matter from primitive times down to our own day, and has the merit of dealing fairly and coolly with the arguments that have been and can be urged against Reservation, its use and abuse.”—*Church Times*.

Demy 8vo. 1s. net.

THE ACTS OF UNIFORMITY : Their Scope
and Effect.

“A short essay which deserves the notice of students of ecclesiastical history ; for Mr. Lacey makes his points clearly, and some of them, if not absolutely new, are newly fashioned.”

—*English Historical Review*.

LONDON : RIVINGTONS





33004

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY



A 000 679 775 7

